


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10 March 1983

SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

No. 1261

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INDONESIA

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Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesia 16 Dec 82 p 12

[Article: "Capture of 'Hasan Tiro' Group Dissident"]

[Text] Banda Aceh, ANTARA--Muhamad Mahmud, 36 years of age, who admitted he was the "regional commander" in Peurlak of the Hasan Tiro dissident group (GHT), was captured recently by a unit from Military Region I/Iskandarmuda in Aceh Timur Regency, together with 2 of his followers. Two rifles, an old pistol, hundreds of bullets, several sets of wornout camouflage green clothing, first aid supplies, and a number of documents and other items were confiscated from them.

The commander of Military Region I/Iskandarmuda, Brigadier General Abdurachman, on Wednesday [15 December] declared that the 2 followers of Muhamad Mahmud were respectively Yakub Puteh, 34 years old, and Ismail Hasan, 35 years old. The ambush of Muhamad Mahmud took place on 10 December 1982 and was the result of "Operation Smile," led by Lt Col Jahdi Husin with a team from Task Force B.

Muhamad Mahmud, who admitted he was a Hasan Tiro group "regional commander" when he was ambushed by the unit from Military Region I/Iskandarmuda, was hiding in the home of a widow in Paya Laman Village, Idi Reyeuk District, Aceh Timur. When he heard the gunshots, he hastened out of the house and surrendered.

The commander of the military region declared that as a result of operations against the Hasan Tiro group in Aceh a number of people who identified themselves as GHT "leaders" had previously been captured alive, together with a quantity of evidence, including documents and old weapons, that was seized. By now the GHT has no real strength. Its followers are no more than a small body of men.

The operation undertaken by the military region was helped by the people who provided information on where the GHT followers were hiding in their area.

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CSO: 4213/32

SECURITY OFFICIAL MEETS, DISCUSSES ISSUES WITH IKAPI

Jarkarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 18 Dec 82 pp 1, 5

[Article: "Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces and Commander of Security and Order Command Sudomo: No Prohibition on Writing for Former Communist Detainees As Long As They Do Not Violate Their Written Promises"]

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--There is no prohibition of former Communist detainees [G30S/PKI] writing, as long as their writing does not violate the provisions involving the written promises which they made before they returned to live in society. These promises included a renunciation of political activity, in the sense of re-establishing the Indonesian Communist Party [PKI] and spreading communist thought in Indonesia.

Admiral Sudomo, the deputy commander of the armed forces and commander of the security and order command, made this statement on Friday [17 December] in the course of a meeting with five members of IKAPI (Association of Indonesian Publishers) led by their chairman, Ismid Hadad.

According to Sudomo, the overall view of the government concerning the return to society and supervision of the former Communist detainees involves ensuring that they have jobs and can support themselves. "If we really intend to promote democracy under the Pancasila [five principles of the nation], we will turn into honest citizens even those who have erred, provided those involved show they are aware of this," Sudomo said.

He said that up to now there have been no regulations to determine to what extent a piece of writing is provocative or not. In that connection the IKAPI was asked to make suggestions so that by giving its views there would be general agreement. For example, would it be necessary to regulate this matter in terms of a certain criterion or would it be enough to look at the writings of the former Communist detainees on a case by case basis.

Sudomo touched on two other questions in speaking to the publishers' group. That is, writing not based on facts but opinions, and writings which do not mention the name of the publisher.

For writings which are not supported by facts the publisher is asked to decide the question of whether or not to publish them. Regarding writings which do

not mention the name of the publisher, he hoped that the IKAPI would be able to resolve this question itself.

In addition to engaging in consultations dealing with the publishing sector in Indonesia, the visit of the IKAPI members to Admiral Sudomo was intended to introduce the new leadership of the body, chosen at the 10th congress of the IKAPI.

5170

CSO: 4213/32

INDONESIA

NEW TAX OF 150,000 RUPIAHS LEVIED ON FOREIGN TRIPS

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 20 Dec 82 pp 1, 5

[Article: "Everyone, Including Cabinet Ministers, Required To Pay Tax of 150,000 Rupiahs for Each Trip Abroad"]

[Excerpts] Jakarta, ANTARA--All state employees, including cabinet ministers, civilian officials and members of the armed forces who travel abroad, whether in the course of official business or not, will be required to have a Foreign Tax Statement Letter (SKFLN) and a receipt showing payment of 150,000 rupiahs per person and per trip abroad, effective 18 December 1982.

This provision is also in effect for employees of state-owned enterprises, foreigners who do business in Indonesia, and other Indonesian citizens.

The director general of the tax service, Dr Salamun A. T. on Saturday [18 December] declared that this regulation is based on Presidential Decision No 84 of 1982, dated 18 December 1982.

The presidential decision states that each person traveling abroad will be required to have an SKFLN certificate. Exceptions from the obligation to have an SKFLN certificate will only be given to: members of the diplomatic corps, employees of foreign missions, United Nations staff employees, experts engaged in technical cooperation and staff of international bodies and organizations approved by the Indonesian Government, provided they are not Indonesian citizens, have no other work, and perform no business activity in addition to their official duties.

Also exempted from the regulation are members of the family and non-Indonesian citizen assistants of the foregoing categories: foreign tourists and other foreigners who carry on no business activity and who are in Indonesia for short visits for a period of no more than 6 consecutive months; crews of aircraft and ships which provide air and surface services on international routes; and people employed by Indonesian citizens who are going to work abroad.

In this way members of athletic teams, religious leaders, pilgrims going to Mecca, journalists, members of cultural missions, and people in similar categories who were previously exempted from the payment of departure taxes with an appropriate recommendation, from now on will be required to pay the 150,000 rupiahs foreign travel tax for each person for each trip, Salamun said.

Meanwhile, Minister of Finance Ali Wardhana stated that the payment of the foreign travel tax, in the form of an advance payment of income tax, will be made in airports and harbors and other points of departure for foreign countries.

In reply to a question from ANTARA the director general of the tax service stated that this policy represents an effort by the government to exercise closer control on Indonesian citizens traveling abroad. In that connection the use of foreign exchange needs to be limited and directed more particularly toward programs which are more productive in terms of national development. Since 15 November the government has raised the cost of obtaining an SKFLN certificate from 25,000 to 150,000 rupiahs per person, per trip, in an effort to limit the travel of Indonesian citizens abroad.

Director General Salamun considers that the government policy is a good opportunity for domestic industry to develop.

Meanwhile, an Indonesian who said he has "just enough income to get by or slightly more and has used his money to make purchases in Singapore" said he does this because the quality of goods there, such as clothing, is better than in Indonesia.

"That's not right. In a world which is as much developed as ours, goods are seeking purchasers. Indonesians don't need to buy things abroad. The goods which they want will also be imported into Indonesia, in view of the size and potential of the Indonesian market," Salamun said.

"In this connection the Indonesian domestic industry can make use of this opportunity presented by the smaller number of Indonesians going abroad by keeping in mind quality and production," Salamun added.

During the 1st week of the implementation of the foreign travel tax the number of Indonesian citizens traveling abroad through Halim Perdanakusuma airport in Jakarta declined. The volume of airline passengers, which was usually from 1,500 to 2,000 persons per day, fell drastically by between 40 and 60 percent.

However, by the beginning of December 1982, the flow of passengers through Halim airport began to return to the levels before 15 November 1982. However, the number of those paying the foreign travel tax was still limited because there were still numerous cases of exceptions given to athletic groups, like participants in the Asian Games and government employees on official business.

Data obtained from Regional Office III of the Directorate General of Taxes in Jakarta shows that for the period from 15 November to 15 December 1982 receipts from the SKFLN tax exceeded 3 billion rupiahs.

5170

CSO: 4213/32

JAPANESE BUSINESSMEN HESITANT ABOUT COUNTER PURCHASE SYSTEM

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 8 Dec 82 p 2

[Article: "Japanese Businessmen Hesitate About Counter Purchase System"]

[Text] Japanese businessmen are aware of the importance of the counter purchase trade system now being promoted by Indonesia to increase its non-oil exports. Not all Japanese businessmen, however, approve of the system nor are they willing to assist in its expansion. Moreover, they indirectly deplore Indonesia's policy of reducing log exports and placing limits on trawling operations.

These were the impressions gained at a meeting on Tuesday afternoon [7 December] between the Indonesian KADIN [Chamber of Commerce and Industry], headed by General Chairman Sukamdani Sahid Gitosardjono, and Kansai Keizai Doyukai, a Japanese businessmen's organization for promoting economic development. The Kansai delegation, consisting of 20 businessmen was headed by Shujiro Chatani.

Kazuo Haruna, one of the Kansai directors and also vice president of Marubeni, said Indonesia could export various manufactured and semimanufactured products as well as raw materials to increase its exports to Japan.

However for manufactured products, the possibility of meeting competition from products already available in Japan had to be taken into account, and this was a very big constraint.

What could be increased are raw material exports, but log exports from Indonesia apparently are being cut and moreover are to be halted. It is also true that the halt in trawling operations will reduce shrimp exports to Japan.

Efforts could be made to increase the export of such commodities as sugar, coffee, natural rubber, and other products. However the market for these commodities at this time is not very encouraging.

Hesitating

At this meeting Tony Agus Ardie, vice general chairman of the compartmental sector for foreign relations, budget and finance, education and training, labor and manpower resources, said the Japanese are still hesitating about responding

to the counter purchase system. "Japan is a good partner of Indonesia particularly with respect to business but unfortunately Japan's attitude toward the counter purchase system is unlike those of other nations such as Yugoslavia or France who are for the system," Tony said.

On this occasion Tony also inquired about the flow of technology from Japan which is believed to be less than that from other nations. Yoshikuni Inoue of the Daikin Company responded by saying technological flow can be divided into two types, hardware and software.

There is no problem with hardware and technological flow is easy, but the technological flow of software is problematical, particularly its management, and therefore specialists must be exchanged between Japan and Indonesia in order to have good technological flow.

Cooperation

A. Baramuli, vice general chairman for the compartmental sector for regional building and services, said cooperation is needed between Japanese and Indonesian businessmen because Japan has invested considerable capital in joint ventures with Indonesia.

For instance, we could use cooperation in textiles, Baramuli said. Japan could import textiles from Indonesia. Japan now imports textiles from Korea and Taiwan; therefore, imports from these two countries could be reduced and replaced with textile imports from Indonesia.

Kansai responded by saying that Indonesian textiles would have great competition from South Korea as well as Taiwan because these two nations had 40 years experience in the textile field while Indonesia perhaps had only about 10 years experience in the field.

6804
CSO: 4213/29

FINANCE MINISTER DISCUSSES POOR ECONOMY

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 13 Dec 82 pp 1, 12

[Article: "Finance Minister on Economic Difficulties; Public Continues To Be Given Hints and Preparation; Although Funds Are Limited New Projects Will Be Carried Out"]

[Text] The Indonesian public is continually being given hints about and being prepared to face economic difficulties in the coming days. Conversely, the public is being urged to maintain its economic activities so that the effects of the world recession do not further worsen the economic situation.

These hints were first offered at the end of last year by Finance Minister Ali Wardhana who hinted that the public should further "tighten their belts" and this was followed by hints from other ministers particularly toward the end of this year. The situation was further clarified by Widjojo Nitisastro, MENKO [minister coordinator] for EKUIN [Economics, Financial and Industrial Affairs] concurrently chairman of BAPPENAS [National Development Planning Board], during a working meeting with the APBN [Estimate of State Expenditures and Income] Commission on Friday morning [10 December] and with parliament's Commission X that evening.

"We must be realists in facing the fact that there are economic problems. We must not minimize these problems, but they need not make us apprehensive and we need not dramatize them," he said.

Indonesia has faced economic problems a number of times and has been able to overcome them. The economic situation was very difficult in 1966-67 and also in 1972 when there was a food crisis. Also in 1975 when we had only \$500 million in foreign exchange reserves. "But no announcement was made then of these problems. So if we didn't know about it, we weren't hurt by it. Yes, we were apprehensive, but only a few persons were apprehensive," the MENKO EKUIN remarked on Friday evening in parliament. (The PERTAMINA [National Oil and Natural Gas Company] crisis peaked in 1975--editor.)

The choices we face now, of course, are hard. The economy certainly is heading downward or sharply declining. Prices are rising if they are controlled and skyrocketing when they are not controlled. Professor Widjojo repeated this on Friday before both the APBN Commission and Commission X.

Indonesia's economic growth rate in the decade of the 1970's was high, even 9.5 percent in 1980. Without giving any figures, Professor Widjojo hinted that the growth rate for this year and next year will not be as high. But in a situation such as this we must continue to try to maintain a high rate of economic activity. With a high rate of economic activity the world economic recession will not seriously affect the Indonesian economy.

Toward this end, activities in the economic sector must be increased because the majority of such activities are in the agricultural sector and the greater part of the Indonesian population depends on agriculture. In the world economy which is beset with problems, Indonesia is still fortunate because rice production is increasing at a high enough rate. In earlier years the increase was only 3.5 to 4 percent but in 1980 rice production increased by 13 percent, in 1981 it rose by 10 percent, and it also increased in 1982. "The increase is estimated at 7 percent. It could be lower, 5 or 6 percent, but it could also be 7.5 percent," he added.

It is important to increase food production not only to meet the population's food requirements, create job opportunities, and to save foreign exchange because food imports are declining but also because increased food production can create markets for the industrial sector.

Professor Widjojo also said this still was not enough. "More stimulation must be given to other economic activities."

He admitted foreign exchange revenue from oil was not as great as it had been in previous years. Therefore foreign exchange must be used selectively and tighter priorities must be drawn for the expenditure of APBN funds. These points were repeatedly stressed by the MENKO EKUIN.

The people's economic activities to date still very much depend on the size of the government budget. Therefore Professor Widjojo cautioned his audience several times that APBN funds would be very limited in the future. Every expenditure for fiscal 1984 is now being carefully scrutinized and analyzed. "Why is it needed? If it is needed, is it needed now or can it be postponed? If it cannot be postponed, must the expenditure be this big or can it be smaller? These are very urgent questions because funds are limited!" he remarked.

In this connection also projects to be built in the coming fiscal year are being scrutinized more carefully. However the MENKO EKUIN said this does not mean that no new projects will be built.

Projects which have been started and are under construction will be continued; they may not be left uncompleted. "Perhaps they may not be completed as rapidly as had been earlier planned," he added.

However, new projects which support other projects now under construction will be carried out. For instance, for the Cengkareng airport project a road is needed from Jakarta to that site. That project has not yet been constructed but it must be constructed.

Similarly for other projects which are included in priority programs. For instance, the construction of SLTP's [First Level Continuation Schools] which will include a program for setting up training facilities. If construction of an SLTP building in one subdistrict is completed, the project will be continued in another subdistrict because it is included in a priority program. "This is a new project," Professor Widjojo said.

Projects such as potable water supplies for subdistrict capitals and rural electrification will also be continued especially if domestic equipment or equipment purchased abroad has already been furnished. If export credit funds have been allocated so that rupiah funds must be allocated, the project also will be completed. "One cannot say that new projects are not needed," Widjojo said.

However, he also cautioned project chiefs carefully to calculate construction costs for their projects in the coming budget year because of the limited funding. Project chiefs usually request more funds than they need to ensure that project costs are covered. If inquiries are made, they always say they need more money. "But ask yourselves, how much of the construction budget funds will be left over?" Professor Widjojo said.

Each project chief is being asked to set limits on his funding request. "If they are provided with a great deal of money and it is unexpended--if there is a big surplus--this is regrettable!" There may be another much needed project which cannot be accomplished because it cannot be budgeted. Just request what you need so that the surplus will not be too big," the MENKO EKUIN said.

6804
CSO: 4213/29

FOOD CRITICAL AREAS PINPOINTED IN 12 PROVINCES

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 18 Dec 82 p 1

[Article: "65 Districts in 12 Provinces Face Food Shortage"]

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--Of the 27 provinces in Indonesia 12 provinces have been declared food critical areas. In the 12 provinces 65 districts have been declared seriously short of food. This is the result of a survey obtained by KOMPAS yesterday [17 December] concerning areas short of food throughout Indonesia.

The survey, which was carried out by a number of government services, including the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Health, indicated that there are 12 food critical areas in Indonesia: West Sumatra, South Sumatra, Lampung, West Java, Central Java, East Java, West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi.

Seven indicators were used to identify the food critical areas: (1) the poverty level based on the availability of nine basic items; (2) the drought situation based on the relative failure of the food harvest (e.g., dried up ricefields); (3) the balance of production and consumption of carbohydrates measured per capita per year and based on the total equivalent production of rice per year per capita; (4) the drought situation in terms of estate production based on the percentage of dead trees; (5) the nutritional state of children below the age of five, based on the percentage of such children whose nutritional state is inadequate or bad; (6) natural disasters based on the frequency of such chronic events per year in each province; (7) the ratio of land ownership of less than 0.25 hectares per family in Java and less than 0.5 hectares outside Java.

In the 12 food critical provinces previously mentioned there are 65 districts which have been declared seriously short of food. However, the KOMPAS source was not able to identify them by name. In order to help them, transmigration programs may be developed, concentrated public works programs may be undertaken, and other programs are still being considered.

Previously, surveys of food critical areas were undertaken separately by the respective government ministries. However, from now on the survey will be conducted in an organized way by the various ministries involved.

INDONESIA

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON INDONESIAN PERSONALITIES

[Unless otherwise noted, the following information on Indonesian personalities has been extracted from Indonesian language sources published in Jakarta.]

VICE ADM MOHAMAD ROMLI--On Saturday morning [4 December] at the State Palace President Soeharto administered the oath of office and installed Vice Adm Mohamad Romli in his new duties as chief of staff of the Indonesian Navy. Vice Adm Mohamad Romli replaced Vice Adm Waluyo Sugito in this position. The installation in office and the administration of the oath were witnessed by Vice Admiral Prasodjohadi (commanding general of the Armed Forces Staff and Commando School) and Lieutenant General Sumantri, assistant for personnel affairs in the Ministry of Defense and Security. Also attending the ceremony were members of the cabinet and other high-ranking officials of the government.

The new navy chief of staff, Vice Adm Mohamad Romli, was previously chief of the operations staff in the Ministry of Defense and Security, a position he held since 1978. He was born in Tulungagung, East Java, on 8 December 1928. He completed his nonmilitary education during three very different periods of history: during the Dutch colonial period, during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, and after Indonesia obtained its independence.

In 1946 Romli joined the navy section of the BKR (People's Security Body) and during the independence war he served as a guerrilla in the mountains and in the jungle. His training in the navy only began in 1954 when he attended an Indonesian Marine Corps training course. He also underwent navigation training in Poland.

His assignments as an officer began on the Indonesian Navy ship "Amahai." In 1965 he served as assistant for operations in the Mandala Siaga Strategic Command during the period of Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia.

In 1967 Romli was a student in the second class at the Navy Staff and Command School, and in 1968 he was assigned as a "caretaker" on the "Ampera Lines" [as published; not otherwise explained].

Before becoming chief of the operations staff in the Ministry of Defense and Security Vice Admiral Romli was fifth assistant to the navy chief of staff,

commander of the navy section of the Armed Forces Staff and Command School, and deputy chief of staff of the navy.

Vice Adm Romli is known as a "low profile" officer and lives simply. [Excerpts] [Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 4 Dec 82 p 1] 5170

AIR MARSHAL SUKARDI--On Saturday morning [4 December] at the State Palace President Soeharto administered the oath of office and installed Air Marshal Sukardi in his new duties as chief of staff of the Indonesian Air Force. Air Marshal Sukardi replaced Air Marshal Ashadi Tjahyadi in this position. The installation in office and the administration of the oath were witnessed by Vice Admiral Prasodjohdi (commanding general of the Armed Forces Staff and Command School) and Lieutenant General Sumantri, assistant for personnel affairs in the Ministry of Defense and Security. Also attending the ceremony were members of the cabinet and other high-ranking officials of the government.

Air Marshal Sukardi was born in Bojonegoro, East Java, on 30 December 1931. He entered flight training school in 1952 and in 1954 was assigned as a pilot to a squadron based at Husein Sastranegara Air Force Base in Bandung. Four years later, in 1958, Sukardi was promoted to flight instructor in Squadron 2 at Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base in Jakarta. In 1960 he became a flight instructor in Training Wing 001 at Adisucipto Air Force Base. He became commander of Squadron 2 in Operations Wing 001 at Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base in Jakarta in 1963. In 1965 he was made assistant director of foreign stores [pengadaan luar negri] at air force headquarters. In 1966 he became chief of the Bureau of Purchases and Materiel Stores at air force headquarters in Jakarta. In 1967 he received the additional assignment as an instructor at Air Force Unit Command School in Jakarta.

He had been assigned to additional duties as commander of Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base in 1963, and in 1970 he was assigned as commander of Air Region VII--Maluki/Irian Jaya. He became commander of Air Region V in Jakarta in 1973 and was assistant for operations in the Ministry of Defense and Security in 1975. In 1977 he became deputy commander of Defense Area II--Java-Madura-and Nusatenggara.

His last position before being promoted to air force chief of staff was that of commander of the National Strategic Command. Air Marshal Sukardi graduated from senior high school [SMA] in 1951 and entered the air force, becoming an air force second lieutenant in 1953.

He has been awarded 16 service medals and decorations, including the Swa Buana Paksa Nararya Star, the Sapta Marga Medal [service against PRRI/Permesta rebels in 1958-59], and the Seroja Medal. [Excerpts] [Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 4 Dec 82 pp 1, 12] 5170

POLICE MAJ GEN ANTON SUDJARWO--On Saturday morning [4 December] at the State Palace President Soeharto administered the oath of office and installed Police Maj Gen Anton Sudjarwo in his new duties as chief of the Indonesian Police.

Major General Sudjarwo replaces Maj Gen Awaluddin Djamin. The installation in office and administration of the oath were witnessed by Vice Admiral Prasodjo-hadi (commanding general of the Armed Forces Staff and Command School) and Lieutenant General Sumantri, assistant for personnel affairs in the Ministry of Defense and Security. Also attending the ceremony were members of the cabinet and other high-ranking officials of the government.

Police Maj Gen Anton Sudjarwo was born in Bandung on 21 September 1930. He graduated from senior high school [SMA] at Magelang, Central Java, in 1952. In 1954 he attended Police Inspectors School at Sukabumi [West Java]. In 1960 he went through "Ranger" training at Porong, East Java, followed by infantry training in 1961 in the United States. In 1968 he attended the regular Police Staff and Command School in Lembang, West Java. In 1969 he attended a jump master training course at Sukasari.

From 1954 to 1956 he was chief of police of the Palopo area in South Sulawesi with the rank of police inspector. In 1956 he was adjutant to the first chief of the Indonesian Police, Police Gen Raden Said Soekanto Tjokrodiatmodjo. From 1956 to 1957 he was chief of Traffic Police in Ujung Pandang [Sulawesi] with the rank of police inspector class I. Later he became a member of the staff of the Organizational Bureau of Police Headquarters (in the Foreign Relations Section) with the rank of police inspector class I and assistant commissioner of police.

From 1959 to 1961 he was commander of "Ranger" Company 5959 of the Mobile Brigade with the rank of assistant commissioner of police. From 1962 to 1964 he was commander of the Scout Battalion of the Mobile Brigade. From 1964 to 1972 he was commander of the Scout Regiment.

In 1971 he was assigned to additional duties as first commander of the Harbor Security Command at Tanjung Priok. From 1972 to 1974 he was commander of District Command 102 in Malang [East Java] with the rank of Senior Commissioner. After that he was successively commander of the Mobile Brigade, chief of Police Region XI--West Kalimantan, Chief of Police Region II--North Sumatra. From 1972 to 1982 he was chief of police of metropolitan Jakarta with the rank of police brigadier general and then police major general. [Excerpts] [Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 4 Dec 82 pp 1, 12] 5170

AIR VICE MARSHAL ROESMAN--The post of commander of the National Strategic Command (KOSTRANAS) will be turned over by the former incumbent, Air Marshal Sukardi, to his replacement Air Vice Marshal Roesman, sources at air force headquarters stated on Wednesday [8 December]. Air Vice Marshal Roesman is now assistant for operations to the air force chief of staff, while Air Marshal Sukardi was installed in office last Saturday [4 December] as the new air force chief of staff, replacing Air Chief Marshal Ashadi Tjahjadi. Air Vice Marshal Roesman, a pilot, has served as governor of the Air Section of the Indonesian Armed Forces adademy and as chief of staff of KOSTRANAS. [Excerpt] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 9 Dec 82 p 1] 5170

AIR VICE MARSHAL OETOMO--Sources at air force headquarters stated on Wednesday [8 December] that the post of deputy chief of staff of the air force will be

transferred from the former incumbent, Air Marshal Alamsyah, to his replacement, Air Vice Marshal Oetomo, who is now deputy commander of Defense Area I in Medan. The transfer of the office of deputy air force chief of staff will take place during the week of 3 December in Jakarta. [Excerpt] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 9 Dec 82 p 1] 5170

GEN WIDJOJO SOEJONO--At a ceremony held in the auditorium of the Ministry of Defense and Security on 4 December Gen Widjojo Soejono, chief of staff of the Security and Order Command [KOPKAMTIB], turned over his duties to the commander of KOPKAMTIB, Admiral Sudomo, prior to retiring from the Indonesian army, in which he has served for 37 years. Gen Widjojo Soejono was installed in office as chief of staff of KOPKAMTIB on 27 December 1980, replacing Gen Yoga Sugomo. It is not yet known who will fill the position of chief of staff of KOPKAMTIB or what Gen Widjojo Soejono's future plans are. [Excerpt] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 5 Dec 82 pp 1, 12] 5170

POLICE BRIGADIER GENERAL SUDJOKO--Police Brigadier General Sudjoko will be assigned as chief of the police area of metropolitan Jakarta. He replaces Police Maj Gen Anton Sudjarwo, who has been installed in office as chief of the Indonesian Police. The transfer of the office of chief of the police area of metropolitan Jakarta will be held on Wednesday [8 December]. Brigadier General Sudjoko's previous post was that of chief of Police Region VI--South Sumatra. Previously, he had been chief of the police region in Maluku, director of university student affairs in the Ministry of Education and Culture, and deputy assistant for intelligence at police headquarters. Dr Sudjoko is known as a smooth, well-mannered police officer. In appearance he has always been sympathetic, particularly when he was chief of police in central Jakarta and he had the duty of breaking up meetings and discussions of university students and other young people. [Excerpt] [Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 6 Dec 82 p 1] 5170

POLICE MAJOR GENERAL PAMUDJI--Police Gen Awaloedin Djamin approached the end of his active service on Friday [10 December] and installed in office and witnessed the assumption of duty by the deputy chief of Indonesian police, Police Major General Pamudji (54 years old). Pamudji replaces Police Lt Gen Sabar Kumbino, who has become a member of the DPR/MPR [Parliament/People's Consultative Assembly]. Previously, Police Major General Pamudji had been chief of Police Region X/East Java. [Excerpt] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 11 Dec 82 p 1] 5170

POLICE CHANGES OF ASSIGNMENT--In the near future there will be a large-scale change of police assignments. The posts involved include 14 out of the 17 chiefs of police region, 4 out of the 6 assistant chiefs of Indonesian police, 2 out of the 3 posts of commanding general of police services, and the position of police inspector general. According to information obtained by KOMPAS, the installation in office of the deputy chief of Indonesian police, the inspector general, the assistant chiefs of Indonesian police, and the commanding generals will take place on 10 December at police headquarters at a ceremony presided over by Police Gen Awaloedin Djamin, the former chief of Indonesian police. The exchange of office of chief of Indonesian police will take place on Saturday, 11 December. The posts of chiefs of police region will be

transferred in the respective area headquarters by Police Maj Gen Anton Sudjarwo, the new chief of Indonesian police.

The 14 regional police posts which will be transferred include the following: chief of Police Region I/Aceh, from Police Brig Gen Pudi Syamsudin to Police Col Syafarudin Datuk Sutan Sampurno. Col Syafarudin had previously been chief of staff of Police Region III/West Sumatra.

Chief of Police Region II/North Sumatra, from Police Brigadier General Hoedioro to Police Brigadier General Sunaryo, who previously had been commander of the central criminal research unit in police headquarters.

Chief of Police Region III/West Sumatra, from Police Brigadier General Sutopo to Police Brig Gen Pudi Syamsudin.

Chief of Police Region IV/Riau Archipelago, from Police Brig Gen Bobby Rachman to Police Brigadier General Sudadi, who had previously been deputy assistant for community relations to the chief of Indonesian police.

Chief of Police Region V/West Kalimantan, from Police Brigadier General Haryono to Police Col Anton Sabar, who had previously been chief of staff of Police Region VI/South Sumatra.

Chief of Police Region VI/South Sumatra, from Police Brigadier General Soedjoko to Police Brigadier General Jusuf, who was previously chief of Police Region XVII/Irian Jaya.

Chief of Police Region VII/Metropolitan Jakarta, from Police Maj Gen Anton Sudjarwo to Police Brigadier General Soedjoko, who had previously been chief of Police Region VI/South Sumatra.

Chief of Police Region X/East Java, from Police Major General Pamudji to Police Brigadier General Sudarmadji, who had previously been chief of Police Region XI/Nusa Tenggara. Pamudji will later be appointed as deputy chief of Indonesian police.

Chief of Police Region XI/Nusa Tenggara, from Police Brigadier General Sudarmadji to Police Brig Gen A. Djuaeni, who had previously been chief of the general secretariat of Indonesian police.

Chief of Police Region XII/East Kalimantan, from Police Brig Gen Azhar Kasim to Police Brig Gen Darmawan Sudarsono, who had previously been chief of the central police information service.

Chief of Police Region XIII/South Kalimantan, from Police Brigadier General Istambah to Police Brigadier General Sanusi, who had previously been chief of staff in the police education and training development command.

Chief of Police Region XIV/South and Southeast Sulawesi, from Police Brigadier General Suhardiman to Police Brigadier General Satoto, who had previously been

chief of staff of Police Region IX/Central Java. Suhardiman is being assigned to police headquarters, and it is expected that he will be assigned abroad as an ambassador.

Chief of Police Region XV/North and Central Sulawesi, from Police Brig Gen Jansen Ibrahim Silaen to Police Brig Gen Bobby Rachman, who had previously been chief of Police Region IV/Riau Archipelago.

Chief of Police Region XVII/Irian Jaya, from Police Brigadier General Jusuf to Police Colonel Suwarso, who had previously been chief of staff of Police Region XVII/Irian Jaya.

Among the positions of assistant chief of Indonesian police which will be transferred are the following:

Assistant for operations, from Police Maj Gen Suradi Permana to Police Brigadier General Sianturi, who had previously been deputy assistant for intelligence.

Assistant for personnel, from Police Major General Sukrisno to Police Major General Kaffandi, who had previously been commanding general of the Research Command.

Assistant for plans and budget, from Police Major General Rahardjo to Police Brigadier General Suwarno, who had previously been deputy assistant for plans and budget.

Assistant for community relations, from Police Brig Gen Chaerudin Nitikusuma to Police Brigadier General Hoedioro, who had previously been chief of Police Region II/North Sumatra. Chaerudin will be temporarily assigned as a senior office in police headquarters.

Regarding the positions of commanding general, the post of commanding general of the Samapta Bhayangkara Command will be transferred from Police Major General Afandi to Police Brig Gen Azhar Kasim, who was previously chief of Police Region XIII/East Kalimantan. Afandi has become a member of the DPR/MPR [Parliament/People's Consultative Assembly].

Commanding general of the Research Command, from Police Major General Kafandi to Police Brig Gen Jansen Ibrahim Silaen, who was previously chief of Police Region XV/Central Sulawesi.

The post of police inspector general will be transferred from the former incumbent, Police Maj Gen Tjoek Suyono, to Police Maj Gen Suradi Permana, who was previously assistant for operations in the Indonesian police.

According to KOMPAS source, there are a number of deputy assistant positions which remain unfilled, such as deputy assistant for operations, deputy assistant for plans and budget, the commander of the central criminal research unit in police headquarters, the chief of the police information service, and the chief of the general secretariat staff. According to the SUMBER source, all of these positions will be filled by the new chief of Indonesian police.
[Text] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 8 Dec 82 pp 1, 12] 5170

THREE FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTORS--Three new directors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were installed in office by the director general for political affairs, Munawir Sjadzali, last Tuesday [30 November]. They include the following: Mohamad Hasan (58 years old) as director for American affairs. He replaces the former incumbent, Akosah, who has been appointed Indonesian ambassador to Bulgaria. Prior to this assignment Mohamad Hasan had been Indonesian ambassador to East Germany. Dr John Muzhar (50 years old) as director for African and Middle East affairs, replacing Abdurrahman Gunadirdjo, who has been appointed Indonesian ambassador to Iraq. Muzhar, who began his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1957, had previously been chief of the Indonesian Mission in Saudi Arabia. Dr Petronella M. Luhulima as director of international treaty affairs, replacing Dr Zahar Arifin, who has been appointed Indonesian ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Dr Petronella Luhulima, who graduated from Foreign Service Academy in 1957 and is a 1962 graduate from the Faculty of Law of the University of Indonesia, had previously been minister counselor at the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore. From 1962 to 1963 she had been assigned to the Indonesian Mission working with UNTEA [United Nations Temporary Administration] in Irian Barat. Later she served as an Indonesian diplomat in Bern (Switzerland), the Netherlands, the Permanent Indonesian Mission to United Nations Organizations in Geneva, and first secretary at the Indonesian Embassy in Mexico. [Text] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 3 Dec 82 p 12] 5170

AMBASSADOR AKOSAH--The Bulgarian Government has given its agreement to the appointment of Akosah as Indonesian ambassador to the country. This was announced by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Wednesday [17 November]. Ambassador Akosah, who was born in Cimahi [West Java] on 16 September 1928, replaces the former incumbent, Ambassador Joost Olivier Rotty, who had completed his tour of duty. After graduating from the Foreign Service Academy in 1954 Ambassador Akosah was assigned to duty in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His first assignment abroad, from 1956 to 1959, was in the Indonesian Embassy in India, with the rank of attaché. He was later promoted to third secretary. His last previous assignment abroad was as deputy chief of mission with the rank of minister in the Indonesian Embassy in Tokyo (1976-79). Since 1981 he has served as director for American affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Text] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 18 Nov 82 p 12] 5170

CSO: 4213/30

AIR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICIAL DISCUSSES PIONEER FLIGHTS

Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 10 Dec 82 p 10

[Article: "600 Airstrips Are Built Privately; Several Pioneer Fields Will Be Upgraded to Commercial Fields"]

[Text] About 600 "airstrips" capable of handling small aircraft have been built by private business in the east Indonesian region in addition to the 88 pioneer airfields which have been built there by the government.

On Thursday [9 December] Arief Budiman, chief of the planning and control section of the air communications facilities development and pioneer flight safety project of the Air Communications Directorate General, disclosed at the Communications Department that these 600 airstrips generally were built by those in the lumber business or PERTAMINA [National Oil and Natural Gas Company] contractors and by church missions for their own needs. About 250, the majority of these airstrips, he said, are located in Irian Jaya and the rest are found in Kalimantan and Maluku.

Regional governments have also built a number of pioneer airfields but some of these are still unprofitable. Budiman cited as an example the pioneer airfield at Sumenep in Madura which was built with APBD [regional budget] funds to provide better transportation to tourists coming over to watch the bull races. To date, however, it has not been used commercially.

It now takes 3 1/2 hours to go from Sumenep to Surabaya by bus so MNA [Merpati Nusantara Airlines] will lose money if it must keep an airplane in Surabaya solely to serve Sumenep. However it is now planned to also serve Bawean Island so one aircraft can serve several places on the same trip, he added.

The same is true for Mopait Airfield in Bolang Mongondow, North Sulawesi, because it takes only 2 hours to get from there to Menado by land. The aircraft, therefore, has no passengers.

During the Christmas season MNA plans to fly to Mopait regularly. This plan is tied to the routine flight to Gorontalo which rightly should be served by two flights at this time.

Budiman said pioneer flights are intended to free remote areas with sparse population from isolation--areas that are reached with difficulty by land. He said air transport has the advantages of speed, need for little infrastructure, and flexibility and is most suitable for areas with little population and difficult terrain.

It has its weaknesses in that door-to-door service cannot be provided and capital is required to provide further transportation to enable passengers to reach their destinations.

In this connection, Budiman said, while MNA has a monopoly on pioneer flights there are still too few passengers on a number of routes, and it has been forced to turn over this monopoly right to private airlines that own small aircraft with a 9-passenger capacity.

These private companies are SMAC for the Sumatra area, DAS [Dirgantara Air Service] for Kalimantan and Bali Air which also serves the western portion of Kalimantan. Merpati at this time is only operating aircraft with a 19-passenger capacity, the Twin Otter and the Cassa-220 aircraft.

Beginning with PELITA IV [fourth 5-year development plan], Budiman said, larger aircraft will be used, namely the CN-235 which has a 35-passenger capacity, and only requires a 900-meter-long runway. These flights, however, will no longer be handled as pioneer flights but rather as commercial flights.

Toward this end the government during PELITA IV will immediately upgrade a number of pioneer airfields to commercial fields, including those at Toli-Toli (in Central Sulawesi), Gunung Sitoli (in North Sumatra), Sampit (in West Kalimantan), and Luwuk (in Central Sulawesi), he added.

To aid MNA in carrying out its pioneer airlines mission, Budiman said, the government had given the airline a 20-billion rupiah subsidy especially for aircraft and several more billions to cover the cost of transporting its fuel.

6804
CSO: 4213/29

INDONESIA

NEW DOMESTIC OIL REFINERIES AFFECT SINGAPORE BUSINESS

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 18 Dec 82 p 2

[Article: "Singapore Steadily Losing Indonesian Oil Business"]

[Text] Singapore, Thursday [16 December]--PERTAMINA [State Oil and Gas Corporation] has informed oil refining companies in Singapore that Indonesian purchases of oil products, including diesel fuel and kerosene, will be reduced by nearly 60 percent in 1983.

According to HARIAN STRAITS TIMES, the Singapore oil refineries will also receive contracts for refining Indonesian crude oil for only the 1st quarter of 1983. Usually, at the end of the year PERTAMINA holds discussions on a new contract valid for 1 year.

Because of this development the Singapore oil industry is afraid that business with Indonesia will "dry up" in 1983. At the time discussions were begun for a new contract last month PERTAMINA signaled its willingness to discuss a new contract for refining Indonesian crude oil in Singapore which would be valid until the middle of 1983 (6 months). For the expansion of Indonesian refineries with a capacity of 200,000 barrels per day will only be completed and in operation by about July 1983.

The Cilacap oil refinery will have a throughput of 160,000 barrels per day of crude oil which has been refined in Singapore for the last few years.

A Singapore oil refinery executive interpreted the desire of PERTAMINA to enter into contracts only for the 1st quarter of 1983 as a sign that PERTAMINA hopes to be able to operate the expanded Cilacap oil refinery even earlier: perhaps by April.

The expansion of the Balikpapan oil refinery, with a output of 200,000 barrels per day, will be completed by the end of 1983. If this refinery also goes into operation, Singapore will no longer refine Indonesian crude oil.

5170
CSO: 4213/32

BRIEFS

NURTANIO PRODUCTION, PROFITS--B.J. Habibie, minister for research and technology, speaking before the Ria Pembangunan organization wives, which is headed by Mrs Tien Suharto and Mrs Nelly Adam Malik, explained that in 1982 PT Industri Pesawat Terbang Nurtanio made a 10.5 billion rupiah profit and turned over 45 percent of this profit to the national treasury. He explained further that Nurtanio had received hundreds of domestic and foreign aircraft orders in 1982. In detail he said that 129 orders were received for the NC-212 aviocar but only 49 were realized and the remaining 80 are still under construction. In addition to those required by our armed forces--the army, navy, air force and search and rescue--NBO-105 helicopters have been ordered by Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Singapore. Seven of the 80 puma SA-300's/Super Puma AS-332 helicopters ordered were realized. Nurtanio received a total of 104 orders for the ON-235 from the Indonesian Air Force, Deraya Air Service, Merpati Nusantara Airlines, Argentina and Liberia, and Aviaco of TransEuropa. In the first years of its existence, the company experienced losses, nevertheless, investment rose to 26.9 billion rupiahs in 1977 and 32 billion rupiahs in 1978, rising further to 103.28 billion rupiahs in 1981. In addition Nurtanio had provided many jobs for relatively young people, those between 20 and 23 years of age. [Text] [Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 7 Dec 82 p 9] 6804

SCIENTIFIC ROCKETS LAUNCHED--Four scientific rockets, made at the National Aviation and Space Agency (LAPAN), were launched perfectly in early December from the LAPAN rocket launching station in Cilauteureun, Pameungpeuk, South Garut, West Java. The 4.03-meter-long scientific rockets which were launched at a 75° inclination, achieved a height of 40 kilometers. These successful launchings are also a gift to LAPAN on its 19th anniversary which was celebrated on 27 November. The first rocket of this launch contained scientific instruments such as an accelerometer and a sun sensor. Both of these instruments provide information on the rocket's pass and on the behavior of the rocket during its flight. Other rockets contained meteorological sensors which measured air pressure and temperature as they rose. At the 35th second after "Go," the instruments separated from the rockets and returned to earth by parachute. All scientific instruments including the separation system were designed by young LAPAN scientists. For the first time an outside element, the Indonesian Amateur Radio Organization (ORARI), participated in viewing the launching to take part in joint monitoring. Scientific data broadcast by the instruments on radio frequency 146.5 Mhz could be heard clearly by ORARI receiving stations in Bandung, Sukabumi, Jakarta, Cirebon, Yogyakarta, Salatiga,

Palembang, Lampung, and Pontianak. Data obtained both from these stations and LAPAN receivers at the launching site will be analyzed for entry into meteorological data for the stratosphere. For these purposes LAPAN hopes that all ORARI receiving stations that recorded data will send such data to LAPAN, giving their respective call signs, names, and addresses. The very real cooperation between LAPAN and ORARI will be increased in subsequent launchings. Several members of this organization will take part in planning scientific instruments (the payload) to be sent up in another launching phase. [Text]
[Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 9 Dec 82 p 8] 6804

FRETILIN LEADER IMPRISONED IN ANGOLA--A man who calls himself "defense minister of the government-in-exile of East Timor" is being held in jail in Angola, accused of smuggling diamonds. This was reported by REUTERS from Lisbon on Thursday [16 December], quoting a Portuguese news agency. According to the Portuguese news agency, which in turn quoted diplomatic sources, Roberio Lobato was arrested in Luanda, capital of Angola, 5 months ago. The Portuguese news agency did not provide further details. However, Angolan officials stated publicly that strong action would be taken against diamond smuggling, as diamonds are the principal export of that country. Rogerio Lobato's brother, Nicolau Lobato, was the leader of the separatist movement, "Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor" (FRETILIN), which proclaimed a short-lived republic in the Portuguese colony before it was integrated into Indonesia in 1976. Nicolau was killed in the subsequent fighting. It is reported that Rogerio Lobato made a trip in 1981 to African countries that had formerly been Portuguese colonies, in an effort to obtain support for FRETILIN. [Text] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 21 Dec 82 p 12] 5170

CSO: 4213/32

PARTY CHIEF HAILS FIRST TAXES PAID IN VIENTIANE MONG DISTRICTS

Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 31 Dec 82 p 2

/Article by Viengkham Thanousai: "Vientiane Province Happily Pays Agricultural Taxes" /

/Excerpts/ Vientiane Province buses carried cadres, workers, this writer and office equipment which is the inheritance of the propaganda, broadcasting, training and cultural service of Vientiane Province, to the Pak Cheng area, Tholakhom District. This is a temporary place to stay in order to get ready to start building the new permanent site for the province /capital/ in Tha Lat according to the resolution of the party central committee politburo and the administrative committee of Vientiane Province on 20 December 1982.

The rural Lao Soung people in Hom and Saisomboun Districts, in particular, were all awakened and happily paid agricultural taxes for the first time in line with their sacred duty. In Hom District alone there were 69,993 tons of agricultural taxes and 120 tons of rice sales. Saisomboun District's agricultural taxes and rice purchases was over 10 tons. Thus, the total of agricultural rice that had already been stored in warehouses was 1413,449 tons; there were 883,995 tons of rice sales and exchanges.

On this occasion I also met Comrade Boungnang Sisombong, secretary of the Hom District party committee, who took part in the first year's agricultural taxes. He said that the aim of paying agricultural taxes this time was to accumulate capital for the government so it could take care of cadres, soldiers, and workers who are its beloved children. Another reason is for the party and government to use it in many different construction works, e.g., hospitals, schools, stores, etc., and to push forward production and development in the country, Hom District in particular and Vientiane Province in general, to be prosperous in the future.

At the closing meeting Comrade Thongdam Manivan, secretary of the provincial party committee and also chairman of the administrative committee of Vientiane Province, wholeheartedly praised all cadres and government employees who determinedly and tirelessly mobilized the people to emulate each other and correctly carried out the agricultural tax policy. He also wholeheartedly praised farmers in this province, especially the Lao Soung nationality in Hom and Saisomboun Districts, for their awakening, their patriotism, their love for the new socialist regime, and their deep understanding of the Lao people's duty in the new regime. Together they were awakened to actively pay

agricultural taxes and to sell their rice to the government in this first phase. After that Comrade Thongdam Manivan introduced the detailed plan and direction to continuously organize and carry out agricultural taxes from now on, such as to continue mobilizing and leading the people to correctly carry out the policy of agricultural taxes and rice sales to the government based on their income and the actual situation in each locality, and also to check and learn of the outstanding cantons, villages and persons in paying taxes and selling rice to the government, along with this it organized, hailed, and attentively carried out national defense and mass-style public security. This is to destroy and defeat all tricks of the imperialists, the Beijing expansionists, and other reactionaries in all cases in a timely fashion. In order to carry out this work well, first of all, we must accelerate the construction of political bases, construct new rural areas to become socialist outposts, encourage and expand dry season production such as dry season rice growing, and grow a lot of crops in order to honorably take part in building Vientiane Province to be steadily strong and fit to be the location of the capital, the heart of the new truly socialist regime.

9884
CSO: 4206/44

1982 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, TAX COLLECTION, RENEWAL OF CO-OP DRIVE NOTED

Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 1 Jan 83 p 2

Article: "1982 Achievement in Economic and Socio-Cultural Construction"

Excerpts Although agriculture was faced with a drought in the early season, because of the effort and decisive leadership of the various levels of party committees the harvest was fairly good. The total rice production this year was over 1.1 million tons. It is one percent less than that of 1981 by comparison. Crops in 4 provinces were damaged from 5 to 10 percent: Savannakhet, Khammouan, Vientiane, and Sayaboury. The outcome in 4 other provinces, Champassak, Saravane, Attapeu, and Oudomsai, was good. Rice purchasing and agricultural taxes was 88,000 tons over last year's by comparison.

Along with rice growing the mutliethnic peoples also put their energy into emulating each other to widely grow secondary crops. The coffee harvest in 1982 was 17.6 percent over that of 1981; soy beans, 22.34 percent; cotton, 5.10 percent; peanuts, 16.22 percent; and tobacco, 18.44 percent over 1981. Meanwhile, animal husbandry was also outstandingly expanded when compared with 1980: buffalo increased by 5.15 percent; oxen, 5.77 percent; pigs, 17.07 percent; sheep and goats, 14.45 percent; and poultry, 27.41 percent. The medicine production for animal treatment has doubled when compared with that for 1981.

Irrigation is considered a central task of agriculture. Last year, the people of all races nationwide attentively constructed and repaired small irrigation ditches by using on-site materials. For medium-sized irrigation ditches we paid attention to where electric pumping machines were available. Twelve projects were achieved in 1982, and were able to pump water into 12,000 hectares of ricefields. Meanwhile, they continued to survey in order to draw up a plan for new construction projects. It is expected that if they succeed they will be able to pump water into an additional 10,000 hectares of ricefields.

Concerning agricultural co-op conversion last year, a number of co-ops were revived and improved. Now there is a total of 1,943 co-op units nationwide including an additional 591 units. There is a total of 86,490 families covering 17.9 percent of the total number of families. There are 86,490 hectares of ricefields which is 20 percent of the total ricefield area. Many

units were primary forces in intensive agricultural production. The co-ops are focal points for land-clearing, small irrigation construction, and the use of technical means. Moreover, the co-ops' handicraft sections are organized and family production is expanded. They are able to extend the number of working days to 200 per year. This has increased the members' revenues for which on the average a person can get 400 kg of paddy per year.

For 1982 the industry, handicrafts and forestry production was able to be maintained to a good level. The total production is 23.79 percent over that of 1981; electrification production is 10 percent over that for 1981; metal exploitation increased 30.10 percent when compared with that for 1981. Gypsum production is 40,000 tons, which is at the expected level of the plan. Production in the chemical section when compared with that for 1981: laundry detergent increased 2.02-fold over that for 1981; electric wire production is up 1.92-fold, and plastic bag production is up 5.57-fold; textile production is 33.27 percent over that for 1981; tree-cutting and manufacturing is 23.57 percent over that for 1981; pottery production within 9 months was 125.05 percent of the whole year plan. Moreover, other sections also actively struggled to carry out their own plans including base construction in order to steadily expand production in the following years.

9884
CSO: 4206/44

PROGRESS ON SWEDISH-AIDED BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION NOTED

Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 31 Dec 82 p 2

/Article: "Nam San Steel Bridge Supports Are Completed" /

/Excerpts/ After everyone got out of the car and before the sun had disappeared from the horizon, Mr. Vanthong Phommavongsa, deputy minister of construction, making a trip to see the Nam San Bridge construction, hurriedly took us to see the bridge construction which the workers of Irrigation Construction Company No 2 has completed 100 percent ahead of schedule in the month.

Mr Vanthong explained in detail about the Nam San Bridge construction in the Meuang Kao area under Pakan District, Vientiane Province. It is an important construction to implement the resolution of the Third Party Congress and the first Five Year Plan whose aim is to respond to what the people have been awaiting for generations. They have wanted to take the shoulder pole carrier from their shoulders, to put the baskets down from their backs, and to eliminate hardship from the people's living in this area of economic development. Agriculture and forestry are important in the Lao-Swedish development and cooperation project. Thus, the party and government have decided to assign Irrigation Construction Company No 2 and State Forestry Enterprise No 1 to be responsible for the construction with the funding, technical guidance, and design by Swedish experts from SIDA.

In this task the two companies have divided up the work and have actively worked together. State Forestry Enterprise No 1 is responsible for assembling the bridge segments and sending them across. Irrigation Construction Company No 2 under the Ministry of Construction is responsible for constructing the bridge supports and for pouring a total of four steel-reinforced concrete supports. Constructing the bridge supports that required putting the main supports 8 meters down from the soil surface and water had many difficulties, the primary problem being the weather. Also, the construction site is 175 km from Vientiane District. These created difficulties throughout the construction period. Instead of spending only 180 days for the construction as averaged out for work days alone, they wasted 237 days because of the bad weather. In order to use the labor correctly, after working for a period of time Irrigation Construction Company No 2 withdrew 33 out of 57 people who were constructing bridge supports for construction elsewhere.

The historical and new face of the Nam San Bridge construction took place from 1 February 1982 to 17 December 1982. It is 11 meters high, 6 meters wide, and 128 meters long, and is able to support over 50 tons. State Forest Enterprise No 1 will complete the bridge segment assembly and will send all of them across in this coming May 1983.

9884
CSO: 4206/44

BRIEFS

HOUA PHAN CO-OPS, CENSUS, TRADE--In 1982 the people and farmers throughout Houa Phan Province all awakened and absorbed the policies of the party and government. They all stopped engaging in their scattered private rice growing to widely organize agricultural co-ops. This /resulted/ in an additional 17 agricultural co-op units, so that now there are 278 agricultural co-op units throughout the province. Of these, 10 units are in Lao Theung Villages and 2 are in Lao Soung Villages. The co-op members are 49.80 percent of the total population which is 86,600 people. As the conversion to agricultural co-ops becomes more widespread it increases by a fairly good amount the production capacity each year. This steadily raises the standard of living of the people. For example, in 1980 the people throughout the province were able to be self-sufficient in terms of food supply. In 1981 this province also sent 2,000 tons of rice to Xieng Khouang Province, and saved over 260 tons of rice for the center. /Text/ /Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 31 Dec 82 p 1/ 9884

CSO: 4206/44

PHILIPPINES

200 NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY SUPPORTERS SURRENDER

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 13 Feb 83 pp 1, 10

[Text]

MACO, Davao del Norte, Feb. 12 — Some 200 New People's Army supporters in barangay Concepcion, Maco town, including the entire membership of the Sangguniang Pambarangay, voluntarily surrendered today to military authorities.

The surrenderees, five of them "NPA sitio tax collectors," were interrogated by elements of the 41st Infantry battalion led by Lt. Col. Julius Javier.

Concepcion barangay captain Santiago Sabidor admitted that the people had already been politicized by the NPAs. However, he said, they were forced to cooperate for fear of being killed.

One of his constituents who reportedly refused to cooperate was beheaded before the villagers.

Sabidor said they started extending clandestine support to the

NPAs since 1980. He said they were forced to contribute P2 and a ganta of rice per month through the sitio NPA tax collector.

He said nobody dared to report the activities of NPAs in the barangay for fear of being liquidated.

It was reported that the mass surrender was initiated by Sgt. Antonio Zafra, Maco INP station commander.

Meanwhile, Maco Mayor Restituto T. Suelto said some 1,000 residents of at least 10 barangays in his town have voluntarily evacuated to avoid being caught in the crossfire between government troopers and rebels.

Suelto said that apart from the four evacuation centers of the Philippine National Red Cross-Davao del Norte Chapter, he has also established six other evacuation centers. (Ped Velasco)

COTABATO CITY, Feb. 12 — A former Catholic nun was captured yesterday after a brief battle between members of the New People's Army and Constabulary troopers in barangay Kibawan, Kidapawan, North Cotabato.

The nun's three companions believed to be members of an NPA liquidation squad were able to slip through the PC cordon.

Recom 12 PC authorities identified her as Sister Amy Domingo, 30, who reportedly admitted being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the NPA for the last two years.

Lt. Winston Ebersol, 457th PC commander, who led the PC team in capturing Domingo, reported to Brig. Gen. Valerio Perez, Recom 12 PC-INP commander, that his patrol was fired upon by the NPA group while closing in on the hideout. The rebels lobed a grenade at the soldiers, but no one was hurt. (R.C. Sinfuego)

CSO: 4200/365

PHILIPPINES

SLAIN REBELS WORE AFP UNIFORMS

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 11 Feb 83 pp 1, 7

[Article by Mel Parale]

[Text] Rebel commands have started mass-producing military uniforms for use of their men in operations against government troops and other dissident targets, seized documents revealed yesterday.

The underground ploy to trick government forces was confirmed with the recovery yesterday of the bodies of 20 rebels slain in the military's counter-offensive in Mindanao provinces.

The rebels, who were killed in clashes in Maco, a forested town in Davao del Norte about 40 kilometers from Davao City, were still in military uniforms when their bodies were hauled out from creeksides at the scene of the encounter.

The uniforms bore army insignias.

The discovery prompted military authorities to adopt new countersigns for soldiers fielded in combat operations.

Gen Fabian C. Ver, AFP chief of staff, received field reports from Maj Gen Josephus Q. Ramas, army chief, showing that a 16-man army platoon, led by Lt M. Abao, was attacked by rebels disguised as army troopers in a remote barangay in Maco, Davao del Norte last Feb 4.

Twelve of the platoon members, including Lt Abao, were killed in that attack. Four soldiers who survived were able to retaliate, killing 13 of the estimated 50-member rebel band.

Brig Gen Benjamin Santos, army 5th division commander who was sent to coordinate military operations in Davao and Bukidnon provinces, disclosed that 21 more rebels were killed in separate clashes yesterday in Northern Mindanao.

This brought to 48 the total number of rebels slain in the government counter-offensive the past four days.

Lt Gen Fidel V. Ramos, AFP vice chief of staff and PC chief, reported upon arrival from field inspections in Mindanao that new rebel tactics involve the merger or rebel bands before staging attacks against government troops.

Rebels identified with the New People's Army operating in Mindanao were estimated at between 400 to 600.

Camp Aguinaldo declassified documents showing that four of the rebels slain in the Davao del Norte encounters were top rebel commanders.

They were identified as Kumander Carim, NPA political officer and head of rebel guerilla command in Eastern Mindanao; Kumander Jing, vice commander of Carim; Kumander Rose and Kumander Mars, a ranking member of the NPA Mindanao secretariat in charge of field infiltration operation.

Rear Admiral Simeon Alejandro, navy chief, sent more marine paratroopers and amphibious units to guard the Davao Gulf following reports that arms landing for rebel elements may take place any moment in the area.

Alejandro directed Commodore Alfredo Dueno, commander of naval forces in southern Philippines to block all possible supply routes of rebels.

The navy is in charge of the airlift of supplies for troops thrown in the Mindanao battle zones.

Military authorities deployed more troops in other fronts in Isabela in Northern Luzon, the Bicol region and Central Mindanao where rebel bands were reported regrouping men for simultaneous attacks.

CSO: 4200/366

PHILIPPINES

AFP DRIVE TRIGGERS EVACUATION

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 12 Feb 83 pp 1, 5

[Text]

TAGUM, Davao del Norte, Feb. 11 — Some 500 families from the outskirt barangays of Maco and Mabini towns, this province, evacuated today in the wake of all-out military operations launched against the New People's Army guerrillas here.

The farmers are now staying in the town proper. Some of them are with their relatives in the neighboring towns.

Administrator Hipolito de Guzman of the Philippine National Red Cross Davao del Norte chapter, said the exodus prompted him to establish four evacuation centers in Maco.

He said evacuees are still pouring in and he has requested more relief supplies, including medicine.

War veteran and civic leader Benjamin Gonzales of this capital town appealed to church and civic groups to extend assistance to the evacuees. As a war veteran, he said he knows the untold hardships of evacuees. (Ped Velasco)

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, Feb. 11 — Two suspected rebels were killed and several others were believed wounded when a joint Constabulary-Army police combat patrol team engaged a New People's Army (NPA) group in a 30-minute gunbattle in the outskirts of Oroquieta city yesterday.

In a flash report to Brig. Gen. Pedro F. Zafra, regional commander, Col. Rodolfo Faculin, provincial commander, identified the fatalities as Blas Japon y Macaslot, 25; and Cirilo Bari, 17.

Taken from them were two Garand rifles, two pairs of binoculars, documents, and a list of persons marked for liquidation.

Meanwhile, in barangay Nabrin, Talacogon, Agusan del Sur, five policemen virtually gave up their firearms to guerrillas in a peace dialogue last Tuesday.

Reports reaching the 10th regional command here said Cpl. Claro B. Perez, substation com-

mander, and four of his men were attending to problems of the barangay when two unidentified armed men stood up from among the crowd and at gunpoint demanded their weapons.

The policemen handed over a .38-caliber revolver, two M-16 Armalite rifles, and 420 rounds of ammunition.

After the incident, the dissidents simply walked away.

In barangay Dumaraín, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, the police apprehended yesterday five suspected terrorists, including two unidentified women.

Col. Cesar C. Navarro, provincial commander, identified the suspects as Armando Padeno, alias "Kumander Limba," Manny Salcedo, and Marcelino Castillo.

The suspects allegedly sent letters threatening to kill newly appointed municipal circuit Judge Florante Madrono if he refuses to cooperate with the dissidents. (Casiano Navarro)

DAVAO CITY, Feb. 11 — A policewoman was fatally shot while a policeman was seriously wounded when they were attacked by six armed men believed to be urban guerrillas at Bunawan, this city, at 7 a.m. today.

The fatality was identified as Sgt. Norma Managbanag, 32. She was hit in the head with bullets from a .45 caliber pistol and died on the spot.

Her companion, Pat. Ernesto Burgas, 33, was hit in several parts of the body and was given a 50-50 chance of survival.

Police said the two were waiting for a passenger jeepney just across their house when they were attacked.

Managbanag was connected with the personnel bureau of the regional PC/INP command in Camp Catitipan. She was in charge of keeping of records for recruitment and promotion of policemen in Region XI.

Burgas is a staff member of the Inspectorate office of the same camp. (RCC)

CSO: 4200/365

PHILIPPINES

OPPOSITION ASKED TO MERGE WITH NP

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 12 Feb 83 pp 1, 6

[Text] Nacionalista Party President Jose J. Roy urged yesterday all other opposition parties to merge with the NP to build up, he said, a strong and effective opposition against the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan.

"If the NP is fully accredited by the Commission on Elections, we will welcome all other political parties outside of the KBL to join us," the NP head and former senator said.

Roy was commenting on the decision of the KBL at a caucus Thursday to enact a law that would pave the way for the accreditation of the NP by relaxing the requirements for accreditation.

It was agreed at the KBL caucus in Malacanang, that for a second political party to be accredited, it must have fielded a candidate in the last presidential elections and obtained the second highest number of votes, and not the 10 percent of the total number of votes cast as originally required.

In the June 15, 1981 presidential polls, NP presidential bet Alejo Santos failed to garner the 10 percent minimum requirement for his party's accreditation.

President Marcos had asked the KBL to adopt an "aura of liberality" to give the opposition an equal chance. The KBL is so far the only accredited party, having met the basic requirement in the last presidential election.

An accredited political party enjoys such rights and privileges as representation in the board of election inspectors, board of canvassers, registration board and other similar Comelec bodies. It can also avail itself of the block voting system.

Roy said he preferred a merger, instead of coalition, with the other opposition parties. Parties merging with the NP will lose their individual identity, while they maintain their identity in a coalition.

Most of the opposition parties are based in their regions like the Lakasng Bayan (Laban) in Metro Manila, Pusyon Bisaya in Region 7 (Central Visayas), Mindanao Alliance in Regions 10 and 11 (Northern and Southern Mindanao), Concerned Citizens Aggrupation in Zamboanga and Bicol Saro in the Bicol region.

Roy said that the NP is fully organized with a party chairman in every province, city and town. He said there are NP members in the Batasan and NP elective local officials from Batanes to Sulu.

CSO: 4200/366

PHILIPPINES

OPPOSITION OFFERED CHOICE OF CANDIDATES

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 14 Feb 83 pp 1, 13

[Article by David C. Borje]

[Text] The Nacionalista Party offered opposition groups yesterday the privilege to choose, after consultations with NP leaders, their own candidates in the 1983 elections for the regular National Assembly--if they unite under one national political party.

NP President Jose J. Roy offered the new comeon in the wake of the inclination of the ruling Kilusang Bagong Lipunan to favor the NP as the second accredited party in the coming elections.

Roy explained that the same privilege was granted to certain groups which joined the NP in the fight against the KBL in previous elections.

Roy said: "No single party in the Philippines today can replace the KBL, and only a merger or coalition of the various opposition groups can topple the ruling party."

He explained that the ruling parties in Japan, France, Italy and West Germany are composed of many parties, and that it is only in the United States and England where the two-party system is strictly observed.

If the NP were accredited, Roy said, the opposition groups making common cause with it may choose their candidates and appoint their representatives in the election boards of inspectors, canvassers and registration, and other election bodies under the Commission on Elections. These are among the rights granted to accredited parties under the law.

The NP chief and former senator also pointed out that political parties do not only exist for elections, but also for airing legitimate grievances and exposing the ills of the party in power.

As the 1984 election approaches, Roy said he expects individuals and opposition groups to join, merge or coalesce with the NP because, he explained, it has a nationwide organization like the KBL.

He said the NP has a chapter in every province, city and municipality and has elective local officials from Batanes to Sulu and members in the Batasan.

Roy has authorized Assemblyman Francisco S. Tatad (NP, R-5), the acting NP secretary general and general campaign manager in the 1981 presidential elections, to contact the various opposition leaders to help bring about a more united opposition.

CSO: 4200/366

PHILIPPINES

OPPOSITION PROMISED AUTONOMY

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 14 Feb 83 pp 1, 13

[Text] The Nacionalista Party said yesterday all opposition political parties joining it, either by merger or coalition, will be given "political party autonomy" in their areas.

Former Sen Jose J. Roy, NP president, explained that the "autonomy" includes the right to choose candidates in the May 14, 1984 Batasan election and to appoint representatives in election bodies.

Roy said that when the NP is accredited, the leaders of the parties merged or coalesced with it shall act as his representatives to exercise the rights and privileges of an accredited political party.

An accredited party like the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, so far the only one, is entitled to appoint representatives in the board of election, inspectors and canvassers, registration boards and other electoral bodies.

The NP head said that in areas where the leaders of the local NP and the merged party are equally strong, the selection of the candidates for the Batasan and appointment of representatives in the various election boards shall be equally divided between them.

Roy conferred with Assemblyman Francisco S. Tatad (NP, R-5), the NP secretary general and general campaign manager of the 1981 presidential election, on the NP's political strategy in the 1984 elections.

Roy and Tatad agreed to revitalize the NP and choose the best candidates to be fitted against the KBL aspirants.

The Batasan resumed yesterday deliberations on second reading on the proposed Professional Regulatory Code.

Batasan leaders said the KBL has no definite stand on the code, thus paving for a free-wheeling discussion of the bill even among KBL members in the Batasan.

The bill seeks to codify all laws and regulations governing the various boards of examiners and the practice of the different professions in the country.

CSO: 4200/366

NEWSMEN BACKED ON RIGHT TO REFUSE MILITARY INTERVIEWS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 2 Feb 83 pp 1, 8

[Article by Rey G. Panaligan]

[Text]

Government lawyers said journalists have the right to accept or decline invitations for dialogues extended by the military.

Representing the military in a Supreme Court hearing yesterday, Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza said:

"If they (journalists) accept, it is purely voluntary, no compulsion is involved. If they decline, then, that is the end of the matter."

Twenty-nine journalists who were either summoned or questioned by military intelligence officers on articles they have written and on other "confidential" matters asked the Supreme Court to stop the military from further "interrogating" them.

The group was led by Arlene Babst, Bulletin Today columnist, and represented by lawyer Joker Arroyo.

It claimed some of

them have been subpoenaed by the national intelligence board headed by Brig. Gen. (ret.) Wilfredo C. Estrada to answer questions ranging from their concept of national security and press freedom to personal beliefs and histories.

It viewed as "coercive" in nature the invitations sent to some of them by the committee.

A letter to Ms. Babst by the NIB's special committee No. 2 dated Dec. 20, 1982, stated that "your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your part and this committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law."

This portion of the letter was construed by the journalists as a form of "intimidation and harassment."

They said in their petition that the proceedings at the NIB's committee No. 2 had "a chilling effect" on them, making

them "gingerly or consciously weighing the dangers of writing at all on subjects touching the government or its officials or on public order and national security."

At the start of the hearing, Solicitor General Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Nathaniel de Pano, Jr. asked the Supreme Court to declare the journalists' petition "moot and academic."

Mendoza said Gen. Fabian C. Ver, in a memorandum to Estrada dated Jan. 19, 1983, ordered that the proceedings of Committee No. 2 be terminated because the NIB was "satisfied with the results of the dialogue and noted better mutual understanding of the respective roles of media and government."

Ver is the director general and chairman of the NIB, an advisory body to the office of the President on matters pertaining to the integration and coordination of intelligence activities.

Mendoza said the journalists have no cause of action in their petition filed before the tribunal because "there is no decision or order issued by the NIB and sought to be en-

forced against them."

"For all that has taken place is plain conversation, interchange of ideas, opinions, perhaps, biases and preferences. But there is 'no charge against, nor any complaint of whatever nature involving the petitioners (journalists) which is the subject of investigation by the NIB," Mendoza said.

"Mere invitation extended to the petitioners to dialogue without legal compulsion cannot, except for the suspicious and hyperactive of imagination, be equated with censorship, punishment, and violation of the Constitutional right to free speech and expression."

With the termination of the proceedings of NIB's committee No. 2, the journalists said they will file an amended petition to include Ver as NIB chairman and the military through Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile to prevent a repetition of what they called as coercive invitation.

They were given 10 days within which to file an amended petition or a reply to the comment of government lawyers submitted yesterday.

CSO: 4200/365

PHILIPPINES

MORE INTERNATIONAL BANKS JOIN LOAN SYNDICATE

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 11 Feb 83 p 10

[Article by George T. Nervez]

[Text] Nine more international lending institutions joined recently in the syndication of the \$300-million jumbo loan which the Central Bank is tapping for the 1983 Consolidated Foreign Borrowing Program (CFBP).

The nine banks, who shall provide a total of \$75 million of the \$300-million jumbo loan, compose the second and third tiers of the loan syndicate, according to CB senior deputy governor Gabriel Singson.

Earlier, the CB announced that 16 banks, including nine of the biggest American, six Japanese and two major European banks committed to grant the \$300-million jumbo.

The 16 banks, which will be the lead managers, will provide a total of \$225 million or \$14.06 million each of the entire loan. The balance of \$75 million will be "sold down" to the second and third tiers of banks.

Singson said that six banks that compose the second tier will each take out \$10 million or a total of \$60 million of the \$300-million loan package.

The other three banks who make up the third tier will provide a total of \$15 million at \$5 million for each bank, he added.

Singson did not identify the nine banks pending final agreement on their participation in the jumbo loan.

However, four banks were reported to have indicated support for the loan. These are the Irving Trust, Korea Exchange Bank, Union Bank (California) and the Bank of New York.

Signing of the loan is scheduled on March 4, 1983, in New York (not here as earlier reported).

The loan has an eight year maturity. It is divided into two branches of \$180 million priced at 5 percent over the US prime rate and \$120 million priced at 7/8 percent over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).

Banking industry sources regard the latest CB borrowing as "very timely" because international lenders have demanded stiffer terms for new loans being tapped by South Korea and Indonesia.

Singson, the country's most seasoned international loan negotiator, headed the CB panel that worked out the terms of the new loan.

CSO: 4200/366

PHILIPPINES

PHILIPPINES ENTITLED TO BORROW 2.7 BILLION FROM IMF

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 10 Feb 83 p 10

[Article by George T. Nervez]

[Text] The country will be entitled this year to a total of \$2.73-billion (2.513 billion special drawing rights-SDR) worth of financing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Central Bank Gov Jaime C. Laya said yesterday. The amount will be tapped for possible future balance of payments (BOP) deficits, export shortfalls and contributions to buffer stocks, particularly sugar, Laya said.

According to Laya, the IMF financing available is slightly higher than the 1,763 billion SDR (about \$1.92 billion) that the country was entitled to borrow last year.

The funds, he said, are available through the IMF's lending facilities such as the ordinary extended fund, supplementary financing, compensatory, bigger stock financing and standby credit.

The CB head arrived yesterday from the meeting in Washington, D.C. of the interim committee of the IMF. The meeting decided to increase the resources of the fund, as well as call for additional quota contributions.

Pending applications from the Philippines for IMF Loans worth \$550 million will be tapped from the new quota.

The country has applied for SDR 315-million (about \$345-million) worth of standby credit and, SDR 188 million (about \$205 million) compensatory financing to finance the temporary drop in the export earnings because of external factors.

Laya said the increase in the quota will provide the country with an expanded credit line with the IMF to meet financing needs for possible future balance of payments (BOP) deficits, export shortfalls and contributions to buffer stocks, particularly sugar.

However, to be entitled to more financing, the Philippines will have to increase its IMF contribution from the existing SDR 315 million (about \$345.5 million) to SDR 440 million (\$479.6 million).

It means that the government will have to put up an additional SDR 125 million (\$136.25 million), one-fourth of which will have to be in foreign exchange and the balance in pesos.

Laya said the 25 percent contributions in foreign exchange of about SDR 31.25 million (\$34.06 million) will be met with by drawing on the foreign exchange holdings of the CB.

The remaining 75 percent or 93.75 million (\$102.19 million) will be deposited by the national treasury with the CB. It will be reflected as an increase in IMF deposits with the CB.

CSO: 4200/366

FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOAN RATES CUT

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 12 Feb 83 p 24

[Text]

The Development Bank of the Philippines yesterday decided to lower the interest rates it is charging on all foreign currency loans in line with the general decline in interest rates overseas.

Foreign currency loans extended in connection with refinancing or restructuring of maturing foreign obligations of DBP borrowers will likewise enjoy lower interest rates under the new policy.

According to the DBP, the interest rates on foreign currency loans extended for refinancing or restructuring of maturing obligations will be decreased from the present 21 per cent per annum to 18 per cent per annum or four per cent over the DBP borrowing costs, whichever is higher.

The DBP said foreign currency loans may be extended to refinance or restructure maturing foreign obligations provided the project "is still viable."

To be eligible for refinancing loans, DBP borrowers must satisfy at least one of three conditions adopted by the DBP for such refinancing. They are the following:

1. A substantial payment of the past due principal, interest and other charges shall be made by the borrowers.

2. The borrowers must make new equity infusion "in an amount as may be necessary," and

3. Additional collateral must be submitted to improve the bank's collateral position.

The DBP said that the new interest structure for foreign currency loans relied by it would result in lowering the financial charges of many DBP borrowers since the rate of interest on such foreign loans will now be computed on the basis of borrowing cost plus a spread of 4.0 per cent per annum to the DBP.

The 18 per cent per annum interest rate or the 4.0 per cent spread

over the actual borrowing costs of the bank on such foreign currency loans, whichever is higher, will have the effect of making the rates gravitate at about the 18 per cent level.

Most of the commercial foreign currency borrowings of the DBP are based on the average London interbank offered rate plus the spread of one per cent more or less.

If the LIBOR remains at lower levels like its present rate of 10 per cent, the actual interest rate which the DBP will charge on foreign currency loans may, in fact, be lower than the ceiling of 18 per cent.

Other foreign cur-

rency fundings of the DBP come from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the Apex fund of the Central Bank.

But the interest rates for these types of foreign currency fundings are much lower than those for Eurodollar rates.

According to the DBP, new foreign currency loans to be approved will carry an interest rate of four per cent above the DBP borrowing cost from sources such foreign currency loan will be drawn.

For WB, ADB and Apex loans, the interest rates shall be four per cent over the combined weighted average borrowing costs.

CSO: 4200/365

BANKS LOWER MARGINAL DEPOSITS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 13 Feb 83 p 12

[Text]

The Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP) has reportedly agreed to lower the marginal deposits required from importers for the opening of import letters of credit (L/Cs).

However, the BAP did not adopt a fixed percentage for the cut.

Individual banks were reportedly given the discretion to reduce the marginal deposits on import L/Cs charged their clients.

Sources said that commercial banks are now charging marginal deposits on import L/Cs in an amount ranging from 15 per cent to 20 per cent of the value of the L/C, compared with the previous rate of 25 per cent.

Earlier, the Central Bank made it known to the BAP that it was posing no objection to

the request made by the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI) for the lowering of marginal deposits to about 10 per cent.

The PCCI also urged the BAP to impose a marginal deposit of 100 per cent on importations of luxuries and other non-essential items as part of the government move to discourage unnecessary importations.

The banks reportedly did not consider the latter request of the PCCI because importation of these items are already controlled by the CB through its "prior approval" requirement.

Lowering of the marginal deposits required on the opening of import L/Cs was asked by the PCCI to give industries some form of relief from the across-

the-board imposition of the 3.0 per cent additional ad valorem tax on all imports under Executive Order No. 860.

On top of this, importers were also required under P.D. No. 1853 to pay advance customs duties on importations upon the opening of the import L/Cs with the commercial banks.

The CB may be expected to lower likewise its required reserves on marginal deposits following the decision by the BAP to let individual member banks to require lower deposits.

The Ministry of Finance clarified the regulations regarding the application of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1853, which requires the advance deposit of duties due, and Executive Order No. 860, which

provides for the additional duty of three per cent ad valorem.

The ministry said Presidential Decree No. 1853 does not require the deposit of import taxes and other import charges and fees.

The advance deposit is in the nature of advance payment of import duties and should be treated as any other payment of import duties through financial institutions, it said.

As provided in section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1853, the deposits collected should be remitted by the financial institution concerned in the manner and within the period prescribed by law and subject to the same penalties prescribed for remittance of import duties paid through financial institutions.

CSO: 4200/365

HARSHER PENALTIES FOR ILLEGAL FIREARMS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 16 Feb 83 pp 1, 10

[Article by Jose De Vera]

[Text] Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Armed Forces vice chief of staff, asked yesterday for the issuance of a presidential decree that would punish with life imprisonment or death the illegal possession of firearms.

He also sought the imposition of life imprisonment on persons convicted of rebellion, insurrection, or subversion who, in the commission of such crimes, used illegally possessed firearms.

Ramos, in his dual capacity as chief of the Constabulary and director-general of the integrated national police, made the proposal in a letter to President Marcos. He coured the request through Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile.

Salient features of the proposed decree are:

1. The repeal of Republic Act No. 4, PD No. 9, PD No. 1728 involving firearms laws.

2. The imposition of stiffer and uniform penalties for violations of firearms, ammunition, and explosives laws.

3. Declaring unlawful and penalizing the tampering of the serial number of any firearm and the repacking of explosives.

4. Simplifying the laws on illegal possession of firearms and explosives.

In his letter to the President, Ramos said law enforcement agencies had noted that acts of terrorism, assassination, killings, and the inflicting of injuries not only to officials but private individuals continued, due mainly to the proliferation of illegally or unlawfully possessed firearms,

ammunition, and explosives among lawless and criminal elements.

He said this was aggravated by the continuing and mounting efforts of radical and subversive groups actively challenging and defying the government through armed or violent confrontations.

Ramos said the illegal manufacture of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, and explosives have significantly increased and "undoubtedly undermine the stability of the nation."

The PC/INP chief's proposals are:

1. Twenty years to life imprisonment for the unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition, or possession of firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition.

2. Mandatory penalty of death for any person who commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code and other special laws through the use of an unlicensed firearm, that results in the death of the victim.

3. Life imprisonment for illegal possession of firearms if the violation is in furtherance of, on occasion of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, or subversion.

4. Twenty years to life imprisonment for the owner, president, manager, member of the board of directors, or other responsible officers of any public or private firm, company, corporation, or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, or corporation, or entity concerned to be used in the

violation of the decree.

5. Five to 10 years imprisonment for the carrying of a licensed firearm outside residence without authority.

6. Five to 10 years imprisonment for tampering with the serial number of a firearm.

7. Five to 10 years imprisonment for repacking or altering the composition of lawfully manufactured explosives.

8. One to five years imprisonment for unauthorized issuance of authority to carry firearm and ammunition outside of residence by any person, civilian or military.

CSO: 4200/365

PHILIPPINES

LEYTE, NEGROS POWER GRIDS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 13 Feb 83 p 13

[Text]

The National Power Corp.'s two geothermal power projects in Leyte and Negros Oriental will start operating in March and May, respectively.

The Leyte power plants use the geothermal steam in Tongonan and Bunawan geothermal field. There are three power units in the area with capacities of 37.5 megawatts each or a total of 112.5 MW, the NPC said.

It said these units are capable of generating 739 million kilowatt hours annually an equivalent of 1.15 million barrels of crude oil.

The project will supply the region with adequate supply of electricity at the lowest practicable cost which

is hoped attract investors to build establishments in the Visayas, the NPC added.

The project cost is estimated at P486 million or P4,320 per KW installed. This is funded by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan Loan; Credit Lyonnais-Sumitomo loan, Toyo Trust Fund Mitsubishi credit, and the NPC-government equity.

The Negros Oriental power project, has three power units with 37.5 MW each. This will enable the country to save about 1.15 million barrels of crude oil annually.

When completed, all three units will be hooked in the Negros grid. They will provide the industrial and rural electrification needs of the region. (PNA)

CSO: 4200/365

SPEED UP ORDERED ON CORN EXPORT FACILITIES

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 12 Feb 83 p 24

[Text] President Marcos ordered yesterday six government offices to implement as soon as possible the setting up of about nine corn export zones throughout the country in an effort to boost the production of yellow corn.

The President directed the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), National Food Authority (NFA), Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH), the Central Bank (CB) and the national food and agricultural council (NFAC) to pour in their technical and financial resources for the success of the zones.

He issued the directive in still unnumbered Letter of Instruction (LOI) signed yesterday during the launching of the Maisagana export drive at the Maharlika Hall in Malacanang.

The corn export zones will be set up in the regions identified by the MA as suitable for mass production of yellow corn under the Maisagana corn production program which was launched in December 1981.

The zones will be located in Cagayan, Isabela, Quirino, Camarines Sur, Albay, South Cotabato, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao.

While the agriculture ministry, in coordination with other government agencies, is still studying the total amount needed to

set up the corn export zones, the President ordered the Ministry of Budget to release ₱20 million for the procurement and distribution of high-yielding varieties of corn seeds as well as for the additional allowance of agricultural technicians in the performance of their duties.

The President also ordered the Central Bank to rediscount the credit lines extended by rural banks in both the Maisagana and the Masagana 99 production program.

MPWH will build feeder roads and other infrastructure needed

in the setting up of the corn export zones while the trade and industry ministry will develop a scheme to expand the export market for corn.

The NFA will coordinate with the Land Bank of the Philippines in the setting up of post harvest facilities.

The Maisagana program was launched in December 1981 geared at making the country self-sufficient in yellow corn. The country has been importing thousands of tons of yellow corn for animal feeds.

The program aims to make the country self-

sufficient in corn by late 1984 or early 1985.

The President expressed disappointment with the results of the 15-month-old program. He announced new measures to revitalize the scheme.

The scheme, however, reduced the country's importation of yellow corn by 100,000 tons. But doubts entertained by the rural banks and the Philippine National Bank's branches resulted in restricting the flow of credit supply to Maisagana.

PHILIPPINES

NPA BANS DOGS IN COUNTRYSIDE

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 11 Feb 83 p 27

[Article by A.B. Villar, Jr]

[Text]

Dogs, "man's best pals," are losing friends in the rural areas of Surigao del Norte.

An embittered resident of the town of San Francisco, who returned to Manila after finding life in his barangay "too hot for residents with relatives in the Army," reported that dogs are vanishing from the barrios of Diaz, Honrado, Macopa, Baibanon, Uslaw, Balite and Gubdang.

The informant, who refused to be identified on print, said that the phenomena is true in all areas visited by roaming New People's Army (NPA) forage units in the province.

"Now, they are not only stealing our dogs for *pulutan*, they have ordered us to do away with our dogs," he lamented.

Dogs give away the presence of NPA bands specially at night.

These groups he also said come down from the surrounding hills at

night dressed like soldiers and would knock at doors for food and contributions.

"They even attend dances unmolested," he reported. "The soldiers are in the cities. We only have the police in town and the under-armed Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) in the barrios."

"Not only dogs are disappearing. Business is also dying out, especially copra and fish-buying," he claimed.

He said further that his family used to trade copra.

"They are now in Surigao city after they failed to meet their ₱5,000.00 quota to the NPA, where it used to be only ₱500.00," he said.

"Terror grips our guts and we could not even rely on government protection," the informant stressed.

The informant arrived with his family this week and is looking for a job.

CSO: 4200/365

PHILIPPINES

BRIEFS

FLOUR SUPPLY STABILIZED--Food Minister Jesus Tanchanco said yesterday that prices and supply of wheat flour have stabilized as flour millers pursued full-swing milling operations simultaneous with the unloading of imported wheatgrains. Unloading of wheat from the Philippine flag vessel mv Asean Liberty was hastened with the use of two additional vacuators provided by other shipowners, Tanchanco said. With the unloading from mv Florence and mv Polly carrying an aggregate of 53,432 tons and the expected arrival of additional three vessels with a total load of 78,000 tons, supply is assured, Tanchanco said. With the normalization in the supply of wheat, the feared panic buying among dealers and bakers has been avoided, he added. [Text] [Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 13 Feb 83 pp 1, 10]

CSO: 4200/365

THAILAND

NEW FORCE PARTY CLAIMS SUPPORT FROM EXPATRIATES IN U.S.

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 25 Dec 82 pp 1, 2

[Article: "New Force Party Boasts That It Has Obtained Much Money From Los Angeles For the Election"]

[Text] Since returning from a trip to gather support in Los Angeles, members of the New Force Party have boasted that they obtained much money for the party and that they are ready to contest the 1983 election. They also said that they received a grand welcome there during their trip to gain support and that the Thais there are ready to keep sending money until the election is over.

On 24 December, Mr Krieng Wisitsoraat, a spokesman for the New Force Party, told reporters that after his group, composed of Sub-Lieutenant Somwang Sirichai, the leader of the New Force Party, and members of the party's executive committee, returned from its visit to the United States, Mr Krieng revealed that they had achieved many results and that they had been warmly welcomed by the Thais in the United States.

The spokesman for the New Force Party also said that besides inviting them to give speeches, the Thais there donated a large sum of money to help the party contest the 1983 election. And most of the Thais there affirmed that they would keep sending money until the election is over. "This has given our party confidence about the coming election. Our hopes are much brighter than we had ever dreamed possible."

Concerning the things achieved by the New Force Party on this occasion, Mr Krieng said that the Thais there had expressed the intention of establishing a New Force Party branch in Los Angeles, California, and in Chicago in order to get the Thais in the various places to provide financial support to the New Force Party. The Thais living there are just as worried about the situation in Thailand as are the people back in Thailand. Most feel that the government has not taken the proper steps to solve the country's problems and that it has not followed the principles. To date, it has just solved the immediate problems. They also said that the government is not master of itself. It is still being manipulated just like a puppet on a string. What is referred to as democracy is just controlled democracy.

The spokesman for the New Force Party also said that the Thais in the United States are still asking that they be given the right to vote as expatriate Thais. They feel that they should have the right to vote in the elections. There should be a survey to determine the number of Thais living abroad. An additional number of candidates for MP should be stipulated in accord with the number of expatriate Thais; the expatriate Thais should then be allowed to elect representatives.

Concerning the rumors that Mr Suthep Wongkamhaeng, the secretary-general of the party, has resigned from the party, Mr Krieng said that this is not true. This was a misunderstanding. When Mr Suthep heard this, he was very surprised and he has confirmed that, if there is an election, he will definitely run in Korat. As for those who have left the party, there is no problem. This is just the way of politics.

11943
CSO: 4207/69

THAILAND

EDITORIAL SCORES PROSPECT OF 'SARIT-LIKE' LEADER

Bangkok MATUPHUM In Thai 23 Dec 82 p 4

[Editorial: "The Leader That the People Want"]

[Text] At present, there is constant talk about what the leader should be like or who should be leader. This is so even though, according to democratic principles, the leader should be elected by the people. The people may make a decision through the political parties, the House of Representatives and the Senate.

But the significance of today's search for a leader is not in step or in accord with the principles of democracy. Or things are only half democratic. Thus, an attempt is being made to create a leader or make oneself leader.

Concerning the talk about who should be prime minister, the attempt to make it seem that this person is suited to being a leader, saying that he resembles past leaders such as Sarit Thanarat in many ways, the attempt to lay a foundation to get the people to feel that a leader should be resolute (in the sense of a dictator) and the attempt to paint a picture showing this or that person as a leader and the next prime minister, we feel that these methods go against the democratic tide. This is because, basically, such a leader is not the real preference of the people. Rather, it is more a matter of instigating incidents and creating a personality in a slapdash manner.

We heartily disagree with the assumption that the people want a person like Sarit Thanarat to be their leader. We disagree with the view that a leader must be resolute like Sarit. This is like spreading propaganda to get the people to move away from democratic principles. Considering this matter in depth, we see that it was leaders like Sarit who led the country so far afield that we had to start over.

Don't people remember that it was Sarit who wasted billions of baht in secret government funds and that when he died his heirs fought for the millions he had left as an inheritance? Part of the money that he embezzled was spent on his hundreds of mistresses. Wasn't it Sarit who arrested and imprisoned hundreds of patriots who loved democracy and wasn't it Sarit who had many of these people killed?

In history, we can see the despotic leaders, and we believe that he was one of these.

What type of person should the country's leader be? This is a question that we must all think about and discuss together. Do we want an honest person with sincere intentions to govern the country or do we want an ambitious person? Do we want a democratic person or a dictator?

If we discuss these problems and come to a clear understanding, we will immediately see that the leader we want is a person who can solve the country's problems in a decisive manner by relying on just and democratic laws. And what is important is that the person must have the people's approval.

A person who becomes leader from pressure or great fanfare is not a real leader. He may rise to the top for a short period depending on the support he has. If his real self is exposed or the forces supporting him evaporate, such a fake leader cannot keep his position as leader.

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CSO: 4207/69

THAILAND

GEN CHAWALIT URGES REPEAL OF ANTI-COMMUNIST LAW

Bangkok SIAM MAI in Thai 14 Jan 83 pp 16-18

[Speech by Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchayut, the assistant army chief of staff for operations, on 17 November 1982 at the Chulachomkla Royal Military Academy]

[Text] The following is from a document that summarizes the situation in the struggle against the CPT and the strategy to be used after the end of the armed struggle. [The text] was [part of] a speech delivered by Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchayut, the assistant chief of staff of the army for operations and the head of the Operations Section of the ISOC, on 17 November 1982 at the Kittickhachon Auditorium, Chulachomkla Royal Military Academy, to the director of communist suppression activities and high-level government officials and military officers. This document reflects the real basis of present-day political thinking and strategic planning, which are aimed at parliamentary politics.

The National-Level Political Offensive, Strategy 66/1980

To expand the sovereignty of the masses in order to reach the goal of having a democratic system, democratic policies must be implemented in the political sphere. One aspect of this is that a strategic political offensive must be launched at the national level in accord with Article 3 of Order 66/1980 on perfecting policies.

We have stated previously that a national-level political offensive that is launched in accord with the stipulated strategic plans will include:

1. Repealing the anti-communist law and promulgating a national security law in its place.
2. Repealing, adding to or revising the political parties and election laws so that things are in accord with the principles of democracy.

3. Revising those provisions of the constitution that concern political parties and so on.

It can be seen that carrying out each stage in accord with the plans stipulated is very difficult. This can be seen from the fact that, during the past 6 months, no progress at all has been made in doing any of these things even though great pressure has been exerted.

It can be said that an important factor in bringing the armed struggle to an end has been the [implementation] of measures for increasing the freedoms of the people. Nothing has been done concerning increasing the sovereignty of the masses, which is the heart of the democratic system. For this reason, the end of the armed struggle is just the end of an armed struggle within a system that is not yet fully democratic. This situation can easily reverse itself.

Allowing society to develop on its own in order to arrive at a perfect system in the future may be impossible or it may take too long, which would risk having a situation that could lead to an armed struggle.

The important factors that pose obstacles include:

1. A lack of clear understanding about the problem of fighting the communists strategically at all levels.
2. A lack of power necessary for carrying out things.

At present, there is much talk to the effect that the sovereignty of the masses has fallen into the hands of the political groups, which do not understand and which are not interested in the struggle to defeat the communists. This is the central problem of all the problems facing the nation. The people are tired of and lack faith in the political parties. This dissatisfaction is increasing daily and it may reach the crisis point. It is essential that the political party system be maintained since this is a characteristic of government in a democratic system.

Because of all the problems that have been mentioned, the struggle by the national army to defeat the communists has encountered great problems. Some have put forward the idea of having an organization that has real power, pure power, to serve as the representative of the masses. It would be an organization temporarily embodying the sovereign power of the people. This would enable the activities to make progress toward the stipulated target.

Another important matter, which is an urgent policy of the director of communist suppression activities, is to reform the Internal Security Operations Command and the regional and provincial security operations commands in both form and substance. The scope of their duties, which will be directly concerned with the situation after the end of the armed struggle, must be broadened.

All ISOC officials, including central and regional officials, and specialists must be given training so that they understand and act in strict accord with Order 66/1980. The scope of the work in maintaining internal security must be broadened even if preparations are reduced. All of these tasks, from fighting the communists directly to carrying on national political, economic and social tasks collectively, must be supervised closely.

The democratic movement, whether carried on by political parties, groups or individuals, must be given full support. Because the democratic movement is the real representative of the masses. And it is the most important mass base of the army for struggling against dictatorship and communism.

The dictatorial movements must be transformed into a democratic movement through efficient education about the national line in accord with Policy 66/1980. It is not true that the dictatorial movements are useless. Because most of these movements in Thailand just misunderstand the essence of democracy.

The development activities presently being carried on in the localities must be expanded. The units that overlap must all be made part of the ISOC.

The Present Course of Action

Military pressure must be applied constantly. The struggle in the plains must be modified.

The heart of the struggle to destroy the party includes holding fast to a peaceful struggle.

This is the meaning of a peaceful struggle, which is the strategic target in narrow circles. More deeply, peaceful struggle is the only measure that will force the communists to give up their armed struggle and in the end become left-wing democrats. Only by stipulating the strategic goals in this way will it be possible to destroy the communist party completely, no matter how difficult it is.

Increasing the conflicts within the party is another thing that will hasten the destruction of the party. The problem is that increasing these conflicts must be done strategically. So that the strategic effects of destroying the party are greater than those achieved by tactical operations, which promote psychological operations, or the accomplishments of the tactical victories, which will not be as beneficial as they should be, particularly in the present situation, dealing with those who have surrendered is the main problem in this matter.

The CPT Situation, the Thinking of the Leadership Organization

The basic line in solving the immediate problems in order to destroy the confidence of the leading organization of the CPT includes:

1. Concerning the CPT's effort to increase the intensity of the class struggle -- using armed struggle to carry on a people's war, increasing and using the benefits from the economic crisis, making attacks and supporting the influential right-wing people and using the influential left-wing people -- we must reduce the intensity of the class struggle by eleminating the people's war.

The struggle must be carried on using weapons and by solving the economic crisis. This must be done by gradually developing things and making plans concerning the economic structure. The struggle must also be carried on by developing the political structure and the state apparatus in a gradual and planned way so that the political structure becomes democratic and efficient. [We] must block both the right-wing and left-wing [groups] and eliminate haphazard operations.

2. Concerning the CPT's effort to increase the intensity of the national struggle -- by increasing cross-border attacks and by mobilizing the ethnic minorities -- we must reduce the conflicts and relax the national struggle by quickly developing national industry and promoting national investments. We must not become the tool of the great powers, who want to use us to fight a war against Indochina. We must quickly develop the ethnic minority zones and increase our efforts to solve the Muslim problem in the south.

3. Concerning the problem of the CPT trying to disrupt things and prevent us from carrying out things in accord with Order 66/1980, we must maintain the basic principles and quickly develop the principles and measures. In solving the problems, we must move from the superficial to the profound, from the immediate problems to the basic problems, from the particular to the general, and from tactics to strategy.

Concerning our operations policies and lines, we will continue to hold fast to Order 66/1980. The details can be summarized as follows:

1. Political measures must be used to open up a way for the CPT and its united front to leave the jungle, live a peaceful life and help develop the country peacefully.

2. Military measures must be used to destroy the bases of the CPT and to pressure the forces of the CPT and united front to abandon the bases and give up the armed struggle.

3. We must take advantage of the situation in which the international communist party, or the Chinese Communist Party and the communist parties in Indochina, has split apart and in which there are serious splits within the CPT. We must expand the operations carried on in accord with the political and military measures so that results are achieved faster. But even though such an opportunity may give rise to good results concerning the speed with which the problems are solved, terrible effects are also present too.

Since Order 66/1980 has been implemented politically in only a superficial way, particularly from the standpoint of tactics, and many members of the CPT have laid down their weapons, if there were no officials responsible for watching the theoretical and strategic problems, the operations would stop at this level. The CPT would be able to use the law of an expanding class struggle and the law of an expanding national struggle to coordinate the two. This would enable them to provide training to revive the movement and to revive the organization of mass activists and the united fronts.

4. At present, almost all their secure bases have been destroyed. The armed struggle has subsided. The forces of the CPT have been dispersed. They have been forced into the plains and towns where they operate as small armed bands. In general, these scattered forces are experiencing economic problems and problems of safety. If the results of Order 66/1980 are not expanded on all fronts and on the strategic level, not only will these forces return to the CPT but even greater numbers of people and united front members than before will go join the CPT.

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CSO: 4207/66

THAILAND

OPINION SURVEY NOTES VIEWS ON MPS, SENATORS

Bangkok PATINYA in Thai 17 Jan 83 pp 17-23

[Article by Simana Sattamai: "Results of a Survey on MPs: The Image of MPs in the Eyes of the People"]

[Excerpt] The Behavior of Politicians, or MPs

Because Thailand has always been administered by various forms of dictatorship (with the exception of communism), the rules of democracy have no meaning. Those who want to play politics have to seek out those with political and economic power and play in a dirty way in order to topple, or defeat, the opposition. This begins with competing with each other for power in their "political party." In seeking votes, candidates spend money to purchase votes and cooperate with government officials to cheat in the election using various methods. Or if there is no other way to win, they assassinate and threaten people.

Once a person becomes an MP, the next goal is to gain a higher political position, especially the position of minister. Thus, it frequently happens that MPs suddenly leave one party and join another party that is expected to join the government. Or wealthy people will give money to MPs in order to "buy" them and get as many MPs as possible to join their party in order to increase their bargaining power in asking to join the government with other parties. It has reached the point where the buying of MPs is looked on as normal behavior in the Thai parliamentary system. As for some MPs who belong to parties that are part of the government, when they fail to obtain a political position, they become very upset and resign from the party. This has happened so frequently that it is said of MPs that they "change parties more easily than they change clothes."

There are many MPs who have been elected using dirty methods, and their goal has been to use their position as MP to pile up profits for themselves. Thus, there have frequently been reports of MPs using their power in an improper way. For example, some MPs have made loan contracts and allowed other MPs to borrow money. They have written letters of resignation for those who take the money so that if these people fail to repay the money or fail to act in accord with the contract, they can submit this letter

of resignation to the speaker of the House of Representatives. These MPs purchase tour bus, train and airplane tickets or they let the vote getters use their right to travel free. Recently, Air Chief Marshal Harin Hongsakun, the president of parliament, revealed that MPs have spent money in excess of their expense accounts. MPs are the ones who have used this right the most. And it has been learned that MPs from nearby provinces have claimed money for flying home even though there are no airports there. Or they have drawn money for trips supposedly made to various areas on the same day or for trips they claim to have made even though they were attending a conference.

Some MPs have revealed that, one time, a group of MPs was invited to a banquet at a liquor distillery. On their return, they each took two cases of liquor. And they were each given gifts or 20,000 baht. There are frequently reports about MPs missing meetings, with the result that parliament has had to cancel the meetings because of the lack of a quorum, and about MPs sleeping during meetings. Thus, MPs have been criticized for "being lazy and not fulfilling their duties." Besides such reports about groups of MPs, there have also been reports about individual MPs. For example, one MP was charged with deceiving a woman and another was charged with squeezing money from a temple. MPs have complained that their salaries are too small. MPs have been shot and killed because of being involved with interests and places of vice such as gambling halls. Also, MPs have used their power to place people in jobs in both government and private units.

MPs who are also ministers have been in the news too. For example, some allowed their subordinates to deal in narcotics. Some of them distributed money to MPs in order to defeat the draft act proposed by the government. They have signed certificates giving people permission to establish insurance companies and gasoline companies. They have signed oil-purchasing contracts that have resulted in the sellers taking advantage of Thailand. And people have made the criticism that they became minister just "by luck" or because they "brown-nosed" the prime minister and not because they have any real skills. Thus, they are like "apprentice ministers" or "decorative ministers." Also, some of them are liars. They do not have the spirit of politicians. They say they will resign but then they refuse to do so. Or when they make a mistake, they do not take responsibility by resigning.

Among a large group of people, there are always some good ones and some bad ones. And the same is true of the MPs. But because most of the news about the MPs is bad, with the good MPs rarely getting into the news (regardless of the reason), this has affected the people's view of the MPs. This will be discussed in greater detail later on.

The Behavior and Image of the Political Parties

PATINYA has analyzed Thailand's political parties several times in the past. In particular, there was the article "Party Dictators: The Single Slate Will Destroy Everything," which appeared in Issue 163, 26 April 1982.

In this article, the important elements and duties of real political parties, based on the meaning assigned by scholars in the Free World, were analyzed. It was pointed out that today's political parties in Thailand do not have the elements and they do not carry out the functions of political parties in accord with the definition given by scholars in a democratic tradition. The only thing that we have are political parties that have registered in accord with the law. In the past, the behavior of these political parties has clearly shown that they are only political groups that have joined together mainly for immediate power and profits. They do not have ideals or definite policies. This is because they are not composed of people who have ideals or harmonious policies. Thus, there have been conflicts over interests both between members of the same party and between the parties. And many of the political parties have been formed to serve the dictators.

In particular, the political parties that join the government have serious conflicts over the policies for solving the problems or developing the country. They fight over this and that. But they do not fight for the interests of the country or the people. Rather, they have conflicts because it is said that the political party that proposes a policy will win the votes of the people. Or if the government does things in accord with that policy, his party will suffer economic losses. When an opposition party implements an erroneous policy that leads to problems, instead of helping each other solve the problems as fellow members of the government, they attack the party both openly and secretly in order to get the people to abandon that opposition party. This results in the problems getting even worse. And what is very sad is that, when the government implements a policy that achieves results, the political parties that compose the government all try to claim that this was their party's policy or that it was their party that compelled the government to implement the policy. But when the government implements a policy that fails, no party dares take responsibility for the policy; they all deny having any responsibility for this. Or they put the blame on other parties even though the government has implemented the policy in accord with a resolution of the cabinet, which has ministers from their own party in it too.

Such behavior on the part of the political parties has caused the Thai people to lose faith in the political parties. This is very dangerous because the dictators can use this to seize power and topple the present system of government and put a new form of dictatorship in its place. PATINYA has constantly tried to warn people about this danger. And we presented the results of a survey conducted by the Phithak Pracha Company Ltd concerning the opinions of students and people on the political parties. The results were presented in the article "Joint-Zone, Single-Slate... Building a Base of Dictatorship," which appeared in Issue 189, 25 October 1982. The results of this survey can be summarized as follows:

The great majority of the students and people (91 percent of the students and 84.9 percent of the people) do not trust or have confidence in the political parties since they feel that the political parties are just interest groups that want to obtain political power in order to protect their interests or make profits for themselves and their friends. Their goal is not to protect the common interests of the country and people.

A Way to Solve the Problems, Which No Country In the World Has Done

Because the MPs and political parties have acted like this, they have been charged as being the ones responsible for creating problems for the country. Thus, measures have been sought in order to control the MPs so that they act in a more disciplined manner and to reduce the number of political parties and create greater solidarity. Concerning the measures that have been implemented, besides failing to solve the problems, they have created even more problems or made the existing problems even worse. This is because the measures are dictatorial.

These measures are: (1) Elections are to be of the joint-zone, single-slate type. Each province is to be a single election zone, with the exception of Bangkok, which is three zones. (2) [People] will vote for a party slate. (3) MPs must belong to a party during the period stipulated. (4) For whatever reason, if an MP has to leave a party, he must give up his seat in parliament too. (5) In each region, each political party must have at least 50 members from each of five provinces. Total party membership must be at least 5,000. (6) The political parties must field a number of candidates equal to at least half the total number of MPs.

It can be seen that these measures are completely at odds with democratic principles and that they will lead to a political party dictatorship. This, in turn, will lead to corruption and systematic profit making in illegal ways, and there will be no juridical apparatus for stopping this. This will greatly harm the country, as was analyzed in PATINYA, issues 163 and 189.

The Structure of Dictatorship: Blocking the Good Politicians

Forcing the MPs to join a political party, controlling the formation of political parties and having joint-zone, single-slate elections has created political inequality. That is, good people who have ideals but no money cannot form a political party. If they want to form a party, they have to rely on merchants, businessmen or powerful people. And in the end, they will have to serve those who gave them this financial support. The smaller parties with idealistic members have to unite. But because their ideals are not in harmony, they have to join the larger parties, which are interest groups without ideals. And in the end, [these smaller parties] will be swallowed up. As for the people, in an election, they will not have a chance to pick out the good people from the bad ones. This is because they have to vote for a single slate of candidates. If they vote for a good person, the bad ones on the slate will become MPs

too. And even if good people become MPs and have the good fortune to become ministers with the firm intention of not engaging in corruption, because of the great difficulties they have been through and because they have spent much money getting elected, they are in debt and need the money that they earn from their positions. This means that they cannot afford to be dismissed from their positions. And so, to keep from being dismissed, they cannot oppose things and must always support things whether they agree or not.

Besides this, with such an undemocratic political structure, the military and bureaucracy will probably not allow the politicians and political parties to have any political power since this might reduce or put an end to their power and profits. For these reasons, honest, knowledgeable and capable people who have ideals and who are sincere toward the majority of the people will not join the political parties or run for election since they feel that there is no good reason to do so. Even if they become an MP or minister, they cannot do anything. And also, they will have to risk losing the honor and prestige that they have had for so long.

The Image of the MPs In the Eyes of the People

Because a serious study has never been conducted to determine the Thai people's views on, or image of, present-day MPs after having heard so much about the behavior of the MPs in the mass media every day, in September 1982, the Phithak Pracha Company research team, headed by Dr Somchai Rakwichit, conducted a survey among students and other people to gain their views on MPs. Data from students were collected at four institutions, that is, Kasetsat, Thammasat, Chulalongkorn and Ramkhamhaeng universities. As for the people, a total of 1,204 people in all the regions were interviewed. The research team used the direct interview technique. The researchers asked the respondents the following question: "In your view, what has the quality of the elected MPs been like?" The respondents were asked to choose one response that was most in accord with their view. The five possible choices were:

1. Very bad
2. Bad
3. Fair
4. Good
5. Very good.

After that, the researchers asked the respondents to state why they had selected that response.

The results of the survey are shown in Figure 1. Among the students, 5.8 percent felt that the quality of the elected MPs was very bad; 35.5 percent felt that they were bad; 52.2 percent felt that they were fair; 6.3 percent felt that they were good; and 0.2 percent felt that they were very good. In short, the great majority of the students, 93.5 percent, felt that the quality of the MPs ranged from fair to very bad. Only 6.5 percent of the students felt that the MPs were generally good or very good.

As for the people, their views were similar to those of the students. That is, 4.5 percent felt that the quality of the elected MPs was very bad; 31.9 percent felt that they were bad; 51.9 percent felt that they were fair; 10.7 percent felt that they were good; and 1.0 percent felt that they were very good. Thus, 88.3 percent felt that the quality of the MPs ranged from fair on down to very bad. Only 11.7 percent felt that the MPs were good or very good.

As for why the respondents held these views, the students and people gave reasons that were very similar. The students and people who thought that the quality of the MPs was generally bad or very bad said that the MPs just try to make profits for themselves rather than serve the public. They do not have any definite ideals, and they do not take responsibility for their duties. They use their powers in illegal ways. They were elected by using financial power and dishonest means. They do not have the good qualities needed by politicians. They lack knowledge and capabilities and this makes it impossible for them to carry out their duties efficiently. They lie and cheat and do not perform their duties in accord with the promises they made to the people. Most of the MPs are members of influential interest groups or they are involved with influential interest groups or various sources of vice. This leads to divisions, and there are conflicts over power and interests.

As for the students and people who felt that the quality of the MPs was generally fair, they said that there are both good and bad MPs. Some of the MPs have ideals and are concerned about the interests of the public. They are responsible, knowledgeable and capable. On the other hand, there are some who do not have any ideals and who are concerned only about their personal interests. They are irresponsible, and they are not really knowledgeable or capable. Concerning the qualifications, behavior and performance of the MPs, on the whole, they are at the "fair" level, that is, they are not good but they are not bad either.

As for the students and people who felt that the MPs are generally good or very good, they said that most of the MPs are good people with knowledge and capabilities. They are responsible toward their duties and are real representatives of the people. And the MPs must try to do a good job so that they will have a chance to be re-elected.

The Senate: Does It Serve the Powerful?

Another thing that shows that the Thai political system is undemocratic is that the present constitution stipulates that the number of senators must be equal to three-fourths the number of elected MPs. And it gives great power to the senators. For example, the president of the Senate is the president of parliament while the speaker of the House of Representatives is only the vice president of parliament. Senators have rights in electing a prime minister, and they can submit resolutions of no-confidence against the government. They can also participate in discussing budget bills and important acts. This is the case even though the senators were

not popularly elected but were appointed by those with power. This goes against democratic principles (as for details about democratic principles, PATINYA discussed this in the article "Unmasking Dictatorship" in Issue 199, 3 January 1983). In practice, senators have been appointed in order to serve as a power base for the government or for certain groups. In general, the senators are supporters of the government. The size of the Senate is three-fourths that of the House of Representatives. Thus, when the votes of the senators are added to those of the elected MPs who are part of the government and to those of a few other MPs who can be persuaded to give support, the government can control a majority vote in parliament.

Thus, we feel that, in the past, the powerholders or government have used the senators as tools to maintain their power and have not relied on the support of the elected MPs even though the MPs are the representatives of the people. Since this is the case, it can be said that the government does not really come from the people. The question, then, is why the people have not opposed having a Senate. The answer is that, in the eyes of the people, the image of the MPs is not very good, as was mentioned above. Thus, the people say that if the MPs are given complete power, they will probably use this power improperly and easily cheat people. Thus, the people are not opposed to counterbalancing the power of the MPs by having a Senate. This can be seen from the results of the survey conducted by the Phithak Pracha Company Ltd. This survey polled students and other people to get their opinion about the Senate. It was conducted in September 1982. The researchers asked the respondents: "To enable the Thai parliament to carry out its duties as well as possible for the country and people in general, what do you think the form of parliament should be?" A pair of choices were presented and the respondents were asked to choose the one they agreed with the most.

1. So that the people have rights and a real voice in a democratic way, parliament should have a single chamber only, that is, the House of Representatives. All the MPs should be popularly elected.
2. In order to have stability and security and to have a weight to counter-balance the power of the elected MPs so that they do not gain too much power, there should be a Senate, with the senators appointed by those with power.

The results of the poll are shown in Figure 2. As for the students, 44.4 percent felt that parliament should be composed of a House of Representatives only (Choice 1); 55.6 percent felt that parliament should have a Senate too (Choice 2). The views of the people were similar to those of the students. That is, 45.8 percent chose Choice 1 and 54.2 percent chose Choice 2, which is less than a 10 percent difference. This shows that there are about equal numbers who support each position on this question. This means that the students and people do not think that having a Senate or not is a very important matter. Since we do not have real political parties with a widespread base of popular support and since the MPs

have not generated trust among the students and people, the students and people are not critical of having a parliament with a Senate that has been appointed by powerholders.

However, even though more than 50 percent of the students and people are not opposed to having a Senate, this does not mean that the students and people feel that the Senate was formed in a legitimate manner. The senators were appointed and they have not come from all walks of life. Most are soldiers. The position of senator is used like a reward for those whom the powerholders feel have made or will make profits for them. Thus, if the position of senator is to have real legitimacy, the senators should be elected by the people or they should be representatives of the people who come from all walks of life. They should not be appointees who all support the government in parliament as is the case today.




Figure 1: The quality of Elected MPs

Key:

1. Percent
2. Very bad
3. Bad
4. Fair
5. Good
6. Very good
7. Students
8. People




Figure 2: Form of parliament

Key:

1. Percent
2. Choice 1: Have only House of Representatives
3. Choice 2: Have both House of Representatives and Senate
4. Students
5. People

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THAILAND

POPULATION GROWTH SLOWS ; MUSLIMS RESIST BIRTH CONTROL

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 6 Jan 83 pp 3, 10

[Article: "The South Is Experiencing Problems With Birth Control Since This Is Against [Islamic] Religion; Other Places Have Achieved Results Beyond Expectations Because of the Economy"]

[Text] Mr Chaiwat Panchaphong, the director of the Office of the Family Planning Association of Thailand, pointed out the factors that have resulted in family planning in Thailand achieving good results. This is contrary to foreign theory that says that the population of the developing countries will increase continuously.

By the end of the Third National Economic and Social Development Plan, Thailand had succeeded in lowering the population growth rate from 3.2 per 1,000 per year to 2.5 per year. And by the end of the Fourth Development Plan, the rate had declined to 2.1 per year. At present, the population growth rate is about 1.9 to 2.0.

The director of the Office of the Family Planning Association of Thailand said that the factors that have resulted in Thailand's family planning activities achieving such results include: 1. Thais are "imitators," that is, they will follow the example of others. 2. Government and private units have carried on such activities in a serious manner. 3. The officials who have carried on such work have worked efficiently. 4. The government has a clear policy and has included this policy in the development plans. 5. The people have cooperated well. This stems in part from the economic recession. 6. Family planning does not conflict with Buddhist principles.

Mr Chaiwat said that studies have shown that the family planning activities have achieved the greatest results in the north. It is thought that this is because there is a private hospital in Chiang Mai that had begun carrying out such work previously. Besides this, this is also due to the culture of the people in this region. The people here are "easy to teach" and appreciate beauty. Thus, they have accepted the fact that family planning will result in the woman having a better figure than if she has many children.

As for the northeast, the population birth rate is still rising. This is because the family planning units have not been able to carry on activities in the remote areas.

One of the areas where the family planning units have encountered obstacles is the south. The director of the Office of the Family Planning Association of Thailand said that this is due partly to the political problems here. Besides this, Islamic law does not support birth control.

However, the association has not neglected to make an attempt. It has tried to inform the people and generate understanding by coordinating activities in this sector with the activities of the cooperatives, such as the rubber plantation cooperatives and the fishing cooperatives, in order to make the cooperative leaders realize the importance of having virtuous children and to induce the cooperative members to engage in family planning.

Besides this, the association has sent officials to remote rural areas in the south. These officials have gone with malaria eradication units from the Ministry of Public Health. They have gone in order to spread knowledge about family planning and about having a better life to the rural people. During the past 2-3 months of carrying on activities, they have received good cooperation from the people in the south.

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THAILAND

MOI ORDERS HALT TO USE OF TERM 'THAI MUSLIM'

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 8 Jan 83 pp 1, 12

[Article: "Use of Term 'Thai Muslim' Prohibited In Order to Eliminate Feeling of Being Separate"]

[Text] The Ministry of Interior has ordered all units subordinate to the ministry to stop using the term "Thai Muslim" and instead use the term "Thais of the Muslim faith." This is to be done for psychological reasons; this will not create a feeling of being separate.

A news report from the Ministry of Interior has informed MATICHON that on 24 December 1982, Mr Phisan Mulasatsathon, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, sent a notice to all provincial governors, to the directors of the state enterprises subordinate to the ministry and to subordinate units directing them to switch from using the term "Thai Muslims" to using the term "Thais." And in cases in which they must be pointed out specifically, the terms "Thais of the Muslim faith" or "Thais from the south" are to be used.

This notice referred to the August 1982 meeting of the National Psychological Operations Committee that was held on 30 August 1982. This conference discussed the matter of using appellations that can have a bad psychological effect. And so it passed a resolution to stop using the term "Thai Muslim."

"The Ministry of Interior discussed this and felt that discarding the term "Thai Muslim" in favor of a more appropriate term would be beneficial in several respects. One result will be to prevent a split into "Thai Buddhists" and "Thai Muslims." This will lead to a greater awareness of being Thai and reduce the war factors that stem from such incitement," said this notice. It directed the provinces and subordinate units and state enterprises to act in strict accord with this.

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THAILAND

EDITORIAL URGES CAUTION ON BREAKING GAS CONTRACT, VOICES DISAPPOINTMENT

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 30 Dec 82 p 5

[Editorial: "The Gas Problem"]

[Text] Ever since the prime minister went to Bang Pakong to conduct ceremonies initiating the use of gas from the Gulf of Thailand in order to use this gas to generate electricity, which was the day that the prime minister expressed great hopes for a very bright future for the country, the people too have had bright hopes and expressed joy about the accomplishments of the Union Oil Company and the future of the country, which will benefit greatly from the gas here.

Besides this, there has also been the hope that it will be possible to use this gas for other industrial projects such as the power plant at Sam Rong. To this end, a gas pipeline has already been constructed.

But the amount of gas that this company has supplied to the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand is much less than that agreed on. This has created problems for the power plants. Besides this, there are problems of gas leaks. And so it may not be possible to supply the power plant at Sam Rong with gas as had been hoped.

At the same time, one cement company had hoped to use gas to produce cement at its plants in Saraburi Province. It has already built a gas pipeline. But it has not been able to bring in gas according to the project or in accord with what has already been done.

The investments that Thailand has made -- such as the construction of a power plant that uses natural gas, the construction of a gas pipeline from the wells to the coast in Rayong Province, which people boast is the longest gas pipeline, and the construction of a land gas pipeline to send gas to various projects -- have wasted billions of baht.

Gas shipments have always been less than what was agreed on with Thailand, that is, with the Petroleum Authority of Thailand. Even if Thailand demands a fine in accord with the contract signed with the Union Oil Company, this will not cover the investments that have been made or the losses that have been suffered.

Various circles have been commenting on this for a long time. But the Petroleum Authority of Thailand has said only that negotiations are underway. And the Union Oil Company has said that it will take steps to supply more gas and fulfill the terms of the contract. But up to now, things have never been done as agreed on.

Now, there are reports that the minister of industry is taking a sterner attitude and has said that if the Union Oil Company cannot do things in accord with the contract, the contract will be revoked and others will be allowed to do the work in its place. It is cheering to know that, even if things are done somewhat late, things will be done in strict accord with the commitments made.

The only question is, concerning our cancelling the contract and finding someone else to do the work, have the circles concerned considered all the factors carefully? Because cancelling the contract is a matter that must be given much thought. We have accepted the results of the work of the company and have fined the company in accord with the contract. And the company's inability to pump gas in the amounts stipulated in the contract may be due to factors beyond its control or there may in fact be something behind this. Don't let the same problem arise again as in the case of revoking the contract that Thai International made with the company that produces the airbus, which is a case that is now being disputed.

Besides this, another question is: Concerning the investments made to build gas pipelines for various industrial activities and to construct plants, to which no gas has been supplied, who will take responsibility for the disappointment and for the losses?

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THAILAND

EDITORIAL BLASTS FOREIGN INFLUENCE OVER DOMESTIC OIL PRICES

Bangkok SIAM MAI in Thai 31 Dec 82 p 3

[Editorial: "Precious Oil -- Slave Contract"]

[Text] General Prem Tinsulanon, the prime minister, spoke proudly at a cabinet meeting after returning from a trip to officially open the oil well in Kamphaengphet Province. This oil, which will be produced at the rate of 5,000 barrels a day, will help the country save some foreign currency. Even though this is not a lot, it is the second start in a "brilliant future." The first began with the production of natural gas.

But along with this pride, Lieutenant Suli Mahasanthana, the minister to the Office of the Prime Minister who is responsible for renegotiating with the Thai Shell Company about the price of oil, had to bustle about because of the well-head oil price. For sales to the Petroleum Authority of Thailand, Shell set the price at \$32.18 per barrel -- citing the price of the crude oil that Thailand has purchased from Saudi Arabia -- even though the price of oil on world markets is lower than that. The Thai government has offered Thai Shell \$25.50 per barrel. This is considered a fair price based on investments and profits. There is no sign yet that these negotiations will reach an agreement in accord with the price offered by the Thai side, which is the owner of the land. This is because of the disadvantageous contract signed by a previous government when the foreign company first asked for exploratory drilling concessions.

This disadvantageous contract clearly states that Thailand must purchase the oil at a price at least equal to the world market price. The government signed this contract even though this is a resource that is pumped out of our own land.

In these countries, the foreign companies have been able to use tricks in order to increase profits for the home company. This has provided an example for the foreign companies that are drilling oil and natural gas in Thailand. They think that this is the way to set prices.

Based on this, we ask the government not to give in to the foreign companies, which like to cite the effect this will have on the investment climate in Thailand and which like to refer to the slave contract that was signed in a previous period. And they frequently say that if Thailand does not agree, in the future, no one will dare invest in Thailand.

These are all lies! Concerning these foreign companies, we have to understand that they will go anywhere in the world if there is any chance of their making a profit. They will go to every country that is secure and that can guarantee that they will not lose money.

Since the oil that has been produced is evidence of the reserves that will produce profits in the future, if we carry a "big stick," the foreign companies will definitely have to follow us after they calculate their gains and losses.

And what is most important is that the government must quickly revise this slave contract and use this as a yardstick in dealing with the foreign companies, both in setting prices and dividing the profits. Otherwise, the oil of which the prime minister is so proud will flow out of Kamphaengphet into the hands of the foreign companies. The only thing left will be dry oil residue and the pride of having deceived oneself.

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THAILAND

LAN KRABUE CRUDE OIL PRICE POLICY QUESTIONED

Bangkok PATINYA in Thai 3 Jan 83 pp 21, 22

[Article: "Why Is the Price of Lan Krabue Crude Oil Equal to That of Oil From Saudi Arabia?"]

[Text] The Thai people have been disappointed by the natural gas matter but they still have hopes for a bright [future] from the Lan Krabue crude oil in Kamphangphet Province. The Thai Shell Exploration Company of Thailand will begin producing oil from the Sirikit well for the first time on 20 January 1983 as a New Year's gift to the Thai people. It is hoped that this will keep Thailand from having to experience another oil crisis and help other business activities to revive quickly.

But unfortunately, the Thai Shell Company has proposed selling crude oil from the Sirikit well to the Thai government at a price of \$34 a barrel. This is the same price as that of the crude oil purchased on an official basis on the world market. It is also the same price as that paid for Arabian light crude oil, which the Petroleum Authority of Thailand purchases from the Petromin Company of Saudi Arabia. This has broken the hearts of the Thai people a second time in the wake of their disappointment with the natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand.

The Facts Concerning Price Setting

After the Thai Shell conducted surveys and struck oil at the Sirikit (Lan Krabue) well in Kamphangphet Province, where the wells are about to go into production, the Thai Shell company told Lieutenant Suli Mahasantha-na, the minister to the Office of the Prime Minister and the head of the crude oil price negotiating team, that it would produce crude oil from the Sirikit well and refine various types of oil for \$37.50 per barrel. In this proposal, the Thai Shell Company also said that it would deduct the \$3.50 per barrel refining charge, which would reduce the price of the crude oil sold to the Thai government to \$34.05 per barrel. But so that the Thai government can benefit even more from the crude oil from the Sirikit well, the company will be glad to reduce the price of the crude oil another 5 percent. Thus, at the latest negotiating session, the Thai Shell Company proposed selling the oil for \$32.35 per barrel. But the government wanted to continue bargaining and asked to buy the

oil at \$27 per barrel. Concerning this, a news source from the Ministry of Industry has told PATINYA that the "government feels that the price of \$34 per barrel proposed by the Thai Shell Exploration Company of Thailand is too high. The government wants the Thai Shell Company to reduce the price of the crude oil sold to the government, which has been set at \$34 per barrel, another 20 percent. This would bring the price down to \$27.24 per barrel. I don't know if the Thai Shell Company has set such a high price because they are experiencing financial problems or what. At present, there are reports that they proposed selling this crude oil to the Esso refinery after the negotiations with the government failed to achieve any results. But it isn't known what price they stipulated. The government will have to find out the facts. I think that \$34 a barrel is too high."

Why \$34

Prior to this, Mr Prakhong Phonlahna, the director of the Mineral Fuels Division, MInistry of Industry, sent a report to Mr Chirayu Isarangkun Na Ayuthaya, saying that the Thai Shell Exploration Company of Thailand would sell oil to the government for only \$15 a barrel and that it would still make a profit after deducting the fees and trade taxes. Besides this, the main office of the Shell Company, which is located in The Hague in the Netherlands, had made an analysis before requesting a concession to conduct a survey in Thailand in 1978. It found that, concerning the crude oil deposits in Thailand, if the surveys found oil, the Shell Company would be able to sell the oil for \$7 per barrel and that it would still make a profit after deducting the fees and trade taxes.

The reason that the main Shell office made a clear analysis of the sales price before requesting a survey concession was because an initial survey had shown that Thailand was an area with one of the world's largest oil deposits. This would result in crude oil production costs being very low here. From the survey and from the report sent by the Thai Shell Company to the government, it was expected that the Sirikit well would produce at least 180 million barrels of oil.

But when the Thai Shell Company proposed these figures during the negotiations on crude oil prices, it claimed that the company would be able to produce only 15 percent of the crude oil from the oil reserves in this well. This was the same as saying that it would be able to produce only 30 million barrels of crude oil. This was similar to the mistake made in estimating the amount of natural gas reserves at the Erawan well.

Because the Thai Shell Company could produce only a much smaller amount of oil, the cost of producing the crude oil went up accordingly. Thus, the Thai Shell Company, citing the higher production costs, said that the company had to sell the oil at \$34 a barrel.

Thais Will Have to Use Expensive Goods

The Thai team, led by Lieutenant Suli, the head of the Thai negotiating team, held negotiations with the Thai Shell Company but failed to reach an agreement. However, there will be a new round of negotiations. This time, Lieutenant Suli will be the only negotiator for the Thai side. A team will not be formed to negotiate with the representatives of the Thai Shell Company.

Recently, Lieutenant Suli held negotiations with two representatives of the Thai Shell Company, Mr Cole, the manager of the Shell Company, and Dr Merki, the director of the Thai Shell Company. What has taken place to date at the negotiations is still a secret. However, regardless of the results, the Thai people will have to use expensive oil. This is because of the government's failure to monitor closely the surveys concerning the amount of crude oil reserves. Because of this, this company has been able to cite various reasons in order to inflate the price at will.

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THAILAND

COLUMNIST URGES END TO PARTICIPATION IN TIN PACT

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 29 Dec 82 p 3

[Chon Tawan column: "Leave the Tin Cartel"]

[Text] The matter of the tin cartel limiting export quotas on tin will have a great effect on the country's economy and society.

Tin is our number one ore export and it has earned more than 10 billion baht for us during the past few years.

If a tin surplus had not arisen because of the United States flooding the market with tin from its stocks, Thailand would soon have become the largest tin producer and exporter in the world. This is because the government, particularly the Department of Mineral Resources, Ministry of Industry, has provided and given much support to this.

But when tin quotas were restricted this time, this put a halt to things and caused severe losses for those in the tin mining business. This is because production fell to only 25 percent of what it had been. Because tin production has fallen so much, those engaged in this will have to cease operations since they cannot cover the rising production costs at a small mine.

The larger mines will have to cut back production in accord with the quotas set by government officials. This means that additional tens of thousands of people in the country will lose their jobs.

A question worth thinking about is: Since we are a member of the World Tin Cartel and have thus had to limit the amount of tin produced, which has had such economic and social effects, would withdrawing from the tin cartel enable us to reduce the danger? Since Thailand must struggle to find money to develop the country, is it right for us to hang ourself for others in order to die together?

If we leave the tin cartel, we will be able to sell tin on markets that are not in the cartel. And even though prices may fall somewhat because of not having any price controls, we will be able to produce and sell tin freely. In order to solve the nation's problems concerning economic and social decline, the government should think about finding a way to solve this problem.

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THAILAND

COLUMNIST HITS MALAYSIA FOR TIN PURCHASE FROM LAOS

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 6 Jan 83 p 7

[Speaking On Behalf of the villagers column by "A Man From Muang Nga": "An International Matter at Phang Nga"]

[Text] Phang Nga, a nice, small town, is experiencing a problem that the cabinet has referred to as an international problem. What else could this be but tin again!

Thailand has long been one of the members of the world tin cartel, as are Malaysia and Singapore. But unlike Singapore, Thailand is a producer while Singapore smelts the ore. And it has influence over Thailand in various ways.

Concerning the shipment of tin overseas, quotas have been restricted in accord with the agreement reached by the member countries in order to keep tin prices from falling because of the glut on world markets. A major producer like Bolivia has left the tin trading cartel and the United States has flooded world markets with tin. Even the Arab countries, which are major customers of the cartel, are releasing their tin onto world markets.

The restrictions on Thai tin quotas at present, which is the time of the year when mining operations are carried on vigorously, have caused problems. The producers cannot sell their tin because the buyers have purchased their full quota and do not dare purchase any more. They are afraid of breaking the law. Many people would like to know what has happened to this tin that could not be sold.

In Malaysia, the tin quota has not been reached. But instead of buying from Thailand, it signed a contract to make purchases from Laos, which is the smallest tin producer in the world. And after a conference lasting only 2 days, it was announced that the duty on tin would be lowered from 2,500 baht to only 500 baht.

Thai tin traders who have made investments must pay a duty of 4,500 baht per hap [one hap equals 60 kilograms]. When the various taxes are added on, this brings the total to more than 6,000 baht per hap. But if the ore is sent to Malaysia, the duty is only 500 baht. When the various taxes are added on, the total does not exceed 1,500 baht. A person would be a fool not to sell to Malaysia.

This is just the difference in duty fees between Thailand and Malaysia. There have been reports for over 2 years now that Thailand will lower the fees from 4,500 baht to 2,400 baht. But nothing has been settled. But in Malaysia, things were settled very quickly.

There have been reports from a reliable news source that this contract was signed because Malaysia thought that the Lao and Thai people resemble each other and that they live near each other. And since the same route is used too, signing with Laos is the same as signing with Thailand.

I would like to know if this is an international matter, our beloved Thai government. If anyone knows, please tell me.

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THAILAND

DAM CONSTRUCTION CAUSES BORDER PROBLEMS WITH BURMA

Chiang Mai THIN THAI in Thai 8 Dec 82 pp 1, 12

[Article: "Mae Sot Checkpoint Will Not Be Opened; Dam Construction to Proceed"]

[Text] The Mae Sot border is still closed; the people on Burma's side are experiencing problems and cannot come to purchase goods.

Because Burmese troops have threatened to harm Thai workers who are building a dam on the Moei River, charging that this will cause the river to erode the bank on the Burmese side instead of eroding the bank on the Thai side, Tak Province has had to announce the closing of the Thai border in Mae Sot District and has resolutely prohibited people from crossing back and forth. A report said that this order is still in effect and that this has caused problems for the people on the Burmese side.

The report said that, normally, few Thais cross over into Burma at Myawaddi since this is a small town that does not have any goods that they want or need. This is very different from the situation on the Thai side in Mae Sot district, where the town is much bigger and where there are a variety of goods available, including various consumer goods, that the Burmese people want.

The report said that Thailand does not want to keep the border closed because it feels sorry for the Burmese people who have had to experience hardships because of not being able to cross over and purchase food and other necessities at the markets in Mae Sot District. In addition, this has cut the incomes of the merchants who regularly come to engage in trade in Thailand.

However, even though the Burmese soldiers have threatened to take action if the Thais build the dam, construction on the dam is proceeding. Thailand believes that this dam is located in Thailand and that Burma does not have the right to interfere. This amounts to interfering in the internal affairs of Thailand.

Construction on the dam was halted temporarily when Burmese soldiers made new threats. But after officials were sent to guard the area, construction got underway again. This has made it impossible for Burma to take any action, even though they are worried that Thailand's construction of this dam will cause the river to erode the river bank on the Burmese side.

The report said that the markets in Mae Sot District are open as usual but that they are quieter than normal. This is because people from Myawaddi on the Burmese side are not coming to shop.

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TONGA

BRIEFS

MALAYSIAN TRAINING FOR OFFICERS--Kuala Lumpur, 3 Feb--The South Pacific island of Tonga is looking into the possibility of sending officers for training at Malaysia's National Public Administration Institute (INTAN). Acting Chief Secretary of Tonga, Sione Kite, said after a briefing by INTAN Director Dr Mohd Shahari Ahmad Jabar yesterday that he was impressed with the courses organized there. Kite is here following Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad's offer to assist Tonga in various fields including training relevant to the country's development programmes.
[Text] [Rangoon THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY in English 5 Feb 83 p 3]

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH MILITARY DISCIPLINE URGED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Jan 83 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Strictly Observing Discipline Outside the Barracks"]

[Text] Strict self-discipline is an attribute that symbolizes the quality of soldiers of a revolutionary army, and is a fine tradition of our army. Observing strict military discipline at all times and places, and in all circumstances, inside as well as outside the barracks, is a duty and a mandatory requirement of all military personnel.

As they come in contact with the vast social milieu outside their barracks, armymen must carefully observe straitlaced discipline. The people love and trust the military for their spirit of enduring hardships, overcoming difficulties and readily giving their lives for the people and fatherland. The people also adore the stringent lifestyle, upright behavior, correct and humble attitude, and kind gestures in everyday life of "Uncle Ho's armymen." That is why a single wrongdoing by a soldier on the streets, at train and bus stations, ports and movie theaters, can undermine the people's warm feelings, giving rise sometimes to unforeseen consequences.

At present, military personnel at a number of units often commit offenses outside the barracks, violating military discipline, wearing untidy uniforms not in line with regulations, displaying arrogance and hurling obscenities, sometimes even quarreling and provoking trouble. These are unsound manifestations, which require special attention and prompt remedial measures on the part of commanding echelons. When military personnel are away from their barracks, units and comrades-in-arms, it is somewhat more difficult for their superiors to control them. According to actual experiences, those units whose personnel are offenders outside the barracks are precisely the same ones who show lax discipline in study, training and everyday life inside the barracks. In these units, the everyday effort to forge discipline is blemished, it does not receive appropriate attention and does not achieve required efficiency. A soldier committed to observing strict discipline and supported by strong and unwavering political capabilities, always behaves and acts correctly, regardless of place, time and circumstances. To help soldiers maintain stiff discipline outside the barracks, commanders must control their behavior and remind them of essential details prior to their

departure. It is necessary for commanders to name group leaders when military personnel go out in groups, in order to get prompt reports on the observance of discipline upon their return, and to address violations in a timely and strict manner. It is nevertheless, important that units regularly and properly carry out the task of education and the inculcation of discipline, and gradually establish specific compliance with regulations. Cadres must set examples for soldiers to follow, while soldiers must form the habit and develop the spirit of complying strictly and voluntarily with military discipline, everywhere and at all times. Discipline enforcement cannot be strict if commanders wait until after a violation has been committed before taking steps to strengthen discipline, then removing them as soon as the urgency has disappeared. Outside the barracks, each soldier must voluntarily and strictly observe military discipline. At the same time, he must remind his companions of this requirement, and aid them in behaving and acting correctly, respecting the people, strictly observing state laws, calmly and clearly distinguishing between right and wrong, and finding the best solution when wrongs occur. He must resolutely prevent regrettable misdeeds from tainting the honor of military personnel and the fine traditions of our army.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AT MILITARY CHECKPOINT REPORTED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Jan 83 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Van Giang, Thu Duc Technical Workers School, Ho Chi Minh City: "Wrongdoing of Lieu De Military Checkpoint"]

[Text] On 16 October 1982, while returning to the unit from leave, I passed by the Lieu De military checkpoint, in Nghia Hung District, Ha Nam Ninh Province. Due to my haste, I made the mistake of wearing civilian clothes with a military cap. Military controllers at the Lieu De checkpoint called me in to check my papers. I recognized my mistake, changed into uniform and asked the controllers for permission to continue the trip in order to get back to the unit on time. The controllers refused and intended to confiscate my civilian clothes. I, as well as my elder and my younger sisters who had accompanied me, implored the controllers to let me go, but they still refused. Since my elder sister had talked a great deal, they suggested that we give them a pack of Song Cau cigarettes. My elder sister went to a refreshment bar to buy a pack of cigarettes at 20 dong. However, after receiving the gift, the controllers still continued to refuse while one controller suggested that we give them more. Reluctantly, I gave 30 dong to a corporal wearing a red armband. After receiving the money, a second lieutenant told me, "OK, you can go now."

Back in the unit, I thought a lot about the incident and was dissatisfied with the action of the Lieu De military checkpoint, which was contrary to proper military behavior. I propose that military organs in Ha Nam Ninh Province and Nghia Hung District take appropriate action against the Lieu De military checkpoint for the above misdeed.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

MR 9 BUILDS VILLAGE UNITS

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 11, Nov 82 pp 56-64

[Article by Major General Ho Ba Phuc: "The Armed Forces of Military Region 9 and the Task of Strengthening the Basic Units in the Villages"]

[Text] During the past several years, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee together with the various local party committee echelons and governments, the people's armed forces of Military Region 9 have given their attention to thoroughly implementing the political line and the military line of the party and have, on the basis of the actual situation within the localities of the military region, made many efforts to strengthen the basic village units in the different localities within the military region. In order for the armed forces of Military Region 9 to help to improve the performance of this task, we present in this article a number of matters that are in the nature of initial experiences and guidelines of the armed forces of Military Region 9 in this task of strategic importance.

1. Being Clearly Aware of the Role and the Task of the Basic Village Units in the New Stage of the Revolution

In socialist construction, the village occupies a very important position. Its position is organically linked to the position of the district; and, the district is, as has been stated by our party, the basic economic and national defense unit of the country. Recently, within our military region, more than a few cadres have subscribed to the concept that the district and the village are separated. We have waged a struggle against this incorrect concept and clearly shown our cadres and soldiers the close relationship that exists between building the villages and building the districts and province as well as the close relationship between building the villages in accordance with the requirements of the initial stage of the period of transition to socialism and the goals and stages involved in developing the villages into strong cells of the district in the work of protecting and defending the socialist fatherland over the long range.

To correctly understand the specifics and the requirements involved in building and strengthening the basic village units, we must always closely

link the political task of the village to the political and military tasks of the province and the military region. The political and military tasks of Military Region 9 are to build itself into a strong strategic defense zone, into a prosperous and strong strategic rear area befitting its strategic economic and military importance vis-a-vis our entire country and southern Indochina. The villages within the military region must not only become economically prosperous and politically stable, must not only have a beautiful cultural and social life, a life lived by new, socialist persons, but they must also be prepared in terms of manpower and materiel, be organizationally prepared to support the frontlines, support the strengthening of the people's army as it fights to defend the fatherland. Each village must be a battle position that is in a high state of combat readiness and possesses both the ability and the strength needed to firmly protect the locality and create the combined fighting strength of the district military fortress and the provincial strategic unit. Within our military region, facts have clearly shown that the majority of the cadres on the various levels and the majority of the people do not have this understanding and are not working to make this understanding a reality. For this reason, there are villages in which the level of grain production and the living conditions of the people have been raised to a rather high level but security and national defense activities are weak and deficient. Of course, if production is underdeveloped, no base exists for performing the national defense task well or the task of a strategic rear area well.

In the face of the collaboration between the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists and the U.S. imperialists and their reactionary lackeys and the fact that Beijing is making every effort to wage a multi-faceted war of sabotage against our country, we also must, when examining the task of strengthening the basic village units, always keep in mind the requirements and tasks of the struggle against the enemy's war of sabotage. The localities within Military Region 9 must give even more attention to this matter. Because, the majority of the provinces within the military region are areas that were controlled by the enemy for several decades in a row, were subjected to the yoke of neo-colonialism as soon as the yoke of old style colonialism was removed and have not been liberated for very long. The number of persons who once served in the puppet army or puppet government is quite high. We have not done much to transform them. More than a few of these persons still obstinately refuse to undergo transformation in good faith or are continuing to serve as lackeys of the enemy by secretly sabotaging and opposing our programs and policies on the basic level. If a determined struggle is not waged against the enemy and if we do not defeat their schemes and acts of sabotage, not only is the building of the national defense system, the maintenance of combat readiness and combat activities sabotaged, but production within the village is slowed and neither socialist transformation nor socialist construction within the village can be successfully carried out.

It is regrettable that many cadres and soldiers, including cadres and soldiers within the armed forces of the military region, still lack vigilance, lack political sensitivity and are not fully aware of the dangerous schemes and acts of sabotage of the enemy. In their multi-faceted war of sabotage against Military Region 9, the enemy considers sabotaging the village base to be their key target. Facts have shown that they employ many forms of organization and

many measures to win the basic level, win the masses away from us and render the apparatus of our dictatorship of the proletariat on the basic level ineffective in a vain attempt to turn our villages into footholds of theirs, into springboards for their activities. The military region and the various provinces promptly pointed out this situation to the cadres of the various sectors, to the people and the armed forces; at the same time, we have established as one of the basic elements in the mobilization of the masses and the strengthening of the basic units the launching of a movement of all the people performing security work and struggling to rid the locality of reactionaries and defeat each act of sabotage of the enemy. It is necessary to firmly strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat system on the basic level and employ the strength of all the people and the government apparatus on the basic level to promptly stop and suppress each act of sabotage of the enemy against the political security and social order of the locality.

When examining the matter of the village level, we must always be fully aware of the special characteristics of the various localities within the military region. Military Region 9 consists of the eight provinces in the Mekong River Delta, which are divided in 85 districts and cities (12 cities), 994 villages, 77 subwards and 6,515 hamlets. The population of the military region, which is nearly 11 million, accounts for roughly one-fifth the entire country's population. In terms of nationalities and religions, the makeup of the population is relatively complex: 5 percent of the population is Catholic, more than 10 percent practices the Hoa Hao religion and nearly 3 percent practices the Cao Dai religion. Nearly 7 percent of the population belongs to the Khmer ethnic minority and more than 2 percent is of Chinese ancestry. The number of puppet troops who were routed on the spot numbers in the hundreds of thousands and accounts for 5 percent of the population. Military Region 9 is in the process of beginning to carry out socialist transformation and socialist construction. To date, the production relations in the countryside are still primarily private production relations and only about 20 percent of the population is earning a living collectively in low-level forms of organization, such as solidarity teams, production teams and production collectives. The level of cultural and social development is very low. The distribution of the population and the distribution of villages and hamlets are complex and are marked by special characteristics. There are large villages with populations of 30,000 to 40,000 concentrated along main roads and rivers for a distance of 15 kilometers. However, many areas are uninhabited, especially along the seacoast and places far from main roads. Many villages were formerly part of the "empty base" that was tightly controlled by the enemy for many years. Many places that were once bases of the revolution are now places at which the revolution is weak. Although the country has been totally liberated, the building of the dictatorship of the proletariat system from the provincial to the district and village levels has only begun. Due to the need for cadres, a rather large number of cadres and key cadres on the village level have been transferred to strengthen district and provincial agencies. The revolutionary movement at installations since liberation day, although it has provided to villages many new, core cadres, has not provided enough cadres for us to build a strong and solid corps of cadres on the village level. This situation has made it difficult for our dictatorship of the proletariat in many villages to avoid being inexperienced and has, at some places, even caused it to be less than politically pure, to

be infiltrated and monopolized by the enemy. Meanwhile, the very high requirements of work tasks and the very decisive and complex nature of the revolutionary struggle demand that we have a large number of high quality cadres and core cadres who are trusted by the masses. Not much has been done to meet these demands of our basic level. In addition, appropriate attention has not been given to strengthening the basic level. For this reason, the strengthening of the village level must be carried out in a fundamental, comprehensive, urgent and constant manner. At the same time, we must perform this work in a stable, steady manner and not be impatient or impetuous. Of course, we cannot use the special characteristics of the military region as an excuse for acting slowly or allowing the situation to remain poor for a long period of time. The realities of the work of strengthening the basic village level in the recent past have shown the actual capabilities that we have with regard to mobilizing weak and deficient villages to advance to the level of development of the average and above average villages. For example, in Hau Giang Province, after it was strengthened, Nhan Nghia Village advanced from being a weak and deficient village to one of the best villages in the province. In Tien Giang Province, Go Cong District has upgraded virtually all of its villages to strong, stable villages, as a result of which the district has become the strong district of the province.

On the basis of the attitudes and concepts mentioned above, the armed forces of Military Region 9 have become more clearly aware of the very high, comprehensive and pressing requirements involved in strengthening the basic village units. At the same time, they are more clearly aware of the complex nature of this work. It is work that demands painstaking research of the measures to be employed and the investment of competent cadres. In particular, it is necessary to clearly recognize the comprehensive objectives and requirements involved in mobilizing the masses to build strong and solid villages. Clearly aware of this, the military region party committee has attached importance to defining in detail the objectives, specifics and requirements of strengthening the villages for the work units of the military region and the various provinces.

2. Clearly Defining the Responsibility of the Armed Forces of the Military Region with Regard to Participating in the Strengthening of the Basic Village Units

Strengthening the villages is important work in all localities within the military region, work that is jointly performed by the various sectors and levels. Our armed forces are a tool of the party and state. Therefore, the armed forces have the task of strengthening the basic level under the leadership and guidance of the local party committee echelon and government and the military region in a manner consistent with the function and task of each military element. Under the conditions of Military Region 9, due to the pressing and widespread requirements of the task of strengthening the basic units in the villages and due to the shortage of cadres within the party apparatus and local government and the very large amount of work that must be performed, it is both very necessary and reasonable for the armed forces to participate in the effort to strengthen the villages in a relatively comprehensive manner.

To perform this task well, the armed forces of the military region must clearly realize that this task is part of the function of the people's army and is also their immediate military task. Because, building strong, solid villages and mobilizing the revolutionary movement of the masses on the basic level lay a firm, solid foundation for building the national defense system, building the battle position of the people's war, building the strategic rear area and building the army's rear area.

Facts have clearly shown that not all cadres and soldiers within the military region have had a correct or clear understanding of this task from the very outset. Some cadres and soldiers still consider this work to be a matter of "doing a good service," of doing the work of the sectors for the state agencies and mass organizations. As a result of this incorrect understanding, some cadres who have been assigned the task of building the village level have maintained that they are incompetent and have, as a result, been "banished" to this work by the organization. There are even some units which maintain that the cadres who perform this work are no longer part of the unit's table of organization and have, as a result, cut the distribution of supplies to these persons! This mistake has only occurred in individual cases but the military region party committee considers it to be a very serious mistake and has taken prompt action to correct it. At the same time, we have attached special importance to struggling against the lack of initiative and activism, against waiting for the local party committee echelon to assign a task before taking action. The military region party committee has pointed out that strengthening the village level has become a pressing political-military task, which every sector and level within the armed forces of the military region must take the initiative in proposing to the local party committee echelon instead of adopting a passive, wait and see or indifferent attitude in the face of the weaknesses and deficiencies of the basic level. Many provincial military commands, such as those in Tien Giang, Ben Tre, Cuu Long, Hau Giang and other provinces, have taken the initiative in serving as the command staff of the local party committee echelon in mobilizing the masses to build the basic village level and mobilizing the local armed forces to participate along with the locality in encouraging the masses to implement the major lines, programs and policies of the party and state.

In conjunction with giving the cadres and soldiers within the military region a clear understanding of the task of actively participating in the effort to strengthen the village level, we have assigned responsibilities for organizing implementation to the provincial military commands and the various units, including the agency of the military region. A resolution issued by the military region party committee in August, 1980, states: "Main force troops, local troops and the agencies on the various echelons must actively participate in mobilizing the masses to carry out socialist transformation and socialist construction, build the national defense system within the scope of their responsibilities and help the locality to build, strengthen and purify the base within the area for which they are responsible. The party committee echelons and the commanders of units, regardless of where they are stationed, must maintain close relations with the local party committee echelon, government and mass organizations for the purpose of adopting a unified plan and coordinating their organization in order to achieve successful implementation by troops."

Actual experience has shown that the educational effort to give troops a clear understanding of this task must be a constant effort; at the same time, misconceptions must promptly be corrected on the basis of actual practice. Recently, many of the comrades who have been assigned to building the basic level have only attached importance to building the villages militarily. Some cadres do not realize that the need to perform this task is a long-range, continuous need, not a need that can be met in merely one phase of activity. Some units use the excuse that they are busy with other work in order to reduce the priority given to the requirement to carry out the assigned task. These incorrect attitudes have exerted something of an adverse influence upon the results achieved in building and strengthening the basic village units.

We have also attached importance to studying and applying the experiences of other military regions with regard to developing upon the role played by military personnel who return to the basic level upon the fulfillment of their military obligation. We consider them to be a very important source of cadres who are local people, ethnic minority members or religious followers, a source of cadres who can rapidly strengthen the villages in the various localities within the military region. If good plans are adopted for managing, training and utilizing these persons, it is possible to annually provide to the military region a few thousand core cadres who have been educated and forged and who have matured within the great school that is the army in order to strengthen the village level.

3. Attaching Importance to Providing Training and Raising the Level of Understanding and Application of the Principles and Methods Involved in Mobilizing the Masses and Building and Strengthening the Village Basic Units

Mobilizing the masses and building and strengthening the village basic units are work involving revolutionary agitation for the purpose of implementing the lines, programs and policies of the party and state regarding politics, the economy, the culture, society, ideology and organization, building the party base, the government and the political mass organizations, building the militia forces, guerrilla forces and so forth at basic units. In order to properly perform the task of mobilizing the masses to build and strengthen the basic units, it is necessary to adopt the correct viewpoint and stand and correctly apply the principles and methods of the party regarding revolutionary work. For this reason, the military region and the various provinces within it have attached importance to providing training to heighten the proletarian viewpoint and stand and the mass viewpoint of the cadres and soldiers within the armed forces of the military region and deepen their knowledge of the various areas of work so that they can successfully carry out the task assigned to them.

As mentioned above, Military Region 9 is an area that has not been liberated for very long. More than a few villages are rated as weak and deficient villages. Because they were controlled and maliciously sabotaged by the enemy in past years, some key, important areas are still places at which we encounter numerous complex problems and difficulties in our effort to build and strengthen the revolutionary government on the basic level. In view of this situation, the work of mobilizing the masses and building the basic units in the villages demands that cadres and soldiers possess a firm class

viewpoint and mass viewpoint and possess good revolutionary qualities. Only in this way is it possible to correctly evaluate the situation at weak and deficient villages; possible to avoid all prejudice and narrowmindedness toward persons who, because they were compelled or deceived by the enemy, worked for the enemy; possible to acquire confidence in the enlightenment of the mass of laboring people to understand the lines and policies of the party; and, at the same time, possible to acquire high revolutionary awareness and keen vision in order to promptly detect evil, disguised saboteurs.

The experience of Military Region 9 clearly shows that mobilizing the masses and building the village base are very difficult and arduous work. Cadres and soldiers assigned to this work not only have their living conditions entirely changed compared to living with their unit, but also must endure many difficulties and hardships. Some cadres must walk through fields and wade through water for one-half day just to reach the masses. When they arrive at the basic level, cadres must live the lifestyle of the people in order to conduct their activities, must display revolutionary virtues and a revolutionary style, must live a pure and simple life and not be drawn into such vices as drunkenness, improper relationships with women and so forth. Otherwise, they will easily lose the confidence of the masses and be unable to correctly implement the programs and policies on building and strengthening the basic level.

In the face of the complex situation at weak and deficient villages and the fact that some places have been strengthened many times but still not made much progress, many cadres and soldiers, when being assigned the work of mobilizing the masses and building the basic level, have lacked confidence in the people, lacked confidence in the fact that results could be achieved. For this reason, it is necessary to build confidence in the assigned job. In addition to teaching the mass viewpoint, one very effective method that can be employed is to use actual results to show to cadres and soldiers our ability to build basic units and upgrade weak, deficient villages to strong, stable ones. Recently, we focused on gaining experience and clearly determining the causes for the success recorded at places that have performed this work well, such as the work group in Nhan Nghia Village in Hau Giang Province, and the causes for the failure of the work group in Long Phu; this has made a practical contribution to increasing the confidence that cadres and soldiers have in the patriotism of the laboring masses, especially at places that were once controlled by the enemy for many years, as well as confidence in their own ability to bring about a change in the situation on the basic level by means of revolutionary agitation.

As regards the work methods employed in mobilizing the masses and building and strengthening the basic village units, we have determined that these methods must focus on correcting the situation at the weak and deficient villages within the locality. In view of the fact that the localities have many such villages, we cannot be impatient or take sweeping action, rather, we must be selective, must conduct a pilot project at one place so that we can gain universal experience for application at other places. We should not begin our work at places that have too many difficulties or problems nor should we begin at places where we have many advantages in our favor.

Experience has shown that the situation at weak and deficient villages is usually a very complicated one. In order to strengthen villages well, we must correctly determine in which ways they are weak and deficient before we can establish an organization and adopt correct work methods that are consistent with the actual situation. Generally, there are several different types of weak and deficient villages: villages that are weak and deficient in all respects; villages that are weak and deficient in only one area (weak with regard to their party or government organization, weak in production or living conditions and so forth); villages that have been weak and deficient for many years; villages that have only recently become weak and deficient and so forth.

The strengthening of the basic village units must first be carried out by the local party organization and government, by local cadres and the local people. The cadres who are dispatched from the upper level generally are only in the village to provide assistance. Therefore, regardless of the case, regardless of whether the village is weak and deficient in every respect or only weak and deficient in one area, the matter of foremost importance is the need to look for every way to restore or strengthen the leadership role of the party within the village, restore party members and cadres to their combat positions and develop upon the vanguard role played by party members and cadres. As regards party members and cadres who are truly not qualified, who have truly suffered a large loss of confidence in themselves on the part of the masses and who are incapable of making progress, the suggestion must be made to the upper level that they be expelled from the party and subjected to harsh disciplinary action if they have committed a disciplinary infraction.

The mobilization of the masses to build and strengthen the basic village units must be carried out under two forms of organization: a centralized organization that operates in campaigns in key areas that are conducted by the units and groups of cadres sent from the province and the military region to strengthen the corps of cadres on the village level; an organization that operates on a routine basis and in which the system of organizations of the party, state and military agencies perform work in accordance with the periodic plans of the locality. Our experience has clearly shown that it is necessary to closely coordinate both of these forms. This is consistent with the specific situation of the military region as a place where many villages are still weak and deficient and must be rapidly strengthened and consistent with the nature of the work involved in building and strengthening the basic level as work that must be performed on a routine and long-range basis. The local armed forces have the ability to participate in both of these forms under the leadership, the division of labor and the organization of the local party committee echelon.

In order to effectively participate in the mobilization of the masses to build the basic level, the armed forces themselves must have a suitable leadership and guidance policy, plan and organization. Because, this is not merely a case of transferring cadres and soldiers to strengthen localities and work on the basic level. Rather, this is one of the fundamental jobs of the armed forces of Military Region 9 in building the national defense system and maintaining a readiness to fight in defense of the fatherland. Therefore, with the consent of the upper level, the military region organized an office

specializing in the building of the basic level to help the party committee and headquarters lead and guide the provincial military commands as well as the military units and the work units tasked with building the basic level in the villages.

Building the basic level also means performing many other jobs: building the party, building the government and the mass organizations; developing production; carrying out cultural and social development and so forth. Cadres and soldiers who want to do a good job of building the basic level must have knowledge and understanding of the lines and policies of the party and state and the policy of the locality concerning these areas of work. As a result, importance must be attached to teaching and disseminating knowledge on the line, the policy and the situation of the locality concerning these areas of work to cadres and soldiers. When it began the implementation of the program of participating in building the basic level, the military region organized training classes for more than 100 cadres of the military region agency, the provinces and the various units in order to prepare them for their work well. Since then, we have always attached importance to providing supplementary training in new knowledge to the persons performing this work. Attention must be given to establishing good relationships among the various sectors and levels. To begin with, there must be unanimity of understanding and viewpoint concerning the lines and policies of the party and state, especially with regard to the task of building the basic level in the villages and districts; there must be agreement concerning the special importance of building the basic village level in socialist transformation and socialist construction as well as in the work of strengthening the national defense system and maintaining combat readiness in the various localities within the military region. On this basis, it is necessary to heighten the sense of responsibility of each person and each level. In the recent past, the various party committee echelons, levels of government and mass organizations in the different localities have enjoyed very good relations with the armed forces, with the military agencies within the military region. At the same time, the armed forces within the military region have displayed a high sense of responsibility, displayed a high spirit of activism and initiative in serving as the command staff of the party committee echelon and local government and united and coordinated closely with the various sectors in order to help build the basic level well and help implement the other work programs and plans of the party, state and locality. Hundreds of cadres and soldiers within the military region have actively participated in the work groups agitating for the establishment of agricultural cooperatives, purchasing grain, carrying out military recruiting and so forth that have been organized by the local party committee echelon and government. The various sectors and mass organizations have actively worked with their local military agency in the induction of youths into the army, the building of the militia and self-defense forces, the maintenance of combat readiness and so forth. This is one of the reasons for the victories that have been won in all areas of work, in general, and in the effort to develop upon the role played by the armed forces in mobilizing the masses to build the basic level, in particular.

The 5th Congress of the Party made very correct decisions concerning the two strategic tasks, our main socio-economic tasks, the national defense task and the task of maintaining our readiness to fight in defense of the fatherland.

As pointed out in the Resolution of the congress, the problem we now face is to organize the implementation of the congress resolutions in order to turn them into real victories.

Military Region 9 is an area that has very large economic and military potentials. The region occupies a very important strategic position within the national defense system. Military Region 9 has the very important political task of building itself into a strong and solid component of the strategic rear area of the entire country. Together with building the provinces and districts, building the basic level in the villages is of decisive importance in the completion of this glorious and weighty task by the army and people of the military region. Because, only by strengthening the basic level, mobilizing the masses to exercise their right of collective ownership and launch an intense, widespread revolutionary action movement can we truly acquire the most stable and largest strength possible in order to turn the tremendous potentials of the locality into real strength and successfully complete each task. Recently, our military region party committee made a comprehensive evaluation of the participation by the armed forces of the military region in the building of the basic level within the villages. In this evaluation, we confirmed our strengths and achievements and pointed out our weaknesses and shortcomings. We adopted a program and plan which require that the various units and provinces make every effort to develop upon their strongpoints, overcome each weakness and intensify their participation in the building of the basic level in the years ahead. Under the leadership of the party committee echelon and with the close coordination of the various sectors within the locality, the armed forces of Military Region 9 are confident that they will make more positive contributions to the work of building and strengthening the basic level and raise the revolutionary movement of the masses to carry out the political, economic and national defense tasks set forth by the 5th Congress of the Party in the various localities within Military Region 9 to a new level of development.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARMY JOURNAL EXAMINES AIRBORNE LANDINGS

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 11, Nov 82 pp 23-34

[Article by Major General Dao Dinh Luyen: "Airborne Landings and Defensive Operations Against Airborne Landings"]

[Text] Airborne landings are a specific type of warfare that emerged in the 1930's and has been developing ever since. It is the direct result of the application of advanced aviation technology, of major changes within the air force and of the new command and mobility capabilities of the army, in general.

Airborne landings can be divided into many different types on the basis of their objective. The first type involves the landing of troops deep within the campaign rear area and the strategic rear area of the opposition and attacking the high level agencies of the state and the military command apparatus, the technical weapons and armories, including nuclear weapons, and the economic, communications and national defense industrial centers together with other targets of campaign or strategic value of the opposing country. Landings of this type are also conducted to open new fronts or attack and occupy islands and naval bases of the opposition. The second type involves supporting other services and branches in order to rapidly cross water obstacles, major rivers, ocean waters, mountainous forests and areas that are difficult to traverse; block the deployment of the opposition's reserve forces from rear lines and block the withdrawal of their forces from the front; destroy or occupy important targets of a campaign and tactical nature and increase the speed and coordination of attacking forces. The third type involves performing a number of special missions that virtually only airborne forces and equipment can successfully perform, such as commando operations, espionage operations and the occupation of high points or a special military position; the landing of troops in the rear area of the enemy in order to rescue forces, etc.

The objectives of airborne landings and the targets to be attacked and occupied by airborne landing forces are some of the main considerations in determining how deeply behind enemy lines troops will be landed, the scale of their operation and the specific makeup of the forces and equipment participating in an airborne landing. In the experience of World War II

(1939-1945), campaign size landing forces usually consisted of one airborne division or two divisions but only on very rare occasions. Campaign size landing forces can consist of two or three airborne landing divisions. For example, the British and American armies mobilized 1,300 military transport planes and 300 surface vessels to land three divisions at Normandy in northwest France. In order to land three divisions and one regiment at Ac-nhem [Vietnamese phonetics], they used 1,600 military transport planes together with 1,300 surface vessels and mobilized 1,100 bombers and 1,200 fighters to land the troops and provide them with combat support. When they landed two divisions in the Rhine River area of Germany, the British and American armies employed 2,060 military transport planes and 920 surface vessels together with 8,520 combat aircraft and 850 pieces of artillery. Tactical landing forces can range from a few companies to one or two airborne battalions. In the war of aggression against Vietnam, the American and puppet armies routinely used helicopters to make tactical landings.

Airborne landings, especially campaign and strategic airborne landings, are usually coordinated with forward offensive forces on the ground or seaborne landings. The purposes of this are to increase the speed of the offensive; crush the basic defense organization of the enemy; attack and occupy important forward targets in a short amount of time; rapidly initiate combat operations deep within the rear area of the enemy; establish sieges of major importance; disrupt the command system of the opposition; and deliver strong, annihilating, surprise blows that have a decisive effect in crushing the resistance by the opposition on the main front in order to rapidly bring the campaign or the war to a victorious conclusion.

The large airborne landing campaigns of the Soviet army in World War II were the Vi-a-gio-ma [Vietnamese phonetics] airborne landing campaign (1942) and the Do-nhi-ep [Vietnamese phonetics] airborne landing campaign (1943). In a 10 day campaign (9-19 August 1945) to destroy the Quan Dong army occupying Manchuria and Korea, the Soviet army victoriously carried out many airborne landings at Cap Nhi Tan, Truong Xuan, Tham Duong, Cat Lam, Dai Lien and Binh Nhuong to occupy airfields and communications centers and block the enemy's withdrawal. A paratroop unit of the Soviet Union landed in the middle of the compound of Quan Dong army headquarters, capturing the chief-of-staff, Ha Ta, and a number of other Japanese colonels and generals.

Military circles in the imperialist countries were quick to highly evaluate the factors of mobility, urgency and surprise in airborne landings and have often used them in coordination with other combat operations on the ground or with seaborne landings in order to create a position from which to overwhelm the opposition on the battlefield and win victory in acts of aggression in the shortest possible amount of time. Airborne landings have been carried out both during the initial period of a war and throughout the course of a war.

World War II proved that airborne landings that are staged at the start or during the initial period of a war can seize the factor of surprise and achieve large results. In May, 1940, the German army dropped large units of airborne forces into Belgium and Holland during the very first minutes of the war (in coordination with heavy bombings by the air force). These units rapidly occupied many cities and other important positions, caused a state of

chaos to exist within the various military sectors and state agencies and penetrated with lightning-like speed into important strategic areas deep within the territory of the countries being attacked. The results of these operations directly contributed to forcing Belgium and Holland to surrender. The campaign conducted by Germany to attack and occupy the island of Crete (May, 1941) in Greece also began with an airborne landing. Many theoreticians within military circles have maintained that, in terms of its objective and results, this was the largest campaign of all the airborne landing campaigns conducted by German airborne forces in World War II.

Since World War II, the strong development of aviation technology, the air force organization and the air forces within the various services has increased the importance of the airborne landings that take place at the start of a war. The position and the role of airborne troops in limited wars of aggression have been even more strongly emphasized by the imperialists. They have organized airborne landing corps that have been equipped and trained to the point where the entire force and all of its equipment can be landed from the sky using high capacity, long-range aircraft, consequently, they can send troops to any battlefield for the purpose of unleashing and waging a war of aggression with the speed of lightning. The aggression against Egypt in 1956 can be used as an example. This war of aggression began with heavy bombing by the air force followed by airborne and seaborne landings. The French and British airborne troops landed in the Port Said and Port Fuad areas in order to occupy key points on the Suez Canal, enable a seaborne landing and support the advance by seaborne troops deep into the territory of Egypt. The development of the fighting from 29 October to 7 November 1956 proved that the airborne landing campaign played a very decisive role in the initial victory of the aggressor forces on the ground.

Since then, the forces and the equipment participating in airborne landings have developed significantly. In addition to paratroop forces, increasing use has been made of ordinary ground force units equipped with mechanized equipment, tanks, missile, air defense artillery, anti-tank artillery and so forth to carry out airborne landings; heavy transport planes capable of transporting these forces, weapons and technical equipment anywhere from 5,000 to 10,000 kilometers have been manufactured. With large capacity transport planes that are capable of landing troops as well as their combat equipment, both the equipment needed to transport troops and the time needed to land them are markedly reduced. The various types of helicopters have also been continually improved upon and are widely used in airborne landing operations. Improvements have also been made to the various types of parachutes, primarily so that troops can be safely dropped at a much higher aircraft speed than before and equipment can be landed by parachute. Many new types of equipment have been manufactured, such as parachute platforms, multi-canopy parachutes, jet parachute systems and so forth. Airborne landings are carried out by means of paratroop forces and by means of aircraft landing on the ground. In order to carry out its schemes of aggression, the United States has organized a "military airlift" capable of rapidly transporting division and corps size military units from the United States to western Europe, the Middle East-Persian Gulf and other places in the world. Technological and organizational improvements have been and are causing airborne landing campaigns in modern warfare to be quite different from the airborne landing campaigns in World War

II, both in terms of the scale of these operations and the forces and equipment participating in them as well as in terms of the military missions performed in these campaigns. Now, airborne forces possess high fighting capabilities and rapid mobility and can perform missions deep behind enemy lines or anywhere behind enemy lines. For this reason, modern armies, together with researching and utilizing their airborne troops, attach importance to research and organization designed to limit the effectiveness of the opposition's airborne troops to the lowest possible level and improving their ability to combat airborne landings.

In order to thwart every act of aggression of the enemy and victoriously wage a war to protect the socialist Vietnamese fatherland in every situation, studying and learning about the enemy, making the necessary preparations and organizing the defense against airborne landings by aggressor forces in our country, especially airborne landings made during the initial period of the war, have become a necessity. According to sources of foreign military information, China has three, and possibly more, paratroop divisions. This force is under the control of the air force. In order to serve their scheme of expansion and aggression, the Beijing ruling circles are making every effort to modernize their army and very much attention is being given to the air force and the strategic airborne mobile forces. They have constructed numerous airfields near the northern border of our country; increased their purchasing of equipment from the West, such as helicopters, support aircraft, large transport planes and so forth; and intensified their training of airborne troops. Ways have also been studied to use China's airborne forces to support "guerrilla" operations. Of course, the actual effectiveness of these airborne troops is dependent upon many other factors, such as their level of organization and command, staff and equipment capabilities, their ability to coordinate in combat with the other branches and services, their experience in coordinating in combat with the other branches and services, etc. Despite this, the mere fact that an enemy lies immediately adjacent to the airspace, the land and the ocean waters of our country and has a large army of several million men and a mobile airborne force organized in the manner described above requires that we be very vigilant against every kind of warfare they practice and always be ready to take the initiative and defeat each of their acts of aggression, each of their airborne landings.

Defending against an airborne landing is a very complicated and decisive type of combat operation because it requires the utilization under a single command of many forces from many different branches and services. This complex and decisive nature is clearly evident in the preparations that must be made, the reconnoitering of the enemy and the selection of combat measures that are as effective as possible, provide for close coordination and employ the fighting capabilities and strength of the various forces and branches at the correct time and place in order to destroy the highest possible percentage of the forces and the equipment transporting landing troops and quickly and systematically crush their airborne landing.

The Ac-nhem incident (1944) is a typical example of a defeat suffered by airborne landing troops. This was the largest airborne landing campaign conducted by the British and American armies in World War II. The landing force consisted of two airborne divisions, the 82nd and 101st Divisions of the

United States, the 1st Airborne Division of the British army and a number of other units. Although a very large force consisting of more than 34,000 troops and more than 5,000 tons of weapons and equipment was landed, they encountered stiff resistance, suffered heavy losses and were unable to achieve the final objective of the campaign. The 1st Airborne Division alone suffered 7,600 casualties and 600 men were taken as prisoners, including the division commander.

On the Vietnam battlefield, in the war of resistance against the French, our army and people had to contend with airborne troops of the enemy. The French army conducted a total of 154 combat operations employing airborne forces, 7 of which involved more than 1,000 paratroops with the largest number of paratroops, 4,500, being used in the Dien Bien Phu campaign; however, they were always attacked by our army, consequently, these operations had a limited impact and usually did not achieve their objective. In the war against the United States for national salvation, the "heliborne" tactic with landing zones being prepared in advance by strong air forces or the secret transportation of troops from far away to make surprise landings in order to "seize upon and destroy" units of the Liberation Armed Forces was bankrupted by our army and people in 1963-1964 as seen in the battle of Ap Bac. In November, 1965, the first "air cavalry" division of the United States showed how powerless it was in the face of the combat art of our army in the Playme Valley. In the Route 9-Southern Laos campaign (1971), in its attack on the landing forces, which consisted of well trained units of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and the puppet paratroop division, our army killed many enemy troops and shot down 120 of their helicopters. These are good experiences that we must research, develop upon and utilize in a reasonable manner in defensive operations against airborne landings under the new conditions of a war to defend the fatherland.

Victory in defensive operations against airborne landings depends directly upon the preparations that are made, upon detecting and reporting the operations of the enemy and upon the command organization and the ability of the forces defending against the airborne landing to participate in combat coordination.

1. Preparations for fighting enemy troops that land by air can only achieve good results if they are made in an effective, well based, detailed and concrete manner before a war of aggression breaks out or before the enemy launches their airborne landing campaign. These preparations include predicting and determining the direction in which landings will occur, landing sites, the size of landings and the methods employed to make landings by the enemy; organizing the forces and the equipment that will participate in warfare (the campaign); drawing up various plans for fighting the enemy; and organizing coordination among the various forces, units, areas and localities in order to attack the forces being landed by the enemy.

In a war to defend the fatherland, our army and people must launch strong attacks against and annihilate the enemy on the frontline while looking for every way to protect the people, protect economic installations and maintain important areas in the rear, even deep within the rear area of the country. These needs reflect a common characteristic of modern war, namely, that the

distinction between the frontline and the rear area is only a relative one. For this reason, all units and localities, be they near the front or deep within our rear area, must be prepared to promptly retaliate against enemy airborne troops regardless of the size of their landing operation. These preparations must be made under unified guidance and a unified plan. Preparations must first be made at the key sites and in the most important directions and areas in order to be ready to rapidly crush campaign or strategic airborne landings by the enemy during the initial period of a war and prevent these landings by the enemy from putting us on the defensive, disorganizing us or causing us to lose our fighting strength. However, we should not allow our concern for key areas to cause us to give light attention to or ignore making preparations to destroy airborne units used by the enemy in commando or espionage operations, to attack and occupy public offices, railroad stations, warehouses and places at which prisoners are being held, to foment rebellion and so forth in our rear area. Making such preparations establishes true coordination with the frontlines and competently supports the frontlines so that they are free to fight the aggressor army on land, at sea, along the seacoast, on the islands and so forth.

One basic element in these preparations is to formulate various plans for fighting enemy troops landing by air. Every unit and every locality that has this task must formulate a plan for fighting enemy troops being landed by air. This plan must reflect the intentions of the enemy in landing troops, the ability of the enemy to land troops, the direction and areas in which the enemy might land troops, the targets of airborne landings and the depth behind frontlines that the enemy might land troops; it must also reflect our forces, means, tasks and the deployment and division of labor among our units as well as the coordination, fighting methods and command structure needed to fight enemy troops being landed by air and so forth. The plans for fighting enemy troops being landed by air can only be highly accurate and effective when they fully reflect the general combat determination and plan of the highest commander on each front, within each area and within each locality; when they are closely coordinated with the plans for defending against enemy air attacks, enemy attacks by sea and enemy attacks on the ground, with the plans for defending against enemy artillery attacks, tank attacks and commando attacks as well as enemy chemical attacks and electronic warfare and with the plans of the main force military corps and local armed forces for organizing battles and campaigns, etc.

On the basis of the plan that is formulated, it is necessary to organize forces (the campaign group) to defend against enemy airborne landings. In order to fight enemy troops that are staging an airborne landing, it is necessary to define the missions and the operations of units and forces, both stationary forces and mobile forces, army forces and militia and self-defense forces, the forces of ground units as well as the forces of the air defense and air force and the official force (formation 1) and the reserve force (formation 2). These forces, especially the mobile, main forces, which perform important missions, must hold maneuvers in the actual terrain on which they will be fighting. The main source of these forces is the various units and localities. Each unit and locality must organize its own defense and be ready to participate in the fight against enemy troops engaged in airborne landings as ordered by the upper echelon. The experience of the war of

resistance against the United States has shown that strong stationary forces are extremely important in attacking enemy forces engaged in an airborne landing as promptly as possible; on the basis of this fact, we deduced the following principle: the person that is stationary is the one that is most mobile.

On the basis of the plan that is adopted, a system of battle positions from which to fight enemy troops making an airborne landing must be organized. The size and the structure of these battle positions must be based on our estimations concerning the size of the enemy landing, the methods the enemy will employ and how far behind the frontline they will land as well as our own strategy and methods of fighting. The basic requirements that must be met when establishing the structure of these battle positions are to insure that our forces can simultaneously attack the main landing forces of the enemy; insure that a large force can quickly be moved to another position in order to fight the enemy; maintain favorable terrain in order to divide the enemy's force and prevent them from developing their offensive; attack the enemy in every direction, when they are near as well as when they are far away, etc. In particular, it is necessary to organize a firepower system that encompasses the entire airspace and territory on the ground that must be controlled. Where the ground is flat and the terrain poses few problems to enemy airborne landings, we can build and deploy trenches, holes, exploding obstacles, obstacles that do not explode and so forth in coordination with our firepower system at the battle position in order to annihilate airborne enemy forces while they are still in the air or as soon as they step foot on the ground.

One matter of decisive significance in seizing the initiative in combat operations against enemy airborne landings is that of insuring the secrecy of all preparations. We must take many measures to maintain secrecy, deceive the enemy, move our forces around, employ camouflage, engage in the electronic struggle and fully comply with the regulations on patrols, travel, guarding against spies, maintaining secrecy, using information equipment and so forth so that we can avoid observation and detection by the ground equipment, air equipment and electronic equipment of the enemy. Inaccurate information on the forces defending against a landing within the area of the landing was an important reason why the British and American forces suffered heavy losses in the Ac-nhem airborne landing campaign.

2. The more accurately and promptly the operations of enemy airborne troops are detected and reported, the more effectively the landing forces of the enemy can be fought.

One law governing the operations of landing forces is to keep all of their intentions and plans concerning the landing a secret until the very last moment and then make a surprise landing in the territory of the opposition in order to rapidly carry out their missions. However, the forces defending against an airborne landing can still ascertain, to some extent, the intentions and the plan of the landing force through the preparations that they make for each landing, especially campaign and strategic landings. There are many phenomena that can be used to determine the airborne landing plans and intentions of the opposition, such as air and ground reconnaissance by them in the area of the landing; their mobilization of landing forces, landing

equipment and combat forces; their training of landing units and the deployment of these units near airfields; support operations; the direct air or artillery attacks to prepare the landing area and so forth. The time needed to prepare for campaign and strategic size airborne landings is generally long, sometimes several months. During this time, the side defending against an airborne landing can, through close observation, detect the operations of the opposition, especially any signs that might indicate that a campaign or strategic airborne landing might be carried out at the same time as attacks on land or attacks at sea during the initial period of the war.

In order to quickly and correctly detect the preparations being made by the enemy for an airborne landing, we must make coordinated use of many sources of intelligence: strategic sources and tactical sources; military sources and civilian sources; local sources and distant sources; sources of human intelligence and intelligence provided by modern technical means; air force intelligence and intelligence provided by the other services; intelligence from materials on hand and newly received materials, etc. The reporting of intelligence information must be prompt, accurate and secret. One basic measure that can be employed to detect signs of an enemy airborne landing is to tightly manage the airspace during each period of time and in all kinds of weather through a clear, detailed division of area management among the various levels, units, branches and services and strict regulations and rules.

Deserving of attention is the fact that we must differentiate between real phenomena and accurate intelligence, on the one hand, and false phenomena and incorrect intelligence authored by the enemy, on the other hand. With the strong development of electronic technology, the enemy is fully capable of devising fake plans, establishing a fake command staff, organizing fake operations on the air waves and so forth for the purpose of deceiving the opposition with regard to the direction, the targets, the forces and the methods employed in an airborne landing. This demands that we be sharp and alert when examining and analyzing the activities of the enemy and that we filter the intelligence being received concerning the enemy.

Once the possibility of an enemy airborne landing become reality, the effort to detect and report the operations of the enemy must be carried out in an even more continuous and precise manner. In this stage, our control of the airspace in all directions over the battle positions from the front to the rear must be even tighter. It is necessary to establish close coordination between the systems of long-range detection and reporting by means of the observer, warning and transmissions stations of radar troops, national air defense troops, air force units, naval units and signal-liaison troops with the systems of short-range detection and reporting by means of the ground warning and observer stations of artillery forces, infantry troops, field air defense forces, militia units, self-defense forces and so forth. This involves a sharp electronic struggle between the side staging the landing and the side defending against the landing. Airborne landing forces generally make full use of all available electronic equipment and technical method to jam the electronic equipment of the opposition so that the forces defending against the landing are easily disoriented in their detection and reporting efforts and confuse that which is fake with that which is real. As a result,

the side defending against a landing must closely coordinate both electronic and optical equipment; fully comply with the provisions and regulations governing the use of reporting and warning equipment; protect information and reporting centers; and rapidly restore them to operation when attacked by the enemy in the course of combat, especially when the opposition is approaching the landing site.

By utilizing the high mobility of the air force, the side that is staging the landing can approach the target from many different directions, use unexpected flight paths, fly at an unexpected altitude and employ other technical and tactical methods to deceive the opposition and reduce the effectiveness of the opposition's reconnaissance, observation and detection. It is under such conditions that accurately and promptly detecting and reporting the main formation, the main direction of flight and flight path as well as the main landing forces and sites of the opposition when they are approaching their targets and accurately and promptly detecting and reporting major changes in the situation in the course of a landing become a major requirements in observing and assessing the enemy and insuring that the side defending against the airborne landing can attack the enemy from the time they are far away until they are near and can concentrate its strength for the purpose of rapidly defeating their landing.

3. The ability to organize and command attacks against enemy forces in the various stages of an airborne landing is manifested first by quickly detecting, accurately predicting and determining the main landing area of enemy forces while coordinating and making good use of available forces and means to counter-attack and attack the main formation, the main force of landing troops in a determined and timely fashion, thereby quickly crushing their airborne landing.

The true pinnacle of skill in organizing and commanding defensive operations against airborne landings is reached when an enemy airborne landing (especially an airborne landing at the start of a war of aggression) is thwarted in its infancy, is thwarted at the staging base of the airborne landing force. To accomplish this it is necessary to directly attack airfields and destroy the aircraft that have been readied for the landing. Direct attacks must also be launched on the positions at which they have concentrated their forces in order to destroy important contingents of the airborne landing force. Through the use of modern military technology, modern armies are fully capable of delivering these offensive blows by means of long-range means and weapons, such as strategic aircraft, missiles, assault submarines and so forth. The realities and the experience of the fight against the United States on the battlefield in the South show that with the strength of the people's war and its effective battle position, these offensive blows can be delivered by means of mobile forces and stationary forces, by means of ordinary forces and specially trained forces, by means of forces organized in advance and forces hastily organized and by means of medium and long-range modern weapons as well as short-range, less than modern weapons. Of course, the use of such forces, means and weapons for this purpose demands that the commander have access to very accurate intelligence information and make very accurate predictions concerning the enemy; that forces be mobilized and organized quickly; and that a specific, detailed plan

of action be established for troops and that this plan be under unified guidance extending from the campaign or strategic headquarters to the detachments that carry out combat missions.

Attacking landing forces as they are flying toward their target involves organizing and commanding operations to attack the enemy while they are still far away and as they approach. The full effectiveness of the air force and air defense troops must be employed to attack the enemy at this time. The air force has the ability to reconnoiter and attack the enemy while they are still far away, especially when they are still in airspace that lies beyond the range of our air defense firepower. Their main target at this time is the transport planes and the helicopters transporting the landing troops of the enemy. When the enemy approaches the airspace over the landing zone and comes within effective range of the air defense firepower system, air defense forces begin to play the key role. As a result, it is necessary to establish close coordination between air defense forces and the air force for the purpose of seizing and maintaining control in the air and concentrate our forces in order to destroy the transport planes and the helicopters carrying the landing forces of the enemy.

When the enemy reaches the airspace over the landing zone and carries out the landing is also a time when very urgent and decisive operations are conducted to resist the airborne landing. Ordinarily, airborne landings start with strong attacks by the air force against targets within the air defense system and the military bases and airfields of the opposition within the area through which their military transport planes will transport the landing force. The air attacks by the side making the landing cease a few minutes before the troops land and resume immediately after the landing has been completed in order to provide continued support to the landing force in combat. At this time, therefore, the matters of greatest importance to the forces resisting the airborne landing are to retaliate against the air attacks by the opposition to "soften" the area of the landing; maintain continuous command operations and be the masters of the situation; limit the losses caused by the enemy's air force to the lowest possible level and seize and maintain air control; correctly determine the main landing site and the location of the main landing forces of the enemy; promptly mobilize forces and employ the strength of the units within the area of the landing to rapidly annihilate enemy troops as they land.

The process of commanding attacks against airborne landings is the process of correctly and promptly employing many different methods of fighting, of changing and developing fighting methods in order to meet campaign and tactical requirements. This involves attacking aircraft as they are landing troops, attacking paratroops as they are floating in the sky and attacking troops being landed by aircraft as soon as they step foot on the ground. When landing troops reach the ground and before they are able to assemble themselves in a formation, our forces at the site must rapidly attack them and prevent them from organizing combat operations and occupying favorable terrain. The fatal weakness of airborne landing forces is that once they have landed in the territory of the opposition, they must have support from the air force and liaison with and support from the forces attacking from the main front. In commanding the attack on enemy landing forces, it is necessary to

take full advantage of this weakness and employ the various types of anti-aircraft firepower in order to destroy many of the enemy's combat aircraft; promptly cut the enemy force into numerous small components; prevent these small components from rejoining one another; prevent them from advancing to their target and joining their attacking forces on the ground; put them into a position in which they are encircled and isolated; and utilize the combined forces of the infantry, mechanized infantry, artillery, tanks, special operations troops, the air force and so forth to annihilate each of their components, especially the main one. In the case in which the enemy lands a very large force, it is best to encircle the enemy, prevent them from moving and then rapidly calling in mobile forces to destroy the enemy force. The use of mechanized infantry, tanks and armed helicopters to rapidly bring in forces and provide more assault power in this case is very necessary.

In order to increase the efficiency with which airborne landings are resisted, forces must be promptly organized to attack the air resupply forces of the enemy and attack the transport aircraft tasked with providing rear service support to the landing force so that the forces of the enemy that have landed and the landing operation of the enemy are worn down and annihilated.

4. The level of combat coordination in defending against airborne landings is a major factor controlling the effectiveness and efficiency with which the enemy is annihilated and their airborne landing is defeated.

This coordination involves combat coordination among many units, branches, services, forces and localities for the purpose of attacking enemy forces as they approach from far away, attacking them in many different areas of our airspace and territory and attacking them at different times, at different elevations and different ranges for the purpose of destroying many different types of targets while they are still in the air or have landed on the ground.

Combat coordination in defensive operations against airborne landings is manifested first in unified actions on the part of each and every unit and force participating in the defense against the landing in each area of operation and each locality in accordance with the established plan and under the unified guidance of the highest commander within the area. There must be close coordination between the air force and the national air defense troops in order to attack enemy forces as they approach from far away, attack them while they are still outside our airspace, attack them when they are within the airspace controlled by our air defense network and attack them regardless of the direction in which they are flying, regardless of the altitude at which they are flying. There must also be coordination between national air defense troops and the field air defense forces of the various branches and services, the local army and the militia and self-defense forces participating in the attack against the enemy when they arrive in the airspace over the landing zone. There must be coordination between main force infantry units and the units of the local armed forces and border security troops; between the units engaged in defensive operations near or within the area in which they enemy might land troops and units farther away; and between stationary units and the units that will be sent to the site of the landing to attack the enemy. There must also be coordination between infantry and mechanized infantry units and tank, artillery, air defense and armed helicopter units in order to launch an

assault upon enemy forces that have landed and regrouped, etc. This combat coordination is achieved in the air, on the ground, within each area and so forth. Herein lies the complex nature of combat coordination in defensive operations against airborne landings. This coordination must be very specific, detailed and precise. Therefore, improving the ability to coordinate in combat operations against airborne landings has become an objective requirement of the side defending against a landing. Combat operations against enemy airborne landings in a war to defend the fatherland are, in essence, modern combat operations, combat operations that are conducted by means of our combined strength.

To improve our ability to coordinate in combat operations against airborne landings, we must possess the necessary knowledge about combat operations against airborne landings, must be thoroughly familiar with the functions and tasks of the units, localities, branches and services in these operations and must, on this basis provide the necessary technical and tactical training as well as training in the command organizational requirements involved in combat operations against enemy airborne landings.

Our military theory and art consider campaigns against enemy airborne landings to be a form of counter-offensive campaign. Basically, the combat operations conducted against enemy airborne landings are offensive operations. We must take the initiative in attacking enemy forces as they approach from far away, while they are still outside our airspace, when they arrive in the airspace over the landing zone and when they actually conduct the landing and begin to carry out their combat mission. We must attack the enemy both in the air and on the ground utilizing every force and every weapon and means at our disposal. However, there might also be a number of defensive battles waged on the ground to prevent the enemy from developing their offensive and occupying favorable terrain. We can make preparations in advance for some campaigns against enemy airborne landings during the initial period of a war. We must find ways to utilize the strengths of the defense system within each area and zone and the strengths of existing forces and means, both stationary forces and mobile forces, especially the mobile equipment and modern firepower within the defense zone, in order to prepare for and wage a victorious campaign against an airborne landing.

An airborne landing by the enemy can begin with a land attack along the border coordinated with an airborne landing conducted along the seacoast shortly before or shortly after the ground attack is launched; it is also possible for a landing to be staged in our rear area in order to inflict damage upon our rear base and provoke domestic reactionaries. Therefore, a campaign (combat) against an enemy airborne landing is usually very closely linked to and coordinated with offensive campaigns, counter-offensive campaigns or defense campaigns as well as operations on land, along the border and along the seacoast against spies and commandoes for the purpose of maintaining political security and social order within our rear area and helping to victoriously carry out our strategy.

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PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEPUTY REPORTS ON LIFE OF TRIBESMEN

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Jan 83 p 3

[Excerpt from report by Y Pah (Y Mot), National Assembly deputy from Gia Lai-Kon Tum Province, at the Fourth Session of the Seventh National Assembly]

[Text] We highly appreciate the reports presented to this session which have dealt more clearly, specifically and profoundly with a number of problems concerning the mountainous provinces.

Producing two or three rice crops per year and applying the intensive cultivation method to increase the crops' productivity are ordinary things in the delta provinces. However, tribesmen in our province considered these tasks to be novelties bristling with difficulties because they believed that the winter-spring days and months were a rest period devoted to drinking parties and idle talks near the flame in the kitchens of their houses on stilts and that the farmland, buffaloes and cattle also needed rest and recreation just like the villagers!

Today the situation has changed. Farming is now carried out in two production seasons. The winter-spring crop has also been grown and the intensive cultivation method applied. The total cultivated area has been raised to 130,000 hectares and the gross grain output to 216,000 tons with an average per capita output of 330 kgs. The grain obligation to the state has been fulfilled and instead of having to ask for support as in the past, tribesmen have now a surplus which they can sell to have money to buy additional food and clothes.

The development of long- and short-term industrial crops will become a reality in our province.

In 1982, we had 3,600 hectares of peanuts, up 21 percent compared with 1981; 1,350 hectares of sesame representing an increase of 93 percent; 1,400 hectares of legumes showing an increase of 2.3 percent; 100 to 150 hectares of each of the following newly planted crops: tea, coffee, rubber and so forth.

In 1983, we will continue to concentrate primarily on the grain production front to steadily step up its production. We will try to increase the total cultivated area to 145,000 hectares and the gross grain output to 240,000 tons (35 to 40 percent of which to be constituted by subsidiary food crops) with an average per capita output of 350 kgs. At the same time, we will raise the peanut area to 4,600 hectares, the sesame area to 2,060 hectares, the tobacco area to 730 hectares, the sugarcane area to 1,850 hectares, the castor-oil plant area to 1,000 hectares, the cotton area to 390 hectares, the legumes area to 2,390 hectares, the tea area to 130 hectares, the coffee area to 450 hectares and the rubber plantation area to 200 hectares. We will create vast regions for the specialized cultivation of industrial crops in order to render a greater service to exportation. Our new concept is to use grain as a stepping stone to develop industrial crops and other strong points of a mountainous province.

For several years our province has concentrated on solving the tribesmen's clothing problem but has been unable to meet each individual's minimum need for blankets and some suits with a weaving pattern designed to his or her liking. We are launching a cotton growing and fabric weaving movement and urging each citizen to grow 20 cotton plants but are still experiencing numerous difficulties.

Concerning the above-mentioned two problems [farming and clothing], we will exert every effort from now to 1985 and we believe firmly that we will succeed on that score. Nevertheless, we suggest that the central level provide additional assistance:

--First, by investing capital, materials and technique in the development of short- and long-term industrial crops in both the state-operated and collective sectors with a view to creating conditions to fulfill the 1983 plan as I have just said.

--Second, by supplying fabrics, fiber, red threads, dyes and improved looms to tribal women to enable them to weave fabrics themselves according to the predilection of each tribe and also to exchange for many kinds of agricultural and forest products which tribesmen have always wanted. At the same time, these supplies will also make tribal women happy because according to our tribal customs and habits, a girl who does not know how to weave fabrics will probably have difficulty in finding a husband.

Apart from the above-mentioned two proposals, we hope that the central level will pay attention to making more capital, material and technical investments in the development of communication roads, bridges and sluices leading to the rural areas by applying the "state and people work together" slogan; that an appropriate policy will be promulgated to encourage the cultivation of subsidiary food crops and the purchase and processing of their products and that additional conditions and means will simultaneously be created to carry out educational, cultural and artistic activities intensively and extensively in the regions inhabited by tribesmen--especially the Meo highlands and the former revolutionary bases.

9332
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PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEPUTY REPORTS ON SERICULTURE, FAMILY PLANNING

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Jan 83 p 3

[Excerpt from report by Nguyen Thi Dinh, National Assembly deputy from Ho Chi Minh City, at the Fourth Session of the Seventh National Assembly]

[Text] To promote the movement to grow mulberry, rear silkworms, cultivate cotton and weave fabrics--occupations that are carried out in a scattered fashion by individual households--, we suggest that the state define quickly and more specifically the various policies, systems and regulations on the following subject matters: lands reserved for mulberry and cotton cultivation, mulberry strains, silkworm breeds and product distribution and consumption.

The Vietnam Women's Union will continue to coordinate closely with the Ministry of Agriculture to best implement the advice by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Pham Van Dong at the November 1982 Conference on Sericulture that women all across the country should be urged to grow mulberry, rear silkworms, cultivate cotton and weave fabrics in a scattered fashion in order to achieve partial self-sufficiency in clothing requirements and contribute to the successful fulfillment of the 1983-85 state plan target of 15 to 16 million meters of fabrics and silk.

Family planning is a problem having a direct effect on the equilibrium of the national economy. Though childbirth is associated with the happiness of each woman and the life of each family, it is completely not a personal affair of each woman and each family. By nature, childbirth is a major social problem of strategic significance and great importance to the very existence and development of the entire nation and society and is also an urgent question of national welfare and people's livelihood both at present and in the future.

According to reckonings by economists and demographers, to stabilize living conditions--not to speak of improving and raising them--, if the population increases by 1 percent, grain production must increase by 2.5 percent and the gross national income by 4 percent. In Vietnam, from 1976 to 1980, the yearly rate of population growth was 2.5 percent while grain production increased by only 1 to 2 percent and the gross national income by less than 4 percent. It is thus clear that our population

growth rate is not yet rational and corresponding to the existing conditions and that this situation is one of the reasons for the current difficulties in our life.

At present, our population is growing at the rate of 2.3 percent. If the family planning movement is maintained at the present level, the norm of 1.7 percent will not be achieved by 1985. Therefore, the family planning movement must undergo a vigorous and profound change. Besides the good methods, sound measures and valuable experiences in our possession, we would suggest the following necessary tasks:

1. Uniformity of Ideological Concept: The entire party, people and army must thoroughly understand the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress: Intensifying the family planning movement is an extremely important task of strategic importance from the socio-economic point of view which deserves the greatest attention and direct concern from party and administration organizations at all echelons and which is not a personal affair of the public health sector and the Women's Union.
2. Uniformity of Organization and Management: We suggest that the state set up a national commission on population and family planning to help the central level guide the nationwide family planning policy. In conformity with the spirit of Directive No 29/HDBT of the Council of Ministers, unit chiefs at all levels and in all sectors must be responsible for ensuring the implementation of family planning norms.
3. Uniformity of Action: In organizing the implementation of this policy, it is necessary to apply uniformly all propaganda, motivating and educational measures as well as those of an administrative, economic, scientific and technical nature.

To achieve the 1.7 percent target by 1985, a key factor is a rigorous leadership to be exercised by party committees and the administration at all levels. Each member of the Party and the Communist Youth Union must self-consciously implement family planning and consider it a responsibility to the fatherland. Mass organizations must consider family planning to be one of the themes of their tasks. All economic and occupational organs, localities, collective organizations and so forth must consider family planning to be part of their political mission and must be determined to implement family planning just like other legally compulsory norms.

In 1983 and throughout the 1980's, the Vietnam Women's Union will resolutely step up the family planning movement in order to realistically contribute to fulfilling the tasks indicated in the 1983 state plan and to ensuring a splendid development of our country in the future.

9332
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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

EMULATION MOVEMENT TO FULFILL HAIPHONG 1983 PLAN LAUNCHED

Hanoi QUAN DOT NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 2 Jan 83 p 1

[Article: "Haiphong Holds Meeting on New Year's Day, Determined to Achieve Success Right in the First Months and First Quarter"]

[Text] (VNA) On the morning of 1 January 1983, at the Municipal Theater Square, the party committee, people's committee and the Fatherland Front Committee of Haiphong City held a New Year's Day meeting to praise last year's emulation achievements, and launch an emulation movement to fulfill the 1983 state plan.

In attendance were 15,000 persons, including delegates of socialist labor collectives, heroes and emulation warriors, representing nearly 1.3 million people and the armed forces of the city; Doan Duy Thanh, party Central Committee alternate member and municipal party committee secretary; Nguyen Dan, people's committee chairman and Nguyen Manh Ai, Municipal Fatherland Front Committee chairman.

Do Muoi, party Central Committee Political Bureau member and vice chairman of the Council of Ministers arrived from Hanoi for the ceremony.

After praising last year's accomplishments and pointing out the city's main mandatory objectives for 1983, Nguyen Dan, on behalf of the municipal party committee and people's committee, called on the city's military and people to carry out the resolution of the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee, achieving unity and unanimity of views and exploiting last year's success, so as to make outstanding achievements in productive labor in the very first days and months of the new year, and to contribute to fulfilling the 1983 state plan with success. On behalf of the Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers, Do Muoi enthusiastically praised the party organization, the people and armed forces in Haiphong for fostering socialist heroism and the tradition of "loyalty, bravery and determination to win," and for achieving unity and unanimity of views in overcoming difficulties and successfully fulfilling the 1982 state plan.

Do Muoi stressed the importance of carrying out the state plan for 1983, the "pivotal" year of the 5-Year Plan (1981-85), as well as the direction, concrete objectives and major policies in guiding and developing plans for

1983 and for the next 3 years, as defined by the 3d Plenum of the Party Central Committee. Then Do Muoi asked the Haiphong party organization and people to take advantage of the strong points of the port city--early growth of many industrial production sectors, skilled workers, current strong changes in agricultural production and fisheries, etc.--to generate the momentum necessary to carry out state plans for 1983 and coming years.

The meeting passed a telegram to be sent to the party Central Committee, the National Assembly, the State Council and the Council of Ministers, pledging that in response to the call by the Seventh National Assembly in its fourth session, the entire party, armed forces and people in Haiphong will resolutely strive to fulfill the 1983 state plan in an outstanding manner, and to contribute, along with the whole nation, to the successful carrying out of the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress, as well as the two strategic tasks of successfully building socialism and defending the Vietnamese socialist fatherland.

9213
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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

A BUSES, CORRUPTION IN GRAIN DISTRIBUTION DEMAND ACTION

Hanoi DOC LAP in Vietnamese 29 Dec 82 p 5

[Investigative report by Ha Chau: "About the Question of Grain Distribution"]

[Text] As we know, grain is an essential commodity item in everyday life. Good distribution of grain is an effective way to reduce the difficult part in the lives of cadres, workers and people. The grain sector is concentrating its efforts on this job. In Hanoi alone, the four urban wards' grain offices each month distribute a considerably large quantity of grain to buyers whose eligibility is set by regulations.

For the first time many grain stores in Hoan Kiem, Ba Dinh, Hai Ba Trung and Dong Da Wards and in the towns of Gia Lam, Van Dien, Yen Vien, etc. have made improvements in their sales procedures to create convenience for customers.

But for the time being, the sources of grain supply for the municipality are far from stable, with the quality of noodles and rice being sometimes good and sometimes poor. And particularly the fact that there is a very great difference between the state supply prices and the free market prices is becoming an "attraction" for those who want to make profit and creating many negative aspects in the grain distribution job. These negative aspects, which are created not only by the cadres and civil servants in the grain sector but also by customers and quite a few organs, enterprises and work sites eligible for grain distribution, are quite serious.

From Within...

In the grain sector, everywhere -- in sales locations, storehouses, etc. -- there are either some or many cases of violations of the grain management and distribution procedures. In Hoan Kiem Ward, where the public opinion recognizes there has been much improvement lately in its grain distribution, whenever supplemental points were added to its grain management policy and

unless control was strict, employees of the stores could easily take advantage of any loopholes to obtain personal gains. For instance, as it recently happened, the state adopted the policy of making adjustments of grain quantities in the case of the people who have reached the age of 18 and either do not have a job yet or no longer go to school, for the purpose of encouraging them to fulfill their labor obligation toward society. Ngoc D., a professional employee of the grain store at No 6 Hang Bong Tho Nhuom Street, went to the families who were served by the store to collect food ration books which he said would be "cut" in accordance with the new regulation. What Ngoc D. actually did was to bring those books to the store where the pay-transfer coupons were taken out and to return them later to the above-mentioned households. By a coincidence, Mrs Nguyen Thi Hong residing at 61 Tuc Mac Alley discovered that Ngoc D. had taken out 20 kilograms of pay-transfer coupons from her grain-purchase book. Later they discovered that within more than a month, through professional manipulation, Ngoc D. "took out" from 38 such books 560 kilograms of the people's pay-transfer coupons and put them into her own pocket.

In Ba Dinh Ward, people are still waiting for the attitude and handling by the responsible organ of the case of 7 employees of the store at 16 Chau Long Street who colluded with Thi D., a merchant hiding behind the "services" label, to collect books from and to buy grain for the families in Nghia Dung Subward being unable to do so because of small family size. When the store received a shipment of good rice and noodles, those 7 employees gave to Thi D. right in the first days of the distribution period a quantity of rice and noodles equivalent to purchases with 90 grain-purchase books, which were then replaced with the poor-quality rice and noodles for sales to book holders, for her to sell for profit in the open market.

At Phuong Lien Subward in Dong Da Ward, a group of people's inspectors who recently checked weighing and measuring in the store there found that an employee, Nguyen Thi L., was delivering less weight per ma of goods to customers and getting 1-2 kilograms each time. With undeniable evidences, she had to sign on the official report and promised to return to the 31 households involved the quantities of grain she had taken from them by cheating. But the fact that is worth mentioning here is that an inspection of the storehouse showed that the entire quantity of grain taken from customers had been secretly shipped out of the store. And that was the case of 31 lucky customers being found during the investigation, while other cases of cheating and underweight deliveries committed by Nguyen Thi L. in a year's time remained largely unknown and were yet to be figured out.

Also in Dong Da Ward, Lai Thanh Nh., an employee of the Tau Bay grain store, stole the grain-purchase book of Hotel K. L. and bought 350 kilograms of rice, which he later sold outside of the store. Blinded by gains, he again

"embezzled" the grain-purchase book of N. T. Machine Enterprise, replaced its cover with a new one on which he wrote the name of another organ and attempted to buy 700 kilograms of grain, but his criminal act was detected.

From Customers

Customers are people eligible for supply of grain as determined by regulations. Any negative aspects that take place usually arise from false statement aimed at getting larger grain rations. This form of cheating can vary: workers in organs, work sites, enterprises, etc. who have joined the army, gone abroad to study or been laid off, even those people who have fled abroad or are dead for some time, still have their names in the books for purchase of grain each month.

This situation is quite common where there are collective mess halls serving large numbers of people, schools operating right inside factories and mostly construction sites.

In Hai Ba Trung Ward, there are 365 organs, enterprises and work sites that have been issued grain-purchase books. An investigation in only 4 units resulted in the discovery and saving for the state of 23 tons of grain each month which otherwise would be wrongly dispensed. An outstanding case was that of the Industrial Construction Corporation (Hanoi Building Service) which had 42 people whose names were included in its grain-purchase book but who have either been transferred or left or died, and yet their grain rations were not cut off. Those 42 people continued to get such rations for a total of 1,811 months and received from the state a total of 16 tons and 619.5 kilograms of grain! That amount of grain was enough for a class of 42 technical worker-trainees for 3 and one-half years or enough to feed 1 worker for 68 years and 4 months!

What is worth mentioning here is the fact that those cases were not "occasional" violations of the grain policy committed by some workers or ordinary working people who do not know policies and the law very well. In many cases, it was discovered in investigations that the wrongdoings were the "positions" of fully responsible cadres. They wanted to commit the wrongdoings in order to have "more leeway to act" as they usually explained to their subordinate-level cadres and civil servants. Even some cases of cheating were committed by the cadres in charge. Four such cases, for instance, took place in machine works N. (in Dong Da Ward). V. V. T. was a guard eligible for 17.5 kilograms per month and later became an administrative office deputy chief, but for 20 months no adjustment was made in regard to his grain ration. D. H. K., a former deputy manager who later became permanent union officer in the factory, for 15 months still received his grain ration as if he remained in the position that directly involved production. P. X. S. who got 20.5 kilograms per

month when he was working directly in production still got that grain ration 20 months after he was transferred to the position of Youth Union secretary. D. V. Ph., who 12 months ago was promoted from the position of deputy manager to that of assistant director, still did not adjust his grain ration yet.

Furthermore, a number of workers in the factory denounced the latter for having made a secret deal with a number of students who had graduated and left the area by buying their grain rations and having sold more than a ton of rice outside of the factory, with the money resulting from the sales being spent on feasting and celebration.

The negative aspects in the distribution of grain occurred not only in organs, enterprises and work sites but also in the collective economic sector. According to investigation data gathered by the grain sector of Hai Ba Trung Ward, the ward as a whole had 8,000 members of small industrial and handicraft cooperatives being eligible for buying grain from the state. But an investigation conducted on the basis of Document 2800 of the Council of Ministers showed that there were in the ward 3,414 persons who were not cooperative members but were eligible for buying grain. Thanks to that investigation, each month the state now does not have to sell 37,425 tons of grain.

Thus it is obvious through those investigations that customers have also been responsible for many negative aspects in grain consumption that was not in conformity with regulations and led to the loss of a considerable volume of grain for the state.

Some Thoughts About Grain Distribution

To have strict grain management and to serve customers well is the objective that the Hanoi grain sector strives to achieve. Whenever there appear negative aspects in distribution, it always takes a good look and tries to handle them. Through this action it exerts educational effects on its cadres and civil servants and brings about prevention of negative aspects. But the public opinion also pointed out that in a number of cases of violations, the attitude of some echelons in the municipality's grain sector toward handling them was far from really strict and fair. According to rumors, the case of "swindling" 560 kilograms of pay-transfer coupons by store employee Ngoc D. (in Hoan Kiem Ward) is now under consideration by the ward's grain office, which will decide whether to prosecute her or to accept an internal solution. Or about the case of Lai Thanh Nh. (Dong Da Ward), who twice stole grain-purchase books, although in all of its aspects the case should be referred to the legal authorities for criminal prosecution, the Dong Da Ward grain office resolved it by only asking him to "quit" his job. As to the cases that were brought to trial in court, in the case of Cao Thi Bich Loc (Dong Da Ward) for instance, who had masterminded the theft of 1.6 tons of pay-transfer coupons, she

only got a suspended sentence of 8 months of imprisonment and a fine of 13,000 dong! Bich Loc's honest coworkers who had seen her newly-built house valued at hundreds of thousands of dong had this joke to say: "Bich Loc is still very much in the black!" Or in the case of store employee Nguyen Thi L., although the Phuong Lien Subward People's Council has approved a motion recommending that she should be kicked out of the grain sector, the Dong Da Ward grain office is still reluctant to do so.

The state policy on grain has a significance of both economic and political value. All organs, enterprises and us people must correctly implement it. Any units that deliberately make false statements out of a lack of responsibility to get grain must be severely punished. In addition to returning the quantities of grain that they got in excess of their rations or in violation of regulations, the heads of these units must be responsible to the state as Decree No 182-CP of the Council of Ministers on the four principles of responsibility indicates.

No matter how strict the grain sector's management procedures and measures may be, they cannot guarantee that people will correctly observe them and seriously carry them out unless there is strict control.

The grain sector has for some time recommended the adoption of permanent, periodical and unexpected control procedures. Many inspector-cadres worked devotedly and conscientiously; as a result, they succeeded in preventing in time many violations of the grain distribution procedures.

But at the present time, inspector-cadres are still under the supervision of ward grain office chiefs. Consequently, the objectivity of inspection is limited. We have learned that in reality, after the cases of grain distribution corruption were discovered, the inspector-cadres involved have been isolated, encountered difficulties while carrying on their duties or received hints from their superior echelons that they would be switched to other work. Is it then advisable to place the sector's inspector-cadres in some arrangement in the ministry's hierarchy? Along with the system of specialized inspectors, we should expand and coordinate it with the network of people's inspectors in subwards so as to create additional "ears and eyes" and thus to limit the negative aspects of grain distribution.

In the last few years, our inspection work discovered a number of cases of corruption in grain distribution and brought them to trial in law courts. There were not so many major cases of corruption in general, but in almost all stores there were employees who cheated by giving inaccurate weights and measures and cuts and colluded with dishonest business people to make profits. Some employees who were new in the grain sector and yet by cheating customers were able to lead the lives of well-to-do families. Others were

able to buy or build their houses and to buy television sets and refrigerators valued at hundreds of thousands of dong. The majority of the people are condemning this situation and hope that the Hanoi grain sector finds it necessary to check into the sources of income of those store employees who have quickly become "rich" like that!

5598

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AGRICULTURE

HA NAM NINH SENDS 13,000 PERSONS TO NEZ'S

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Jan 83 p 1

[Article: "Ha Nam Ninh--In 1982, Over 13,000 People Took Part in Building New Economic Zones"]

[Text] (VNA) In 1982, Ha Nam Ninh Province sent 2,532 households totaling 13,269 persons (including 6,918 laborers) to build new economic zones, fulfilling 128 percent of the assigned norms.

Learning from 1981 experiences, the Ha Nam Ninh Committee For New Economic Zones has arranged for key cadres and representatives of cooperative members of localities having prospective departees to make an advance visit to new economic zones to inquire about the terrain and climate, and carefully to prepare conditions for resettlement. Along with Minh Hai Province, Ha Nam Ninh Province has extended ties of brotherhood to districts and villages, thereby acquiring comprehensive support from the local people and enabling the resettlers to become stable, gain assurance and enthusiastically take up production. As a result, in 2 campaigns, 1,268 households totaling 6,592 persons (including 3,672 laborers) in Ha Nam Ninh have volunteered to go to Minh Hai for resettlement.

In just 1 year, resettlers from Ha Nam Ninh have harvested 22,560 tons of paddy. According to estimates, up to 25 percent of the households have gathered from 3 to 4 tons of paddy, and the lowest amount has exceeded 1 ton.

Ha Nam Ninh compatriots have also volunteered to go to Lam Dong, Gia Lai-Cong Tum and Kien Giang Provinces to build their new homes, and contribute to expanding production and developing culture.

Among the Ha Nam Ninh departees there were 113 party members, 250 teachers, 30 public health cadres and 45 scientific and technical cadres....

Last year, Ha Nam Ninh Province also invested 12 million dong, built and updated 35 water conservancy, communications and agricultural works, and expanded the new economic zones within the province. The districts have sent 573 households, including 1,052 laborers, to cooperatives specializing in planting rush and tea in the new economic zones of Con Thoi (Kim Son District)

Nghia Dien (Nghia Hung District), Bach Long (Xuan Thuy District), and Yen Son (Tam Diep District).

This year, Ha Nam Ninh continues its investments in the expansion of rush and tea new economic zones and in the creation of an apricot area in Kim Bang district.

9213
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HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

BRIEFS

CONSTRUCTION OF AN DUONG BRIDGE--(VNA) On the morning of 1 January, Haiphong City began building An Duong Bridge across the Lach Tray River, linking urban wards to Route 5. Measuring 222 meters in length and 15 meters in width, it is one of the biggest existing or planned Haiphong bridges. An Duong Bridge is one of the key 1983 projects in Haiphong. Do Muoi, a member of the party Central Committee Political Bureau and vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, attended the ground breaking ceremony. Haiphong City has drawn up plans for mobilizing the combined strength of all local sectors and main building and assembling forces and concentrating it on the bridge, so that the bridge can be dedicated by next year's National Day, 2 September 1984. [Text] [Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Jan 83 p 1] 9213

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LIGHT INDUSTRY

CONFERENCES REVIEW WORK IN JOINT COOPERATIVE SECTOR

Hanoi DOC LAP in Vietnamese 29 Dec 82 p 6

[Article by Anh Xuan: "An Important Step Forward"]

[Text] In September and November, the Joint Small Industry and Handicrafts Cooperatives of Ho Chi Minh City held two important conferences to review the task of strengthening the management of cooperatives and production teams using the "evaluation criteria system." The two conferences at the same time praised the small industry and handicrafts cooperatives and production teams in the wards and precincts for having fulfilled the 1982 plan in only 9 and 10 months.

This year the small industry and handicrafts sector of Ho Chi Minh City has scored a great victory: by September 1982 the sector as a whole has reached the value of production of 1 billion 600,000 dong, as compared with the goal set for the entire year of 1982 of 1 billion 900,000 dong. It felt it could easily overfulfill the plan and therefore set the target for its efforts of over 2 billion dong in value of gross production by the end of 1982.

The gradual increases in the past years showed the turnovers being 338 million dong in 1977 and increasing to 1.438 billion dong in 1981 and the work force in the entire sector being 100,000 in 1977 and increasing to over 165,000 people in 1981. With 14,659 production installations, the small industry and handicrafts sector of Ho Chi Minh City became the main-force army that manufactured consumer goods for the municipality and the entire country. In this force there were 206 cooperatives and 2,209 production teams totaling 90,000 members, playing a backbone role in production and each year accounting for 50 percent of the value of gross production in the entire sector.

However, beside the above-mentioned positive aspects, there also were negative deeds resulting from the fact that the strengthening of management was not achieved in time, the guidance for drafting projects and plans was far from appropriate and the managerial capabilities of the collective installations were

still poor and weak, which created loopholes to allow the negative aspects of the capitalist spontaneous way of doing work to exert bad effects on the market and society. Most outstanding was the fact that product quality was declining as the result of cuts of raw materials, illegal deals, cheating, etc. Most serious was the very poor quality of bicycle products and parts, the demand of which was increasing everyday; it would take a long time to restore the confidence of customers that was lost because of this quality problem!

In such a situation, one of the focal points of the 1982-1983 work of the municipality's joint cooperative sector is to quickly overcome the state of working carelessly, sloppily and dishonestly. To do so, we must consolidate the collective production sector in every way from the way to conduct business to morality and virtues and at the same time strengthen control over the private installations.

The September and November conferences of the municipality's joint cooperative sector were really aimed at that purpose. To reorganize the management of cooperatives and production teams, superficial mobilization and empty arguments would not be enough, but we must turn to what was really being done to achieve consolidation. Through guidance, trial work and the real experience of a number of installations a concept was formed as to how to evaluate management through the "evaluation criteria system." This system contains the generalized criteria for evaluating the hard-core and most basic jobs in connection with the management of a small industry and handicrafts cooperative or production team. These are the essential jobs to be done that every cooperative and team member must understand and do, ranging from organization, supervision to plan management and technical, materials and financial management, as well as political and ideological work and work related to everyday life. According to the temporary rules of the joint cooperative sector, there are 36 and 27 criteria for evaluation of cooperatives and production teams, respectively. These criteria can be considered a creation of this municipal sector. We need only to use these criteria to check on a permanent basis, to guide the management work of cooperatives and production teams in the right direction and in conformity with the policy and to ensure scientific management on the basis of promoting democracy. For instance, the management boards of cooperatives or production teams must be reelected at the specified time; the financial situation of funds must be made public, the plan for distribution of income to members must be approved by the higher echelons in the joint cooperative sector; 100 percent deliveries of products to the state in accordance with the signed contracts must be ensured; there must be no stealing of electric power, no reduction of raw materials due to cheating, etc.

With these 36 (for cooperatives) and 27 evaluation criteria (for production teams), both the control components at the upper level and the members of

cooperatives and production teams at the lower level can evaluate a cooperative or production team in the way it has worked or moved correctly or has committed any violations and give it a rating -- outstanding, good, average or poor. (Thanks to these evaluation criteria, the municipality has discovered over 300 "ghost" cooperatives and production teams and is now in the process of revoking their permits and dissolving them.)

Although in the initial stage the application of the "evaluation criteria system" naturally does not bring about satisfactory results immediately, it has prevented negative acts, cheating and violations of the democratic process within the production collectives and gradually puts an end to the "half socialist, half capitalist" way of management that suits one's convenience, or the "socialist" shell and "capitalist" innards, that has appeared in quite a few cooperatives and production teams.

Before the end of the year, on the basis of past experience, the municipal joint cooperative sector will suggest the application of the "evaluation criteria system" to the small industry and handicrafts households operating on an individual basis, thus gradually limiting the way of doing business for profits and the dishonest way and step by step persuading the individual operators to join production teams and cooperatives. For we know that the individual work force in the small industry and handicrafts sector in Ho Chi Minh City remains a large one -- in the last 9 months it produced over 600 million dong worth of goods on the market (accounting for 40 percent of the total value of gross output of 1.6 billion dong of the entire sector in the first 9 months of 1982).

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LIGHT INDUSTRY

SHORTCOMINGS OF SMALL INDUSTRY, HANDICRAFTS SECTOR DISCLOSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Jan 83 p 2

[Article by Le Chi Tiet, president of the Federation of Small Industry and Handicrafts Cooperatives in Ho Chi Minh City: "Quantity and Quality of Small Industry and Handicrafts Production in Ho Chi Minh City"]

[Text] In 1982, the volume of small industry and handicrafts production in Ho Chi Minh City attained the gross output value of 2.3 billion dong, surpassing the plan norm (of 2.2 billion dong) by 4.54 percent and showing an increase of 59.5 percent over the norm achieved in 1981. Though still unable to take full control of all the merchandises of the small industry and handicrafts sector, the state has controlled 60 to 70 percent of them in the precincts and districts. In the first 9 months of last year, 15,051 contracts were signed [between the state and this sector] with a settlement value of more than 4 billion dong and showing--in comparison with the same period in the previous [1981]--an increase of 19.2 percent in the number of contracts and an increase of 217.2 percent in the value of merchandises contracted-ordered by and sold to the state. In 1982, the value of export goods came to 225.6 million dong--up 103.6 percent over 1981. Some 20,000 laborers were engaged by the sector in 11 months but a number of them left afterward so that the actual increase was only 10,660 people. The current total number of laborers is 177,885 who are working in 25,353 production installations including 208 cooperatives, 2,189 labor cooperation teams and 22,956 private and individual installations. From between 150 and 200 dong some years ago, the average monthly income of each cooperative member rose to between 600 and 700 dong in 1982.

The merchandises produced by the small industry and handicrafts sector in the city belong to thousands of groups each of which includes dozens of different kinds. However, the quality of the goods manufactured is still a matter of concern. In matters of product quality, no compromise should be made under the pretext that there are peculiarities such as the everchanging multiformity of merchandises, the scattered situation of production, the nonuniformity of technical equipment, the instability of material supplies, the frequent need to exploit and fully use discarded materials and so forth.

Under the same circumstances, there are, however, certain merchandises of fairly good and relatively stable quality such as the three- and six-moldboard plows, trailers and water tanks manufactured by the Dong Tam Machinery Cooperative; the grain grinders of the Gia Dinh Machinery Cooperative; the internal combustion engine spare parts of the Que Huong Machinery Cooperative; the barges of the 2-9 and Phuong Nam Cooperatives and the Tien Tien Labor Cooperation Team; the clippers and multiblade knives of the Ly Thuong Kiet Machinery Cooperative; the desk lamps of the Quyet Tien Cooperative; the electric fans of the Nhat Quang Cooperative and Ngoc Giao Production Installation; the tires of the Tan Binh and Dong Tam Rubber Production Teams; the electric irons of the Duong Van Bo Production Installation; the welding sticks of the Ba Quang Production Installation; the soldering irons of the Ba Quang Production Installation; the wooden toys of the Duc Minh Production Installation; and the handicraft and fine art items including small-bamboo blinds, items made of rattan, ordinary bamboo and leaves, embroideries, knitted articles as well as 15 types of goods shown at the Economic-Technical Achievements Exhibition in Giang Vo, Hanoi. These merchandises have won decorations.

Ranking among the consumer goods of alarmingly low quality are bad quality bicycles (especially their frames, chains, cogwheels, ball bearings, inner tubes and tires); utensils made of too thin aluminum sheets; soaps having too low a fat acid content compared with the fixed standard; sub-standard toothpastes; alcohols with the intoxicating element ratio exceeding the fixed limit; fish sauce and others whose protein content is far under the fixed percentage; thinly woven fabrics and clothes made contrary to conventional sizes; reed mats and lacquer ware whose quality has dwindled, etc. Another grievance is the fact that merchandises bearing the trademarks of state-operated or foreign manufactures have been circulated with the aim of cheating buyers. The existence of bad and bogus merchandises has caused heavy losses, especially the stagnation of goods in warehouses, the immobilization of capital and the waste of social wealth.

The manufacture of bogus merchandises with the objective of making a great profit is a criminal act which deserves severe punishment. These illegal business methods are usually accompanied by other negative practices such as tax evasion, refusal to register one's business and trademark, cutting down the fixed amount of raw materials used in making goods, resorting to underhand dealings to take away the state-owned materials and so forth.

There are many reasons for the decline in product quality. First to be mentioned is the fact that equipment and machines are very insufficient, disparate and old, that material supplies and raw materials do not conform to stipulations and classifications and that discards have been used profusely. But the main reason is a failure to pay due attention to product quality and to consider it a matter of ethics and conscience for the producer and of vital importance to small industry and handicrafts production. In addition, the new socialist production relationships have not yet been strengthened firmly, the individual and private sector has sometimes expanded spontaneously because of a slack management and certain installations and producers with a tendency to make a great profit have manufactured

bad or bogus merchandises and stolen the raw materials entrusted to them under contract. The technical management and product quality control network in the small industry and handicrafts sector is still too weak and cannot yet build up and put its activities into the right track.

On the other hand, we must speak of the improper implementation of economic policies and managerial measures which has also had an effect on the state of product quality. In the course of replanning production and issuing trade licenses, there has been a tendency to allow the overdevelopment of certain businesses and trades without taking into consideration the possibility of striking a balance among supplies, raw materials and technical conditions and without thinking of the need to formulate production projects anew. Too many individual and private installations have spontaneously started business activities without having the necessary industrial conditions and regardless of the product quality standards.

The contract ordering of goods and the purchasing and pricing methods have been managed loosely. Though having the same ability to produce and to ensure product quality, many cooperatives and labor cooperation teams have not been granted contracts while other private and individual installations have signed contracts [to produce goods for the state sector] or been allowed to purchase products. Worse still, a number of cooperatives have been reduced to acting as satellites of private and individual installations because they want to provide employment and income for their members. Since quality standards have not been mentioned clearly in economic contracts, this loophole has been taken advantage of by bad elements to produce poor quality merchandises and to steal raw materials. Because contractual prices have been fixed uniformly without regard for the grades of product quality, they cannot yet have the effect of encouraging the producer to heighten product quality. In the field of market management, no hard struggle has yet been conducted against the bad habit of circulating bad, phony and smuggled merchandises. Moreover, many state commercial shops and those belonging to the Federation of Small Industry and Handicrafts Cooperatives have accepted consignment goods which are of low quality or which bear bogus foreign trademarks.

In the near future, the guidelines to be followed to intensify control over product quality are to step up propaganda and education to make all producers aware of their duty to ensure product quality; to link the task of ensuring product quality with the struggle aimed at socialistically transforming all trades within the small industry and handicrafts sector and at reforming and replanning production and, on this basis, to manage product quality along economic-technical lines; to set up a network to manage technique and to control product quality; to strengthen control over product quality and to consider quality standards to be legally compulsory regulations as well as criteria for evaluating and examining emulation achievements; to increase equipment, improve professional skills, apply technical innovations, formulate stable technical regulations and so on.

The Political Bureau resolution on the tasks in Ho Chi Minh City has pointed out: With regard to small industry and handicrafts, it is necessary to cooperativize them or to combine them under various forms of joint business between the state and small industry and handicrafts households and to try by all means to use and develop production potentials--especially the professional and technical skills of handicraftsmen--, bearing in mind, however, the need to constantly educate them and to carry out criticism and struggle to overcome their negative aspects. By carrying out their activities according to the above-mentioned guideline, the guidance organizations from the ward, village, precinct and district levels to the Cooperatives Federation in the city will be able to promote production development, to obtain a higher product quality and to put an increasing large amount of merchandises into the hand of the state. The strengthening of the Cooperatives Federation's organizations at all levels through the appointment of cadres with managerial abilities is an urgent demand aimed at fulfilling the mission entrusted in the present stage.

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TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

RAILROAD SECTOR PLAN FOR 1983 DETAILED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 2 Jan 83 p 1

[Article: "In 1983, Railroad Sector Improves Transportation Quality, Ensures Safety, Serves Passengers Better"]

[Text] Preparing enthusiastically for carrying out the 1983 plan, the railroad sector held a conference to review last year's achievements.

In 1982, despite difficulties in fulfilling plans for production, and transportation of goods and passengers, the entire sector has achieved specific results in many fields--raising gross output value, striving to improve capital construction and loading and unloading capabilities; maintaining and achieving moderate progress in managing the organization, making it sounder, ensuring relative security, as well as safety for commodity transportation and for material and technical bases. However, the most outstanding accomplishment lay in raising the value of production output and industrial repairs, thus enabling the sector to attain from 108 to 112 percent of the plan.

Nevertheless, during the past year, the railroad sector still experienced shortcomings in many respects--flawed management; lack of a balanced, firm and consistent plan; shallow basic research and economic analysis; and proliferation of negative evidences. Last year, there still were regrettable instances of loss of safety and breaches in discipline, causing damage to state properties as well as passenger lives and properties. Striving for 1983 goals, the railroad sector has assigned concrete tasks to its components--train departures and arrivals on schedule; safety on all trains and lines; and determination to fight negative evidences. All cadres, workers and civil servants are being asked to contribute realistically to repair work, raising material and technical quality, achieving economy, increasing income, lowering costs and fighting loss of revenue with efficiency.

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